WIPE THE STATE OF ISRAEL OFF THE MAP--AND EVERY OTHER STATE, TOO!
A Review of Michael Neumann's
The Case Against Israel
By Mark R. Crovelli
[Editor's
Note: Michael Neumann's comments on this review may be found at the
end of the article. Readers are requested to remember, that despite
the author's rhetoric of calling for the destruction of all states,
voluntaryists seek to delegitimize the very idea of the State through
education, and we advocate the non-violent withdrawal of the cooperation
and tacit consent on which all State power ultimately depends.]
Michael
Neumann, a professor of philosophy at Trent University in Ontario, Canada,
has offered the world an absolutely indispensable book for understanding
the complex and propaganda-ridden moral issues surrounding the state
of Israel. The Case Against Israel
(2005, Counterpunch/AK Press) presents a brutally logical argument against
the Zionist program that ultimately culminated in the establishment
of the "Jewish state," as well as a devastating critique of
Israeli expansion and aggression in the decades since its founding.
In an age when virtually anyone can be scalded with the "anti-Semite"
branding iron simply for questioning acts of the Israeli government,
Neumann's book offers a refreshingly honest and indeed courageous analysis
of the real moral issues involved. [1]
This
review will be broken into two relatively focused sections. In the first
section, I recount Neumann's basic claim in Part I of the book that
Israel is an "illegitimate" state--a claim that is both brilliantly
argued and exceedingly convincing. In the second section I take
issue with Neumann's claim that, even though the state of Israel
"has no legitimate foundation," it would nevertheless be "wrong
to try to destroy [illegitimate states such as Israel], not because
it would be wrong if they vanished, but because the attempt would, in
fact, have dreadful consequences." [2]
ISRAEL IS
NOT A LEGITIMATE STATE
Unlike
the majority of journalists, politicians and philosophers, Michael Neumann
does not assume that the years preceding 1948 (with the exception of
the Holocaust) are off-limits for moral scrutiny. On the contrary, Neumann
takes the position that the founding of Israel in Palestine had (and
continues to have) important moral implications for the conflict that
subsequently developed between Palestinians and Israelis. Hence, Neumann's
analysis begins with the question of whether the Zionists were morally
justified in their quest to create a "homeland" in Palestine.
In
order to answer this question, Neumann first tackles the oft-overlooked
question of what the Zionists meant when they spoke of creating a "homeland"
for the Jews. The answer, as Neumann piercingly observes, is that when
the Zionists spoke of a "homeland" for the Jews, what they
had in mind was a sovereign state for Jews; that is, a government
run for and by Jews:
[The
Zionists] did not come simply to find refuge from persecution. They
did not come to 'redeem a people.' All this could have been accomplished
elsewhere, as was pointed out at the time, and much of it was being
done elsewhere by individual Jewish immigrants to America and other
countries. The Zionists, and therefore all who settled under their auspices,
came to found a sovereign Jewish state. [3]
This is no
trivial point--especially for all the non-Jews who lived in Palestine
before the founding of the so-called "Jewish state." Indeed,
for non-Jews who were already living in Palestine, the implication of
creating a new sovereign state run for and by Jews was that they would
be subject to a government they never asked for and that would operate
expressly on the behalf of people other than themselves:
[Living
under Jewish sovereignty] means that Jews have a monopoly on violence
in the areas they control. …A Jewish state is simply a state where
Jews are firmly in control and where that much is recognized. Within
its borders, Jews hold the power of life and death over Jews and non-Jews
alike. That is the true meaning of the Zionist project. [4]
The
morality of the founding of a "homeland" for the Jews, therefore,
must be appraised in the light of the fact that this meant the creation
of a state--a government--that was to be run for
and by a certain ethnic group, and despite the wishes of all the people
who would be subject to its power. The consequences of creating a state
run for and by Jews, and that would have power over non-Jews as well,
were, according to Neumann, virtually sealed. The creation of such a
state could not have been viewed as anything other than a grave threat
to all non-Jews already living in Palestine who would be subject to
its jurisdiction. In the first place, as Neumann cogently observes,
the non-Jewish population of Palestine could expect a government that
would expressly not govern on their behalf:
[The
Palestinians] realized that many thousands of people, with whom they
had had no contact and to whom they had done no wrong, had come and
were coming from thousands of miles away to establish a state of
their own in as much of Palestine as they could get. …Because
[the Palestinians] were not Jewish, they would not partake of sovereignty
in this state: whatever its constitution, things would be arranged so
that Jews had the deciding say, at the very least in all matters the
Jews decided were of vital importance. Ultimately, 'the Jews' would
hold the power of life or death over the Palestinians. [5]
Moreover, the
creation of a state run for and by Jews had the obvious implication
that the Jews would eventually try to rid Palestine of non-Jews:
The
Zionists had often portrayed themselves as the leaders of 'one people,'
the Jews, who wanted Palestine for themselves. They might, when politically
useful, provide reassurances about their intentions. But clearly, they
could not very well have Palestine for themselves without ridding it
of its present inhabitants. The Palestinians, therefore, had good reason
to fear an ethnic conflict in which extermination became far from unimaginable.
And this is in fact how sentiments have evolved.[6]
The idea that
the Palestinians would eventually have to be removed from Palestine
was, moreover, confirmed by many remarks made by Israel's founding generation,
as well as the early establishment of a militant civilian
settler movement to colonize Palestinian lands.
The
Palestinians thus had good reason to fear, not the Jews per se,
but the establishment of a state--an apparatus of power and coercion--that
would be run for the benefit of and by Jews alone. Facing this grave
threat to their freedom and property from the establishment of the Jewish
state, the Palestinians were justified in attempting to resist the imposition
of a foreign power over them that they neither wanted nor asked for.
As
for some of the more common arguments advanced to defend the creation
of the Jewish state, Neumann offers devastating rebuttals. With Rothbardian
eloquence and logic, Neumann skewers the idea that the Jews had a "historical
right" to Palestine: "In territorial disputes, one might expect
the Greeks to fare better than the Jews, because the Greeks' rule and
subsequent presence [in Palestine] were both longer and stronger. Yet
if the Greeks claimed much of the Eastern Roman Empire, including Turkey,
they would be suspected of insanity. And the Italians? How much of the
Roman Empire is rightfully theirs? These claims, one may safely say,
have been lost." [7] Neumann similarly bulldozes the idea that
Jews have a biblical right to Palestine [8], the idea that the Holocaust
in some way justified the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine [9],
and the idea that the Jews were acting in self-defense when they founded
the Jewish state. [10]
The
conclusion that Neumann draws from all this is that the Zionist project
to establish a Jewish sovereign state, and which did indeed culminate
in the establishment of the state of Israel, was morally illegitimate:
Zionism
always was, despite strategically motivated denials to the contrary
and brief flirtations with other objectives, an attempt to establish
Jewish sovereignty over Palestine. This project was illegitimate. Neither
history nor religion, nor the suffering of Jews in the Nazi era, sufficed
to justify it. It posed a mortal threat to the Palestinians, and it
left no room for compromise. Given that the Palestinians had no way
to overcome Zionism peacefully, it also justified some form of violent
resistance. [11]
Note that Neumann
is not claiming that the Jews had no right to seek refuge during or
after the Holocaust, nor even that they were in the wrong to seek to
live together in Palestine. On the contrary, the sole reason why Israel's
founding was illegitimate, according to Neumann, was that the project
was intended from the start as an attempt to assert "ethnic sovereignty"
over land that was already occupied by Palestinians:
It
may have been justified to try and save the lives of Jewish refugees,
but that never justified the state of Israel or the intention to establish
it. Had the Zionists not been Zionists, had they asked for nothing more
than the right to seek refuge in a land rather than rule it, matters
might have been different, but they weren't. [12]
From these
observations, Neumann concludes that "Israel has no legitimate
foundation." [13]
ALL STATES ARE ILLEGITIMATE
- GOOD RIDDANCE TO THEM ALL!
Having
brilliantly and convincingly argued that the state of Israel has "no
legitimate foundation," one expects Michael Neumann to wrap up
Part I of the book by denouncing the very existence of this illegitimate
state. Indeed, since the state of Israel was born out of the morally
illicit intention to either boot out or subjugate the non-Jewish population
in Palestine to an ethnically "Jewish state," the most obvious
solution to the moral challenge posed by this state would be simply
to get rid of it.
Neumann
is not willing to go this far, however, and he dismisses the idea of
getting rid of the state of Israel, (or most other "illegitimate"
states, for that matter), because the consequences of attempting
to get rid of it would be "dreadful." [14] It is at this point
that I must object to Neumann's otherwise brilliant argument, for his
argument against getting rid of the state of Israel is extremely weak,
inconsistent, and ultimately undermines the rest of his superb "case
against Israel."
In
order to see why, it is important to first note that Neumann's argument
does not spring from any moral opposition to the elimination of the
state of Israel per se. On the contrary, he takes a rather sanguine
view of Israel's disappearance or destruction:
If Israel collapsed simply because it lost external and internal support,
nothing wrong would have happened. Nor would it be wrong to destroy
Israel as a political entity if its continued existence would have even
worse consequences… .[15]
Neumann goes
on to explain that his objection to the elimination of the state of
Israel is ultimately based upon the assumption that the consequences
of attempting to do so would be "dreadful":
In
some ways, the more cynical Zionists are right: Israel's foundations,
even if every single allegation of ethnic cleansing is completely accurate,
are no worse than those of most other states. Virtually no state has
legitimate foundations, and in that sense virtually no state has a right
to exist. In theory, therefore, everyone has a right to interfere with
the existence of those states. In practice, however, such 'interference'
is almost never justified…This is because the cure of destruction
is in practice worse than the disease of illegitimate existence. In
practice, wiping out a powerful state such as the U.S. or Israel would
cause even more suffering than letting it survive. More important, attacks
on these states would almost certainly be unsuccessful and merely add
to the evil of illegitimate existence the much more serious evil of
catastrophic warfare. So Israel, like any other illegitimate state,
does for all practical purposes have the right to exist. It would be
wrong to try to destroy these states, not because it would be wrong
if they vanished, but because the attempt would, in fact, have dreadful
consequences. [16]
Neumann's
objection to the elimination of the state of Israel is thus wholly dependent
upon the unproven assumption that the consequences of attempting to
get rid of it would be far worse than allowing it to continue to exist.
This assumption, however, is completely unjustifiable. The consequences
of attempting to get rid of or actually getting rid of the state of
Israel not only need not be "worse" than allowing it to continue
to exist, but need not be "bad" at all.
In
the first place, whether or not the consequences of attempting to get
rid of the Israeli state would be "dreadful," slightly bad,
or even wonderful depends upon who you ask. Sure, if you ask a would-be
Israeli settler hoping to expropriate a house that is currently owned
by Palestinians, he is indeed likely to deem the consequences of attempting
to get rid of the Israeli state as "dreadful." He is likely
to view any such attempt as a serious threat to his goal of robbing
a Palestinian of his home using the Israeli military as his means. If
you ask the Palestinian who is facing eviction from his ancestral home
by one of the most well armed and aggressive militaries in the
world whether it would be "dreadful" if people attempted to
get rid of that military and the civilian government that directs it,
I find it doubtful that you would get the same answer. Or, suppose you
were to ask the people of Gaza in all their current wretchedness whether
"wiping out a powerful state such as the U.S. or Israel would cause
even more suffering than letting it survive"--does anyone really
believe that they would answer affirmatively?
The
second problem with claiming that the elimination of an illegitimate
state such as Israel would "cause even more suffering than letting
it survive" is that the claim depends upon what time period one
is talking about. It is indeed true that attempts to rid the world of
aggressive, murderous and illegitimate states can
cause a great deal of short-term suffering--possibly even more suffering
than would have been caused by allowing the illegitimate and murderous
states to survive. But, what justification could there be for only considering
the short-term consequences, while ignoring the possible long-term consequences
of getting rid of such states? After all, the consequences of
ridding the world of an illegitimate and oppressive state in the long-run
could far, far outweigh the short-term suffering that some people
might have to endure to throw off the yoke of an illegitimate government.
Were people to succeed in destroying an illegitimate and oppressive
state, who could predict how much suffering this would prevent, and
for how many years--or even centuries? And this problem is compounded
by the fact that, because one cannot legitimately compare
one person's suffering with another person's [17], it is not possible
to make objective judgments about how much suffering
would be caused by either decision. One cannot say, for example, "attempting
to overthrow the Israeli state would cause X amount of suffering, while
letting it survive would cause Y amount of suffering" because there
is no common unit of "suffering" one could use to make such
a judgment. [18] All one can justifiably say in such a case is that
either course of action is likely to cause some suffering, and, since
we are not omniscient, we are not in a position to know which course
will objectively cause more. [19]
These
considerations bring us to a third problem with Neumann's claim that
overthrowing or attempting to overthrow an illegitimate state would
"cause even more suffering than letting it survive"; namely,
that not all attempts to overthrow an illegitimate government are unsuccessful--or
even violent. The outcome of an attempt to overthrow an illegitimate
government depends upon many factors, but is chiefly dependent upon
the ideas held by the people involved. Indeed, since "illegitimate"
governments (and "legitimate" governments, too, if such a
thing is indeed possible) are always composed of a minority of the population,
their continued existence is wholly dependent upon the ideas held by
the mass of people who fund the state; that is, the taxpayers. [20]
Should the taxpayers come to believe in sufficient numbers that the
state is indeed illegitimate, there would be virtually nothing that
the members of the state could do to perpetuate their parasitical existence,
short of killing off the very people on whom they depend for funding.
At that point, the illegitimate state would very quickly wither and
die of its own accord, and without the need for violence or suffering
of any sort. The point here is simply that the outcome of an attempt
to overthrow an illegitimate state such as Israel need not involve violence
or suffering at all, (e.g., 1989, in some former Soviet republics),
and this fact seriously calls into question Neumann's weak defense of
Israel's "right to exist." For, if it is indeed possible to
overthrow Israel without violence and suffering of any kind, then ought
we not to promote precisely this outcome, since it is "not a legitimate
state?"
Another
problem in this same vein is that to judge a person's right to defend
himself against an illegitimate government based upon the amount of
suffering he might cause and his likelihood of victory would lead us
to stupefyingly counterintuitive conclusions. Indeed, the main conclusion
that would follow from such a proposition would be that those people
who are oppressed by the most powerful illegitimate states would have
less of a right to attempt to overthrow them than those people who
are oppressed by relatively less powerful states. For, the more powerful
and oppressive a state is, ceteris paribus, the more difficult
it is to overthrow it, and the more likely that suffering and death
will result from the attempt. Hence, we would be forced to conclude
that the people of, say, Jordan would have a better moral claim to attempt
to overthrow their illegitimate government (because the likelihood of
victory against the relatively weak Jordanian government is higher and
the likelihood of widespread suffering lower) than the people of, say,
Palestine (because the likelihood of their victory over the vastly more
powerful and aggressive Israeli state is significantly lower, and the
likelihood of widespread suffering much greater). But, what kind of
moral theory would we have on our hands, if it permitted or even condoned
the overthrow of weak and less oppressive states, while it imbued the
most oppressive and powerful states with a macabre form of legitimacy,
simply because they cannot be easily overthrown, and because they threaten
to inflict severe suffering on any and all who should try?
All
of the preceding considerations lead us inexorably to the most important
question of all; namely, why ought we to try to justify the existence
of "illegitimate" states at all? Why not simply call a spade
a spade, and call for the complete elimination of these murderous, thieving,
and liberty-destroying institutions that we call "states?"
Why not advocate anarchism, since, as Michael Neumann brilliantly observes,
"virtually no state has legitimate foundations, and in that sense
virtually no state has a right to exist?" There is some truth in
the claim that eliminating the state of Israel alone
could lead to horrendous bloodshed and possibly even widespread ethnic
warfare and ethnic cleansing in the Middle East. All the more reason,
then, to call for the elimination of all
states in that region, and beyond. It would be hard to claim that, say,
Mubarak's government, or the Saudi oligarchy, or especially Ahmajinedad's
Iran has a stronger "right to exist" than the Israeli government,
so why not go ahead and call for the complete elimination of all
these murderous and oppressive institutions from the world?
The
anarchist solution to the Israeli-Palestinian morass has been given
short shrift, mainly due the repeated calls by various hypocritical
governments in the Middle East that have called for "wiping the
state of Israel off the map." This has given many people the impression
that calling for the elimination of the Israeli state is some sort of
anti-Semitic ploy to rid the Middle East of Jews. The anarchist, however,
calls for the elimination of all
murderous, thieving, and intolerable governments--including the so-called
"Muslim" ones. His position derives from the recognition that
governments qua governments are always immoral and "illegitimate,"
and that mankind does not need government in order to live together
in peace, security and prosperity. [21]
The
Israeli government is only one of a long and despicable list of "illegitimate"
and murderous institutions that thrives on stolen money (i.e., "taxes"),
war and domination. Good riddance to all
of them.
CONCLUSION
The
aim of this review is certainly not to skewer Michael Neumann's The
Case Against Israel. On the contrary, the book is one of the few
truly honest and valuable works to be published since Israel's founding.
This review is only intended to take Neumann's brilliant argument to
its logical conclusion, which is to call for the elimination of all
states, including Israel and the United States, which would rid the
world of the institutions that are responsible for the kinds of atrocities,
suffering and death that Neumann so vividly and accurately chronicles
with respect to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute.
[Michael Neumann,
author of the book under review, offered the following comments via
email on December 2, 2009:
Even
if you had omitted the generous praise, I would have been delighted
with the review. I suppose, these days, it takes an anarchist to really
understand how important, and how ominous, it is to impose a state on
someone. That's too bad, because even if you believe states are necessary,
you ought to understand how ultimately frightening they are. Only Hobbes
really got that right.
You
get me at a very busy time of year and I can't give you anything like
the comments the review deserves. Forgive a few superficial points,
the product of a hasty read.
I
wasn't quite sure whether you took my defense of Israeli statehood beyond
what it was. Though you certainly appreciated that it was limited, I'm
saying the only reason not to destroy the Israeli state is that
too much blood would flow. That settlers or other might feel
the abolition was a disaster, would not concern me in the slightest.
As
for your rebuttal, the points are well taken, but I am not convinced.
In particular, even accepting that some
states can go more quietly, I cannot for a moment suppose that Israel
would go without either prolonged warfare that killed hundreds of thousands,
or a nuclear conflagration. I concede it possible that, in the long
run, the continued existence of Israel might be even worse, but long-run
possibilities are very uncertain, much more so than Israel's probable
reaction to a serious military assault in the immediate future. Long
story short, I think that tilts the case against trying to destroy Israel.
I
have always rejected anarchism, not because I'm deaf to its objections
to states - not at all - but because I am too pessimistic about human
conduct to believe in the prospects for non-states. This isn't an argument
we can resolve. Meanwhile I can only thank you for a critique as carefully
constructed and executed as I could ever ask for.]
End Notes
[1] For a devastating
critique of the liberal use of the "anti-Semite" slur to undermine
any criticism of Israel, see in particular, Norman G. Finkelstein,
Beyond Chutzpah: On the Misuse of Anti-Semitism and the Abuse of History
(Berkley: University of California Press, 2005). Finkelstein's merciless
bulldozing of Alan Dershowitz's The Case for Israel
is especially entertaining and instructive.
[2] Michael
Neumann, The Case against Israel
(Petrolia, Cal.: Counterpunch/AK Press, 2005)., p. 90.
[3] Ibid.,
p. 36. It is worth recalling in this connection the recurring demand
of various Israeli administrations for the Palestinians and various
Arab governments to recognize Israel as a "Jewish state" as
a precondition for even talking with them.
[4] Ibid.,
loc. cit.
[5] Ibid.,
p. 42
[6] Ibid.,
p. 44. On the idea that the Palestinians had good reasons to fear their
eventual removal from Palestine, see pp. 41-66.
[7] Ibid.,
p. 71. For the full refutation of the "historic right" argument,
see pp. 67-76.
[8] Ibid.,
pp. 73-76.
[9] Ibid.,
pp. 76-79.
[10] Ibid.,
pp. 79-86.
[11] Ibid.,
p. 86.
[12] Ibid.
p. 88.
[13] Ibid.,
p. 89.
[14] Ibid.
p. 90.
[15] Ibid.,
loc. cit.
[16] Ibid.,
loc. cit.
[17] On this
problem, see especially, Murray N. Rothbard, "Toward a Reconstruction
of Utility and Welfare Economics," in The Logic of Action One:
Method, Money, and the Austrian School
(London: Edward Elgar, 1997).
[18] Ibid.
[19] On yet
another level, the claim that governments ought to be allowed to continue
to survive "in the name of peace" (Ibid., loc cit.) is completely
blind to the historical reality that the modern state is the most
murderous institution ever created by man. For the modern state's death
toll, (170 million people), see R. J. Rummel, Death by Government
(New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1994).
[20] Ettienne
de la Boétie, The Politics of Obedience: The Discourse of Voluntary
Servitude, 2nd ed. (New York: Black Rose Books, 1997).
[21] On anarchism
as the only consistent and defensible ethical system, see in particular
Murray N. Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty
(New York: New York University Press, 1998)., Hans-Hermann Hoppe,
The Economics and Ethics of Private Property: Studies in Political Economy
and Philosophy, 2nd ed. (Auburn, Ala.: Ludwig von Mises Institute,
2006)., and Anthony de Jasay, The State
(Indianapolis, Ind.: Liberty Fund, 1998). For further studies on "free
market anarchism," see, inter alia, Hans-Hermann Hoppe,
ed., The Myth of National Defense: Essays on the Theory and History
of Security Production (Auburn, Ala.: Ludwig von Mises Institute,
2003)., Gustave de Molinari, The Production of Security, trans.
J. Huston McCulloch, Occasional Papers Series
(New York: Center for Libertarian Studies, 1977)., David Friedman,
The Machinery of Freedom: Guide to Radical Capitalism
(New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1978)., Morris Tannehill, Tannehill,
Linda, The Market for Liberty
(San Francisco: Fox & Wilkes, 1993)., and Murray N. Rothbard,
For a New Liberty (New York: Macmillan, 1973).