Watcha Gonna Do?


Excerpts from a Speech by Gene Sharp

[Editor’s Note: Gene Sharp is the doyen of nonviolent thinkers. Born in 1928, he founded the Albert Einstein Institution in 1983. Its mission, an extension of his life’s work, is to advance the study of nonviolent action. His 3 volume work, THE POLITICS OF NONVIOLENT ACTION (1973) came to my attention shortly after The Voluntaryists was begun in 1982. Many forms of non-electoral strategies dovetailed with the voluntaryist opposition to the Libertarian Party. George Smith alluded to these alternative methods of displacing State power in his “Party Dialogue.” Gene Sharp’s fundamental belief is aligned with the voluntaryist insight and can be traced back to Etienne de LaBoetie’s DISCOURSE OF VOLUNTARY SERVITUDE. “Every power structure relies upon the subjects’ obedience to the orders of the ruler(s).”

Articles about nonviolence have appeared in THE VOLUNTARYIST since its inception. The major ones include:

Issue 1: Book review of Sharp’s THE POLITICS OF NONVIOLENT ACTION
Issue 3: Book review of Sharp’s GANDHI AS A POLITICAL STRATEGIST
Issue 9: Francis Tandy, “Methods”
Issue 26: Murray Rothbard, “The Voluntaryist Insight”
Issue 27: Jerry Tinker, “The Power of Nonviolent Resistance”
Issue 125: “Voluntaryist Resistance”
Issue 128: Issue 128: “Without Firing A Single Shot: Voluntaryist Resistance and Societal Defense.”

On December 7, 2012, Gene Sharp received the Right Livelihood Award. The following text is an excerpt from his acceptance speech delivered before the Swedish Parliament in Stockholm. The speech had no title, so I have chosen an expression from his concluding remarks to identify it. Parts of the speech were reprinted in The Albert Einstein Institution’s December 2013 newsletter, “Nonviolent Struggle.” A video presentation can be found on the worldwide web at http://www.rightlivelihood.org/sharp_speech.html.]

Violence in our world is so common and mostly accepted without question that at times it seems to be a permanent part of reality. Those of us who want the future to be different are often relegated to a role of irrelevant objectors, able only to dissent, but unable to achieve a change away from the heavy role of violence in political practice. This situation can lead us to accept that reliance on violence is inevitable and beyond our control. That conclusion is a great error.

During the past century and long before, at times, people have found another way to fight when they needed to struggle for various objectives. In those limited situations the use of violence shrank or disappeared. The violence had been replaced with nonviolent struggle.

Nonviolent struggle, or nonviolent action, includes three categories of methods. The methods of nonviolent protest are symbolic activities, such as marching and the displaying of certain colors. This technique also includes the more powerful methods of noncooperation such as social boycotts, labor strikes, economic boycotts, and political noncooperation, including civil disobedience. There are also the methods of nonviolent intervention and disruption, such as sit-ins, fasts, and the creation of new institutions.

This technique is identified by what people do, not by what they believe. Such actions have been used against diverse types of opponents, including employers, governments, and dictatorships. Rarely an individual takes such action, but almost always it is a group; scores, hundreds, thousands, or even millions of people acting together.

Throughout the centuries people have waged this type of conflict with modest effectiveness. The past resisters have had limited knowledge and understanding of the operation of the technique. There were no guidebooks on planning strategy, nor even lists of “dos and don’ts”. Sometimes this type of conflict was used where it was not expected, for example, in Nazi-occupied Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, elsewhere, and even in Berlin to save Jews during the Holocaust.

It was once thought that the peoples of Eastern and Central Europe would be living under Communist rule for decades, barring a Western military intervention. Now, the peoples of Poland, East Germany, the former Czechoslovakia, and other countries are recognized as having freed themselves without a war of liberation.

Perhaps most remarkable of all are the little nations of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Their brave guerrilla wars were fought against both Nazi and Soviet rule, and all three Baltic states had been annexed as republics of the Soviet Union. Following their own improvised methods of nonviolent protest and new strategic understanding gained from my then new book CIVILIAN-BASED DEFENSE, they exited the Soviet Union with minimal casualties.

In early 2011 the predominantly nonviolent victorious revolutions against long entrenched autocratic regimes in Tunisia and Egypt launched the “Arab Spring.” The struggles were stunning in their mass mobilization, nonviolent discipline, fearlessness, and speed.

Now there is a widespread growing hunger for knowledge about nonviolent struggle, fueling an increased demand for publications and other resources. New and old books are revealing a technique of great power with insights into its history and understanding of how it operates. The Arab Spring and other developments have let the genie out of the bottle and it cannot be put back again. The knowledge of how to cast off oppression nonviolently is now known and is spreading.

The dramatic increase in media attention to our work at the Albert Einstein Institution in the wake of the Arab Spring revealed an amazing new reality. Nonviolent struggle is finally receiving the serious attention and consideration it has long deserved. Also, it should be noted that the several dozens of reporters from various countries who contacted us already had an accurate basic understanding of nonviolent struggle. None of them had the old misunderstandings that were nearly universal in past years. Long-standing misconceptions about nonviolent struggle have included that it can only be successful against gentle opponents, that it requires a charismatic leader, that it only “works” by conversion, that in order to keep the required nonviolent discipline it is necessary that resisters believe in moral nonviolence or pacifism, that wise action requires a single strategic genius, such as Gandhi, and that violence works quickly, while nonviolent struggle takes forever.

We now know that those earlier misconceptions that limited the relevance of nonviolent struggle are false. Effective nonviolent struggle is now known to be more possible than earlier believed. Nevertheless, almost all governments retain their irrational faith in the omnipotence of violence, and therefore drag their people into disasters. However, we now know that the disasters caused by violence in political conflicts are not inevitable. My writings and those of others show that power in political conflicts is derived from identifiable sources. All of these sources are rooted in the obedience, cooperation and assistance of people and their institutions. When that cooperation and obedience are withdrawn, oppressive regimes are left without the support necessary for their continued rule.

But despite this more accurate understanding and growing recognition, challenges remain. We now know that people need to learn how to plan a wise strategy for their struggle. If the hard-won gains achieved by nonviolent struggle are not to be later stolen, as they were in Russia by the Bolsheviks in 1917 and in Iran by the Ayatollahs in 1979, it is necessary to learn how to block such efforts. It is important that the achievements and failures of nonviolent struggles be accurately documented for the historical record and not forgotten or misrepresented after the immediate crisis has passed. It is necessary to learn how to block foreign military intervention, whatever the real motive, that can derail the collapse of the oppressing regime and help it to maintain its rule. Foreign military assistance can also give the foreign forces major control of both the on-going struggle and the future society. Instead of accepting military intervention, the nonviolent struggle movement needs to intensify its self-reliant efforts to paralyze or disintegrate the oppressive regime.

Much has been learned about the nature and potential of nonviolent struggle. And there is still a lot to be learned. Many dangers remain. Major efforts are required to spread the knowledge of how to defeat those dangers and how to increase the effectiveness of nonviolent struggles. A future of domination, the rule of violence, and popular helplessness is not inevitable!

I once lived in a not-very-fancy area of Brooklyn, in New York. And when you get in a conversation with people there, it always ended, “So whatcha gonna do?” And it’s not only the people of Brooklyn in that section who had that experience; that their efforts had never succeeded.

But now people around the world are not thinking, “So whatcha gonna do?” No, [now they are asking,] “What’re we gonna do?” It’s a different attitude. They’re learning how to do it and how to achieve, and we hopefully have played a small role in that if we want to do it in the future. We now have the knowledge needed to block that sad future, if we have the will to use it. We are at a new stage in the practice of nonviolent struggle and in the recognition of its potential. If we take wise and responsible steps in the coming years, the future will reveal achievements beyond all that we can now even imagine.

On the Duty of Civil Disobedience


by Henry David Thoreau

[1849, original title: Resistance to Civil Government]

I heartily accept the motto, “That government is best which governs least”; and I should like to see it acted up to more rapidly and systematically. Carried out, it finally amounts to this, which also I believe — “That government is best which governs not at all”; and when men are prepared for it, that will be the kind of government which they will have. Government is at best but an expedient; but most governments are usually, and all governments are sometimes, inexpedient. The objections which have been brought against a standing army, and they are many and weighty, and deserve to prevail, may also at last be brought against a standing government. The standing army is only an arm of the standing government. The government itself, which is only the mode which the people have chosen to execute their will, is equally liable to be abused and perverted before the people can act through it. Witness the present Mexican war, the work of comparatively a few individuals using the standing government as their tool; for in the outset, the people would not have consented to this measure.

This American government — what is it but a tradition, though a recent one, endeavoring to transmit itself unimpaired to posterity, but each instant losing some of its integrity? It has not the vitality and force of a single living man; for a single man can bend it to his will. It is a sort of wooden gun to the people themselves. But it is not the less necessary for this; for the people must have some complicated machinery or other, and hear its din, to satisfy that idea of government which they have. Governments show thus how successfully men can be imposed upon, even impose on themselves, for their own advantage. It is excellent, we must all allow. Yet this government never of itself furthered any enterprise, but by the alacrity with which it got out of its way. It does not keep the country free. It does not settle the West. It does not educate. The character inherent in the American people has done all that has been accomplished; and it would have done somewhat more, if the government had not sometimes got in its way. For government is an expedient, by which men would fain succeed in letting one another alone; and, as has been said, when it is most expedient, the governed are most let alone by it. Trade and commerce, if they were not made of india-rubber, would never manage to bounce over obstacles which legislators are continually putting in their way; and if one were to judge these men wholly by the effects of their actions and not partly by their intentions, they would deserve to be classed and punished with those mischievious persons who put obstructions on the railroads.

But, to speak practically and as a citizen, unlike those who call themselves no-government men, I ask for, not at one no government, but at once a better government. Let every man make known what kind of government would command his respect, and that will be one step toward obtaining it.

After all, the practical reason why, when the power is once in the hands of the people, a majority are permitted, and for a long period continue, to rule is not because they are most likely to be in the right, nor because this seems fairest to the minority, but because they are physically the strongest. But a government in which the majority rule in all cases can not be based on justice, even as far as men understand it. Can there not be a government in which the majorities do not virtually decide right and wrong, but conscience? — in which majorities decide only those questions to which the rule of expediency is applicable? Must the citizen ever for a moment, or in the least degree, resign his conscience to the legislator? Why has every man a conscience then? I think that we should be men first, and subjects afterward. It is not desirable to cultivate a respect for the law, so much as for the right. The only obligation which I have a right to assume is to do at any time what I think right. It is truly enough said that a corporation has no conscience; but a corporation on conscientious men is a corporation with a conscience. Law never made men a whit more just; and, by means of their respect for it, even the well-disposed are daily made the agents on injustice. A common and natural result of an undue respect for the law is, that you may see a file of soldiers, colonel, captain, corporal, privates, powder-monkeys, and all, marching in admirable order over hill and dale to the wars, against their wills, ay, against their common sense and consciences, which makes it very steep marching indeed, and produces a palpitation of the heart. They have no doubt that it is a damnable business in which they are concerned; they are all peaceably inclined. Now, what are they? Men at all? or small movable forts and magazines, at the service of some unscrupulous man in power? Visit the Navy Yard, and behold a marine, such a man as an American government can make, or such as it can make a man with its black arts — a mere shadow and reminiscence of humanity, a man laid out alive and standing, and already, as one may say, buried under arms with funeral accompaniment, though it may be,

“Not a drum was heard, not a funeral note,
As his corse to the rampart we hurried;

Not a soldier discharged his farewell shot
O’er the grave where our hero was buried.”

The mass of men serve the state thus, not as men mainly, but as machines, with their bodies. They are the standing army, and the militia, jailers, constables, posse comitatus, etc. In most cases there is no free exercise whatever of the judgement or of the moral sense; but they put themselves on a level with wood and earth and stones; and wooden men can perhaps be manufactured that will serve the purpose as well. Such command no more respect than men of straw or a lump of dirt. They have the same sort of worth only as horses and dogs. Yet such as these even are commonly esteemed good citizens. Others — as most legislators, politicians, lawyers, ministers, and office-holders — serve the state chiefly with their heads; and, as the rarely make any moral distinctions, they are as likely to serve the devil, without intending it, as God. A very few — as heroes, patriots, martyrs, reformers in the great sense, and men — serve the state with their consciences also, and so necessarily resist it for the most part; and they are commonly treated as enemies by it. A wise man will only be useful as a man, and will not submit to be “clay,” and “stop a hole to keep the wind away,” but leave that office to his dust at least:

“I am too high born to be propertied,
To be a second at control,
Or useful serving-man and instrument
To any sovereign state throughout the world.”

He who gives himself entirely to his fellow men appears to them useless and selfish; but he who gives himself partially to them is pronounced a benefactor and philanthropist.

How does it become a man to behave toward the American government today? I answer, that he cannot without disgrace be associated with it. I cannot for an instant recognize that political organization as my government which is the slave’s government also.

All men recognize the right of revolution; that is, the right to refuse allegiance to, and to resist, the government, when its tyranny or its inefficiency are great and unendurable. But almost all say that such is not the case now. But such was the case, they think, in the Revolution of ’75. If one were to tell me that this was a bad government because it taxed certain foreign commodities brought to its ports, it is most probable that I should not make an ado about it, for I can do without them. All machines have their friction; and possibly this does enough good to counter-balance the evil. At any rate, it is a great evil to make a stir about it. But when the friction comes to have its machine, and oppression and robbery are organized, I say, let us not have such a machine any longer. In other words, when a sixth of the population of a nation which has undertaken to be the refuge of liberty are slaves, and a whole country is unjustly overrun and conquered by a foreign army, and subjected to military law, I think that it is not too soon for honest men to rebel and revolutionize. What makes this duty the more urgent is that fact that the country so overrun is not our own, but ours is the invading army.

Paley, a common authority with many on moral questions, in his chapter on the “Duty of Submission to Civil Government,” resolves all civil obligation into expediency; and he proceeds to say that “so long as the interest of the whole society requires it, that it, so long as the established government cannot be resisted or changed without public inconveniencey, it is the will of God… that the established government be obeyed — and no longer. This principle being admitted, the justice of every particular case of resistance is reduced to a computation of the quantity of the danger and grievance on the one side, and of the probability and expense of redressing it on the other.” Of this, he says, every man shall judge for himself. But Paley appears never to have contemplated those cases to which the rule of expediency does not apply, in which a people, as well and an individual, must do justice, cost what it may. If I have unjustly wrested a plank from a drowning man, I must restore it to him though I drown myself. This, according to Paley, would be inconvenient. But he that would save his life, in such a case, shall lose it. This people must cease to hold slaves, and to make war on Mexico, though it cost them their existence as a people.

In their practice, nations agree with Paley; but does anyone think that Massachusetts does exactly what is right at the present crisis?

“A drab of stat,
a cloth-o’-silver slut,

To have her train borne up,
and her soul trail in the dirt.”

Practically speaking, the opponents to a reform in Massachusetts are not a hundred thousand politicians at the South, but a hundred thousand merchants and farmers here, who are more interested in commerce and agriculture than they are in humanity, and are not prepared to do justice to the slave and to Mexico, cost what it may. I quarrel not with far-off foes, but with those who, neat at home, co-operate with, and do the bidding of, those far away, and without whom the latter would be harmless. We are accustomed to say, that the mass of men are unprepared; but improvement is slow, because the few are not as materially wiser or better than the many. It is not so important that many should be good as you, as that there be some absolute goodness somewhere; for that will leaven the whole lump. There are thousands who are in opinion opposed to slavery and to the war, who yet in effect do nothing to put an end to them; who, esteeming themselves children of Washington and Franklin, sit down with their hands in their pockets, and say that they know not what to do, and do nothing; who even postpone the question of freedom to the question of free trade, and quietly read the prices-current along with the latest advices from Mexico, after dinner, and, it may be, fall asleep over them both. What is the price-current of an honest man and patriot today? They hesitate, and they regret, and sometimes they petition; but they do nothing in earnest and with effect. They will wait, well disposed, for other to remedy the evil, that they may no longer have it to regret. At most, they give up only a cheap vote, and a feeble countenance and Godspeed, to the right, as it goes by them. There are nine hundred and ninety-nine patrons of virtue to one virtuous man. But it is easier to deal with the real possessor of a thing than with the temporary guardian of it.

All voting is a sort of gaming, like checkers or backgammon, with a slight moral tinge to it, a playing with right and wrong, with moral questions; and betting naturally accompanies it. The character of the voters is not staked. I cast my vote, perchance, as I think right; but I am not vitally concerned that that right should prevail. I am willing to leave it to the majority. Its obligation, therefore, never exceeds that of expediency. Even voting for the right is doing nothing for it. It is only expressing to men feebly your desire that it should prevail. A wise man will not leave the right to the mercy of chance, nor wish it to prevail through the power of the majority. There is but little virtue in the action of masses of men. When the majority shall at length vote for the abolition of slavery, it will be because they are indifferent to slavery, or because there is but little slavery left to be abolished by their vote. They will then be the only slaves. Only his vote can hasten the abolition of slavery who asserts his own freedom by his vote.

I hear of a convention to be held at Baltimore, or elsewhere, for the selection of a candidate for the Presidency, made up chiefly of editors, and men who are politicians by profession; but I think, what is it to any independent, intelligent, and respectable man what decision they may come to? Shall we not have the advantage of this wisdom and honesty, nevertheless? Can we not count upon some independent votes? Are there not many individuals in the country who do not attend conventions? But no: I find that the respectable man, so called, has immediately drifted from his position, and despairs of his country, when his country has more reasons to despair of him. He forthwith adopts one of the candidates thus selected as the only available one, thus proving that he is himself available for any purposes of the demagogue. His vote is of no more worth than that of any unprincipled foreigner or hireling native, who may have been bought. O for a man who is a man, and, as my neighbor says, has a bone in his back which you cannot pass your hand through! Our statistics are at fault: the population has been returned too large. How many men are there to a square thousand miles in the country? Hardly one. Does not America offer any inducement for men to settle here? The American has dwindled into an Odd Fellow — one who may be known by the development of his organ of gregariousness, and a manifest lack of intellect and cheerful self-reliance; whose first and chief concern, on coming into the world, is to see that the almshouses are in good repair; and, before yet he has lawfully donned the virile garb, to collect a fund to the support of the widows and orphans that may be; who, in short, ventures to live only by the aid of the Mutual Insurance company, which has promised to bury him decently.

It is not a man’s duty, as a matter of course, to devote himself to the eradication of any, even to most enormous, wrong; he may still properly have other concerns to engage him; but it is his duty, at least, to wash his hands of it, and, if he gives it no thought longer, not to give it practically his support. If I devote myself to other pursuits and contemplations, I must first see, at least, that I do not pursue them sitting upon another man’s shoulders. I must get off him first, that he may pursue his contemplations too. See what gross inconsistency is tolerated. I have heard some of my townsmen say, “I should like to have them order me out to help put down an insurrection of the slaves, or to march to Mexico — see if I would go”; and yet these very men have each, directly by their allegiance, and so indirectly, at least, by their money, furnished a substitute. The soldier is applauded who refuses to serve in an unjust war by those who do not refuse to sustain the unjust government which makes the war; is applauded by those whose own act and authority he disregards and sets at naught; as if the state were penitent to that degree that it hired one to scourge it while it sinned, but not to that degree that it left off sinning for a moment. Thus, under the name of Order and Civil Government, we are all made at last to pay homage to and support our own meanness. After the first blush of sin comes its indifference; and from immoral it becomes, as it were, unmoral, and not quite unnecessary to that life which we have made.

The broadest and most prevalent error requires the most disinterested virtue to sustain it. The slight reproach to which the virtue of patriotism is commonly liable, the noble are most likely to incur. Those who, while they disapprove of the character and measures of a government, yield to it their allegiance and support are undoubtedly its most conscientious supporters, and so frequently the most serious obstacles to reform. Some are petitioning the State to dissolve the Union, to disregard the requisitions of the President. Why do they not dissolve it themselves — the union between themselves and the State — and refuse to pay their quota into its treasury? Do not they stand in same relation to the State that the State does to the Union? And have not the same reasons prevented the State from resisting the Union which have prevented them from resisting the State?

How can a man be satisfied to entertain and opinion merely, and enjoy it? Is there any enjoyment in it, if his opinion is that he is aggrieved? If you are cheated out of a single dollar by your neighbor, you do not rest satisfied with knowing you are cheated, or with saying that you are cheated, or even with petitioning him to pay you your due; but you take effectual steps at once to obtain the full amount, and see to it that you are never cheated again. Action from principle, the perception and the performance of right, changes things and relations; it is essentially revolutionary, and does not consist wholly with anything which was. It not only divided States and churches, it divides families; ay, it divides the individual, separating the diabolical in him from the divine.

Unjust laws exist: shall we be content to obey them, or shall we endeavor to amend them, and obey them until we have succeeded, or shall we transgress them at once? Men, generally, under such a government as this, think that they ought to wait until they have persuaded the majority to alter them. They think that, if they should resist, the remedy would be worse than the evil. But it is the fault of the government itself that the remedy is worse than the evil. It makes it worse. Why is it not more apt to anticipate and provide for reform? Why does it not cherish its wise minority? Why does it cry and resist before it is hurt? Why does it not encourage its citizens to put out its faults, and do better than it would have them? Why does it always crucify Christ and excommunicate Copernicus and Luther, and pronounce Washington and Franklin rebels?

One would think, that a deliberate and practical denial of its authority was the only offense never contemplated by its government; else, why has it not assigned its definite, its suitable and proportionate, penalty? If a man who has no property refuses but once to earn nine shillings for the State, he is put in prison for a period unlimited by any law that I know, and determined only by the discretion of those who put him there; but if he should steal ninety times nine shillings from the State, he is soon permitted to go at large again.

If the injustice is part of the necessary friction of the machine of government, let it go, let it go: perchance it will wear smooth — certainly the machine will wear out. If the injustice has a spring, or a pulley, or a rope, or a crank, exclusively for itself, then perhaps you may consider whether the remedy will not be worse than the evil; but if it is of such a nature that it requires you to be the agent of injustice to another, then I say, break the law. Let your life be a counter-friction to stop the machine. What I have to do is to see, at any rate, that I do not lend myself to the wrong which I condemn.

As for adopting the ways the State has provided for remedying the evil, I know not of such ways. They take too much time, and a man’s life will be gone. I have other affairs to attend to. I came into this world, not chiefly to make this a good place to live in, but to live in it, be it good or bad. A man has not everything to do, but something; and because he cannot do everything, it is not necessary that he should be petitioning the Governor or the Legislature any more than it is theirs to petition me; and if they should not hear my petition, what should I do then? But in this case the State has provided no way: its very Constitution is the evil. This may seem to be harsh and stubborn and unconcilliatory; but it is to treat with the utmost kindness and consideration the only spirit that can appreciate or deserves it. So is all change for the better, like birth and death, which convulse the body.

I do not hesitate to say, that those who call themselves Abolitionists should at once effectually withdraw their support, both in person and property, from the government of Massachusetts, and not wait till they constitute a majority of one, before they suffer the right to prevail through them. I think that it is enough if they have God on their side, without waiting for that other one. Moreover, any man more right than his neighbors constitutes a majority of one already.

I meet this American government, or its representative, the State government, directly, and face to face, once a year — no more — in the person of its tax-gatherer; this is the only mode in which a man situated as I am necessarily meets it; and it then says distinctly, Recognize me; and the simplest, the most effectual, and, in the present posture of affairs, the indispensablest mode of treating with it on this head, of expressing your little satisfaction with and love for it, is to deny it then. My civil neighbor, the tax-gatherer, is the very man I have to deal with — for it is, after all, with men and not with parchment that I quarrel — and he has voluntarily chosen to be an agent of the government. How shall he ever know well that he is and does as an officer of the government, or as a man, until he is obliged to consider whether he will treat me, his neighbor, for whom he has respect, as a neighbor and well-disposed man, or as a maniac and disturber of the peace, and see if he can get over this obstruction to his neighborliness without a ruder and more impetuous thought or speech corresponding with his action. I know this well, that if one thousand, if one hundred, if ten men whom I could name — if ten honest men only — ay, if one honest man, in this State of Massachusetts, ceasing to hold slaves, were actually to withdraw from this co-partnership, and be locked up in the county jail therefor, it would be the abolition of slavery in America. For it matters not how small the beginning may seem to be: what is once well done is done forever. But we love better to talk about it: that we say is our mission. Reform keeps many scores of newspapers in its service, but not one man. If my esteemed neighbor, the State’s ambassador, who will devote his days to the settlement of the question of human rights in the Council Chamber, instead of being threatened with the prisons of Carolina, were to sit down the prisoner of Massachusetts, that State which is so anxious to foist the sin of slavery upon her sister — though at present she can discover only an act of inhospitality to be the ground of a quarrel with her — the Legislature would not wholly waive the subject of the following winter.

Under a government which imprisons unjustly, the true place for a just man is also a prison. The proper place today, the only place which Massachusetts has provided for her freer and less despondent spirits, is in her prisons, to be put out and locked out of the State by her own act, as they have already put themselves out by their principles. It is there that the fugitive slave, and the Mexican prisoner on parole, and the Indian come to plead the wrongs of his race should find them; on that separate but more free and honorable ground, where the State places those who are not with her, but against her — the only house in a slave State in which a free man can abide with honor. If any think that their influence would be lost there, and their voices no longer afflict the ear of the State, that they would not be as an enemy within its walls, they do not know by how much truth is stronger than error, nor how much more eloquently and effectively he can combat injustice who has experienced a little in his own person. Cast your whole vote, not a strip of paper merely, but your whole influence. A minority is powerless while it conforms to the majority; it is not even a minority then; but it is irresistible when it clogs by its whole weight. If the alternative is to keep all just men in prison, or give up war and slavery, the State will not hesitate which to choose. If a thousand men were not to pay their tax bills this year, that would not be a violent and bloody measure, as it would be to pay them, and enable the State to commit violence and shed innocent blood. This is, in fact, the definition of a peaceable revolution, if any such is possible. If the tax-gatherer, or any other public officer, asks me, as one has done, “But what shall I do?” my answer is, “If you really wish to do anything, resign your office.” When the subject has refused allegiance, and the officer has resigned from office, then the revolution is accomplished. But even suppose blood shed when the conscience is wounded? Through this wound a man’s real manhood and immortality flow out, and he bleeds to an everlasting death. I see this blood flowing now.

I have contemplated the imprisonment of the offender, rather than the seizure of his goods — though both will serve the same purpose — because they who assert the purest right, and consequently are most dangerous to a corrupt State, commonly have not spent much time in accumulating property. To such the State renders comparatively small service, and a slight tax is wont to appear exorbitant, particularly if they are obliged to earn it by special labor with their hands. If there were one who lived wholly without the use of money, the State itself would hesitate to demand it of him. But the rich man — not to make any invidious comparison — is always sold to the institution which makes him rich. Absolutely speaking, the more money, the less virtue; for money comes between a man and his objects, and obtains them for him; it was certainly no great virtue to obtain it. It puts to rest many questions which he would otherwise be taxed to answer; while the only new question which it puts is the hard but superfluous one, how to spend it. Thus his moral ground is taken from under his feet. The opportunities of living are diminished in proportion as that are called the “means” are increased. The best thing a man can do for his culture when he is rich is to endeavor to carry out those schemes which he entertained when he was poor. Christ answered the Herodians according to their condition. “Show me the tribute-money,” said he — and one took a penny out of his pocket — if you use money which has the image of Caesar on it, and which he has made current and valuable, that is, if you are men of the State, and gladly enjoy the advantages of Caesar’s government, then pay him back some of his own when he demands it. “Render therefore to Caesar that which is Caesar’s and to God those things which are God’s” — leaving them no wiser than before as to which was which; for they did not wish to know.

When I converse with the freest of my neighbors, I perceive that, whatever they may say about the magnitude and seriousness of the question, and their regard for the public tranquillity, the long and the short of the matter is, that they cannot spare the protection of the existing government, and they dread the consequences to their property and families of disobedience to it. For my own part, I should not like to think that I ever rely on the protection of the State. But, if I deny the authority of the State when it presents its tax bill, it will soon take and waste all my property, and so harass me and my children without end. This is hard. This makes it impossible for a man to live honestly, and at the same time comfortably, in outward respects. It will not be worth the while to accumulate property; that would be sure to go again. You must hire or squat somewhere, and raise but a small crop, and eat that soon. You must live within yourself, and depend upon yourself always tucked up and ready for a start, and not have many affairs. A man may grow rich in Turkey even, if he will be in all respects a good subject of the Turkish government. Confucius said: “If a state is governed by the principles of reason, poverty and misery are subjects of shame; if a state is not governed by the principles of reason, riches and honors are subjects of shame.” No: until I want the protection of Massachusetts to be extended to me in some distant Southern port, where my liberty is endangered, or until I am bent solely on building up an estate at home by peaceful enterprise, I can afford to refuse allegiance to Massachusetts, and her right to my property and life. It costs me less in every sense to incur the penalty of disobedience to the State than it would to obey. I should feel as if I were worth less in that case.

Some years ago, the State met me in behalf of the Church, and commanded me to pay a certain sum toward the support of a clergyman whose preaching my father attended, but never I myself. “Pay,” it said, “or be locked up in the jail.” I declined to pay. But, unfortunately, another man saw fit to pay it. I did not see why the schoolmaster should be taxed to support the priest, and not the priest the schoolmaster; for I was not the State’s schoolmaster, but I supported myself by voluntary subscription. I did not see why the lyceum should not present its tax bill, and have the State to back its demand, as well as the Church. However, as the request of the selectmen, I condescended to make some such statement as this in writing: “Know all men by these presents, that I, Henry Thoreau, do not wish to be regarded as a member of any society which I have not joined.” This I gave to the town clerk; and he has it. The State, having thus learned that I did not wish to be regarded as a member of that church, has never made a like demand on me since; though it said that it must adhere to its original presumption that time. If I had known how to name them, I should then have signed off in detail from all the societies which I never signed on to; but I did not know where to find such a complete list.

I have paid no poll tax for six years. I was put into a jail once on this account, for one night; and, as I stood considering the walls of solid stone, two or three feet thick, the door of wood and iron, a foot thick, and the iron grating which strained the light, I could not help being struck with the foolishness of that institution which treated me as if I were mere flesh and blood and bones, to be locked up. I wondered that it should have concluded at length that this was the best use it could put me to, and had never thought to avail itself of my services in some way. I saw that, if there was a wall of stone between me and my townsmen, there was a still more difficult one to climb or break through before they could get to be as free as I was. I did nor for a moment feel confined, and the walls seemed a great waste of stone and mortar. I felt as if I alone of all my townsmen had paid my tax. They plainly did not know how to treat me, but behaved like persons who are underbred. In every threat and in every compliment there was a blunder; for they thought that my chief desire was to stand the other side of that stone wall. I could not but smile to see how industriously they locked the door on my meditations, which followed them out again without let or hindrance, and they were really all that was dangerous. As they could not reach me, they had resolved to punish my body; just as boys, if they cannot come at some person against whom they have a spite, will abuse his dog. I saw that the State was half-witted, that it was timid as a lone woman with her silver spoons, and that it did not know its friends from its foes, and I lost all my remaining respect for it, and pitied it.

Thus the state never intentionally confronts a man’s sense, intellectual or moral, but only his body, his senses. It is not armed with superior wit or honesty, but with superior physical strength. I was not born to be forced. I will breathe after my own fashion. Let us see who is the strongest. What force has a multitude? They only can force me who obey a higher law than I. They force me to become like themselves. I do not hear of men being forced to live this way or that by masses of men. What sort of life were that to live? When I meet a government which says to me, “Your money our your life,” why should I be in haste to give it my money? It may be in a great strait, and not know what to do: I cannot help that. It must help itself; do as I do. It is not worth the while to snivel about it. I am not responsible for the successful working of the machinery of society. I am not the son of the engineer. I perceive that, when an acorn and a chestnut fall side by side, the one does not remain inert to make way for the other, but both obey their own laws, and spring and grow and flourish as best they can, till one, perchance, overshadows and destroys the other. If a plant cannot live according to nature, it dies; and so a man.

The night in prison was novel and interesting enough. The prisoners in their shirtsleeves were enjoying a chat and the evening air in the doorway, when I entered. But the jailer said, “Come, boys, it is time to lock up”; and so they dispersed, and I heard the sound of their steps returning into the hollow apartments. My room-mate was introduced to me by the jailer as “a first-rate fellow and clever man.” When the door was locked, he showed me where to hang my hat, and how he managed matters there. The rooms were whitewashed once a month; and this one, at least, was the whitest, most simply furnished, and probably neatest apartment in town. He naturally wanted to know where I came from, and what brought me there; and, when I had told him, I asked him in my turn how he came there, presuming him to be an honest man, of course; and as the world goes, I believe he was. “Why,” said he, “they accuse me of burning a barn; but I never did it.” As near as I could discover, he had probably gone to bed in a barn when drunk, and smoked his pipe there; and so a barn was burnt. He had the reputation of being a clever man, had been there some three months waiting for his trial to come on, and would have to wait as much longer; but he was quite domesticated and contented, since he got his board for nothing, and thought that he was well treated.

He occupied one window, and I the other; and I saw that if one stayed there long, his principal business would be to look out the window. I had soon read all the tracts that were left there, and examined where former prisoners had broken out, and where a grate had been sawed off, and heard the history of the various occupants of that room; for I found that even there there was a history and a gossip which never circulated beyond the walls of the jail. Probably this is the only house in the town where verses are composed, which are afterward printed in a circular form, but not published. I was shown quite a long list of young men who had been detected in an attempt to escape, who avenged themselves by singing them.

I pumped my fellow-prisoner as dry as I could, for fear I should never see him again; but at length he showed me which was my bed, and left me to blow out the lamp.

It was like travelling into a far country, such as I had never expected to behold, to lie there for one night. It seemed to me that I never had heard the town clock strike before, not the evening sounds of the village; for we slept with the windows open, which were inside the grating. It was to see my native village in the light of the Middle Ages, and our Concord was turned into a Rhine stream, and visions of knights and castles passed before me. They were the voices of old burghers that I heard in the streets. I was an involuntary spectator and auditor of whatever was done and said in the kitchen of the adjacent village inn — a wholly new and rare experience to me. It was a closer view of my native town. I was fairly inside of it. I never had seen its institutions before. This is one of its peculiar institutions; for it is a shire town. I began to comprehend what its inhabitants were about.

In the morning, our breakfasts were put through the hole in the door, in small oblong-square tin pans, made to fit, and holding a pint of chocolate, with brown bread, and an iron spoon. When they called for the vessels again, I was green enough to return what bread I had left, but my comrade seized it, and said that I should lay that up for lunch or dinner. Soon after he was let out to work at haying in a neighboring field, whither he went every day, and would not be back till noon; so he bade me good day, saying that he doubted if he should see me again.

When I came out of prison — for some one interfered, and paid that tax — I did not perceive that great changes had taken place on the common, such as he observed who went in a youth and emerged a gray-headed man; and yet a change had come to my eyes come over the scene — the town, and State, and country, greater than any that mere time could effect. I saw yet more distinctly the State in which I lived. I saw to what extent the people among whom I lived could be trusted as good neighbors and friends; that their friendship was for summer weather only; that they did not greatly propose to do right; that they were a distinct race from me by their prejudices and superstitions, as the Chinamen and Malays are that in their sacrifices to humanity they ran no risks, not even to their property; that after all they were not so noble but they treated the thief as he had treated them, and hoped, by a certain outward observance and a few prayers, and by walking in a particular straight through useless path from time to time, to save their souls. This may be to judge my neighbors harshly; for I believe that many of them are not aware that they have such an institution as the jail in their village.

It was formerly the custom in our village, when a poor debtor came out of jail, for his acquaintances to salute him, looking through their fingers, which were crossed to represent the jail window, “How do ye do?” My neighbors did not this salute me, but first looked at me, and then at one another, as if I had returned from a long journey. I was put into jail as I was going to the shoemaker’s to get a shoe which was mended. When I was let out the next morning, I proceeded to finish my errand, and, having put on my mended show, joined a huckleberry party, who were impatient to put themselves under my conduct; and in half an hour — for the horse was soon tackled — was in the midst of a huckleberry field, on one of our highest hills, two miles off, and then the State was nowhere to be seen.

This is the whole history of “My Prisons.”

I have never declined paying the highway tax, because I am as desirous of being a good neighbor as I am of being a bad subject; and as for supporting schools, I am doing my part to educate my fellow countrymen now. It is for no particular item in the tax bill that I refuse to pay it. I simply wish to refuse allegiance to the State, to withdraw and stand aloof from it effectually. I do not care to trace the course of my dollar, if I could, till it buys a man a musket to shoot one with — the dollar is innocent — but I am concerned to trace the effects of my allegiance. In fact, I quietly declare war with the State, after my fashion, though I will still make use and get what advantages of her I can, as is usual in such cases.

If others pay the tax which is demanded of me, from a sympathy with the State, they do but what they have already done in their own case, or rather they abet injustice to a greater extent than the State requires. If they pay the tax from a mistaken interest in the individual taxed, to save his property, or prevent his going to jail, it is because they have not considered wisely how far they let their private feelings interfere with the public good.

This, then is my position at present. But one cannot be too much on his guard in such a case, lest his actions be biased by obstinacy or an undue regard for the opinions of men. Let him see that he does only what belongs to himself and to the hour.

I think sometimes, Why, this people mean well, they are only ignorant; they would do better if they knew how: why give your neighbors this pain to treat you as they are not inclined to? But I think again, This is no reason why I should do as they do, or permit others to suffer much greater pain of a different kind. Again, I sometimes say to myself, When many millions of men, without heat, without ill will, without personal feelings of any kind, demand of you a few shillings only, without the possibility, such is their constitution, of retracting or altering their present demand, and without the possibility, on your side, of appeal to any other millions, why expose yourself to this overwhelming brute force? You do not resist cold and hunger, the winds and the waves, thus obstinately; you quietly submit to a thousand similar necessities. You do not put your head into the fire. But just in proportion as I regard this as not wholly a brute force, but partly a human force, and consider that I have relations to those millions as to so many millions of men, and not of mere brute or inanimate things, I see that appeal is possible, first and instantaneously, from them to the Maker of them, and, secondly, from them to themselves. But if I put my head deliberately into the fire, there is no appeal to fire or to the Maker for fire, and I have only myself to blame. If I could convince myself that I have any right to be satisfied with men as they are, and to treat them accordingly, and not according, in some respects, to my requisitions and expectations of what they and I ought to be, then, like a good Mussulman and fatalist, I should endeavor to be satisfied with things as they are, and say it is the will of God. And, above all, there is this difference between resisting this and a purely brute or natural force, that I can resist this with some effect; but I cannot expect, like Orpheus, to change the nature of the rocks and trees and beasts.

I do not wish to quarrel with any man or nation. I do not wish to split hairs, to make fine distinctions, or set myself up as better than my neighbors. I seek rather, I may say, even an excuse for conforming to the laws of the land. I am but too ready to conform to them. Indeed, I have reason to suspect myself on this head; and each year, as the tax-gatherer comes round, I find myself disposed to review the acts and position of the general and State governments, and the spirit of the people to discover a pretext for conformity.

“We must affect our country as our parents,
And if at any time we alienate
Our love or industry from doing it honor,
We must respect effects and teach the soul
Matter of conscience and religion,
And not desire of rule or benefit.”

I believe that the State will soon be able to take all my work of this sort out of my hands, and then I shall be no better patriot than my fellow-countrymen. Seen from a lower point of view, the Constitution, with all its faults, is very good; the law and the courts are very respectable; even this State and this American government are, in many respects, very admirable, and rare things, to be thankful for, such as a great many have described them; seen from a higher still, and the highest, who shall say what they are, or that they are worth looking at or thinking of at all?

However, the government does not concern me much, and I shall bestow the fewest possible thoughts on it. It is not many moments that I live under a government, even in this world. If a man is thought-free, fancy-free, imagination-free, that which is not never for a long time appearing to be to him, unwise rulers or reformers cannot fatally interrupt him.

I know that most men think differently from myself; but those whose lives are by profession devoted to the study of these or kindred subjects content me as little as any. Statesmen and legislators, standing so completely within the institution, never distinctly and nakedly behold it. They speak of moving society, but have no resting-place without it. They may be men of a certain experience and discrimination, and have no doubt invented ingenious and even useful systems, for which we sincerely thank them; but all their wit and usefulness lie within certain not very wide limits. They are wont to forget that the world is not governed by policy and expediency. Webster never goes behind government, and so cannot speak with authority about it. His words are wisdom to those legislators who contemplate no essential reform in the existing government; but for thinkers, and those who legislate for all tim, he never once glances at the subject. I know of those whose serene and wise speculations on this theme would soon reveal the limits of his mind’s range and hospitality. Yet, compared with the cheap professions of most reformers, and the still cheaper wisdom an eloquence of politicians in general, his are almost the only sensible and valuable words, and we thank Heaven for him. Comparatively, he is always strong, original, and, above all, practical. Still, his quality is not wisdom, but prudence. The lawyer’s truth is not Truth, but consistency or a consistent expediency. Truth is always in harmony with herself, and is not concerned chiefly to reveal the justice that may consist with wrong-doing. He well deserves to be called, as he has been called, the Defender of the Constitution. There are really no blows to be given him but defensive ones. He is not a leader, but a follower. His leaders are the men of ’87. “I have never made an effort,” he says, “and never propose to make an effort; I have never countenanced an effort, and never mean to countenance an effort, to disturb the arrangement as originally made, by which various States came into the Union.” Still thinking of the sanction which the Constitution gives to slavery, he says, “Because it was part of the original compact — let it stand.” Notwithstanding his special acuteness and ability, he is unable to take a fact out of its merely political relations, and behold it as it lies absolutely to be disposed of by the intellect — what, for instance, it behooves a man to do here in American today with regard to slavery — but ventures, or is driven, to make some such desperate answer to the following, while professing to speak absolutely, and as a private man — from which what new and singular of social duties might be inferred? “The manner,” says he, “in which the governments of the States where slavery exists are to regulate it is for their own consideration, under the responsibility to their constituents, to the general laws of propriety, humanity, and justice, and to God. Associations formed elsewhere, springing from a feeling of humanity, or any other cause, have nothing whatever to do with it. They have never received any encouragement from me and they never will. [These extracts have been inserted since the lecture was read — HDT]

They who know of no purer sources of truth, who have traced up its stream no higher, stand, and wisely stand, by the Bible and the Constitution, and drink at it there with reverence and humanity; but they who behold where it comes trickling into this lake or that pool, gird up their loins once more, and continue their pilgrimage toward its fountainhead.

No man with a genius for legislation has appeared in America. They are rare in the history of the world. There are orators, politicians, and eloquent men, by the thousand; but the speaker has not yet opened his mouth to speak who is capable of settling the much-vexed questions of the day. We love eloquence for its own sake, and not for any truth which it may utter, or any heroism it may inspire. Our legislators have not yet learned the comparative value of free trade and of freed, of union, and of rectitude, to a nation. They have no genius or talent for comparatively humble questions of taxation and finance, commerce and manufactures and agriculture. If we were left solely to the wordy wit of legislators in Congress for our guidance, uncorrected by the seasonable experience and the effectual complaints of the people, America would not long retain her rank among the nations. For eighteen hundred years, though perchance I have no right to say it, the New Testament has been written; yet where is the legislator who has wisdom and practical talent enough to avail himself of the light which it sheds on the science of legislation.

The authority of government, even such as I am willing to submit to — for I will cheerfully obey those who know and can do better than I, and in many things even those who neither know nor can do so well — is still an impure one: to be strictly just, it must have the sanction and consent of the governed. It can have no pure right over my person and property but what I concede to it. The progress from an absolute to a limited monarchy, from a limited monarchy to a democracy, is a progress toward a true respect for the individual. Even the Chinese philosopher was wise enough to regard the individual as the basis of the empire. Is a democracy, such as we know it, the last improvement possible in government? Is it not possible to take a step further towards recognizing and organizing the rights of man? There will never be a really free and enlightened State until the State comes to recognize the individual as a higher and independent power, from which all its own power and authority are derived, and treats him accordingly. I please myself with imagining a State at last which can afford to be just to all men, and to treat the individual with respect as a neighbor; which even would not think it inconsistent with its own repose if a few were to live aloof from it, not meddling with it, nor embraced by it, who fulfilled all the duties of neighbors and fellow men. A State which bore this kind of fruit, and suffered it to drop off as fast as it ripened, would prepare the way for a still more perfect and glorious State, which I have also imagined, but not yet anywhere seen.

Ethics of Voting Part III


 by George H. Smith

 7. Recapitulation

In Part Two of this article I sketched a theory of institutional analysis whereby individuals, filling institutional roles, contribute unintentionally to the goals of an association (i.e., a designed institution). Institutional analysis does not violate the principles of methodological individualism. On the contrary, anarchist theory relies on institutional analysis for its coherence. Anarchists who defend political office-holding and electoral voting cannot reasonably do so by opposing institutional analysis as such. Unless political libertarians are willing to purge their vocabulary of all institutional terms (“State,” “society,” the “market,” etc.) and all institutional propositions (e.g., “the State is invasive per se”), then their objections to voluntaryist arguments will reek of insincerity.

Of course, it is possible to accept institutional analysis and yet object to its particular application in the case against office-holding and voting. This is the only viable approach open to political Anarchists. Unfortunately, we possess no body of libertarian theory which treats institutional analysis in detail, so a discussion of the institutional features of voting requires considerable preliminary groundwork. Having discussed some procedural issues in Part One and institutional analysis in Part Two, I shall now explore how institutional analysis applies specifically to the State and to offices in the State. Then I shall move from institutional analysis considered descriptively to the normative or moral implications of institutional analysis. To what extent are those individuals who work within an association morally and/or legally responsible for the institutional products of that association? This thorny area is undoubtedly the most complex and controversial aspect of institutional analysis, yet it must be addressed if the moral implications of electoral voting are to be flushed out. Anarchist theory will never advance beyond a rudimentary level so long as this issue remains unresolved.

Modern States, I have argued, are designed institutions. They did not emerge spontaneously from the unplanned coordination of individuals pursuing disparate goals (such as in social division of labor). The State resembles a business organization; it was designed and established to achieve specific goals, and it has developed a sophisticated division of labor which furthers these goals.

This does not mean that all features of the modern State are designed. Economists point out that even rigidly structured business organizations and political bureaucracies exhibit signs of spontaneous order, often caused by internal competition for positions of prestige and power. Nevertheless, there are crucial differences between undesigned and designed institutions. Associations (designed institutions) coordinate individual actions to further homogeneous and predetermined goals. An auto factory, for instance, does not assemble workers, allow them to do as they please, and then accept whatever results from their unplanned interaction. Associations impose a structure of internal organization, a division of labor, to achieve particular goals. Any spontaneous order within the association is subordinated to these goals.

Modern States, far from evolving spontaneously, arose from the desire of political rulers to establish territorial sovereignty. The State’s spontaneous order occurs within these parameters. A State cannot allow developments that weaken its territorial sovereignty; it reacts quickly and decisively against all threats. The spontaneous order in society generally, on the contrary, operates under no such constraints. Social institutions may change drastically or die altogether without the interposition of force to prevent these changes. A similar hands-off policy is unthinkable for States.

8. “Invasive Per Se”: The Minarchist-Anarchist Debate

The core of anarchism is the claim that the State is necessarily invasive, or invasive per se. This is also the point of contention between anarchism and minarchism. If the basic institutional purpose of the State is one which could be accomplished by voluntary means, then the State is not necessarily invasive. If one were to argue (however implausibly) that the institutional purpose of the State is to deliver mail, then the fact that existing States use invasive means (taxation and a coercive monopoly) to provide this service would have no direct bearing on the theoretical question of whether invasive means must be employed to accomplish this goal. A totally voluntary mail service could be established; and if mail delivery is the defining characteristic of the State, then we have the theoretical possibility of a “voluntary State.” In this view, one could push for the elimination of the invasive aspects of the current government until it is pared down to its “proper” function of mail delivery. If we substitute “defense of individual rights” for “mail delivery” (one is as arbitrary as the other), we have the minarchist argument for the possibility of a non-invasive State.

The anarchist rejects the argument that the basic institutional purpose of the State is one which could theoretically be achieved by voluntary means. The anarchist considers the fundamental purpose of the State to be territorial sovereignty, and this is inherently invasive. Beginning with the libertarian prohibition of invasive acts, the anarchist adds the insight that the State is invasive per se — i.e., it must commit invasive acts to fulfill its basic purpose. When the nonaggression premise is applied to this view of the State, the consequence is a total rejection of the State on libertarian grounds. Thus, as I argued in Part One, anarchism is more than libertarianism. Anarchism is the nonaggression axiom combined with a particular view of the State — a view that relies on institutional analysis.

The minarchist-anarchist debate revolves around the essential (or defining) purpose of government. Minarchists assert that the “proper” function of government is defense of individual rights, broadly conceived (police, military, and judicial system). But it is unclear what “proper” means here. If it means “morally proper” — i.e., the State cannot legitimately exceed these boundaries — then no anarchist will disagree. No institution, by whatever name we call it, may properly violate rights. But why the State should be the focus of defense remains a puzzle. Minarchists must show that States were designed (in a substantial number of cases) with the defense of rights as a fundamental purpose. Unfortunately for them, history does not smile on this thesis. Territorial sovereignty was clearly the purpose leading to the organization and consolidation of modern States. This required a monopoly of legitimized coercion to eliminate potential competitors or those opposed to sovereignty altogether. The State’s monopoly on the means of coercion left it little choice but to provide a semblance of defense for its subject. The provision of these “services” plays an important role in legitimizing State rule (to preserve “law and order”), without which mass compliance would be difficult to achieve.

The anarchist thesis — that the State is invasive per se is an institutional judgment. It attributes an invasive purpose not to every person who joins the State but to the institution itself. Most of the State’s members may not personally care care about,or even know of, arcane subjects like territorial sovereignty. They may work for the State just to make a living. Others may find satisfaction in wielding power, and still others may have the sincere desire to accomplish something worthwhile. Political libertarians usually fall in the latter category. They see themselves as harbingers of freedom. When it is pointed out that their personal intentions — why they choose to join the State — are an issue distinct from their objective role within the State apparatus; and when it is argued that, insofar as they fulfill their roles as political office-holders, they thereby contribute to the institutional goals of the State, they protest that they do not personally aggress against anyone. Short of catching them with a smoking revolver, they claim exemption from the anarchist curse of the State and its agents. (Never mind that the smoking revolver test would exonerate the vast majority of State employees from personal liability; such inconvenient details are passed over by the political anarchist.)

The political anarchist professes to “hate the State” while avoiding a clear identification of who, or what, constitutes “the State.” Understandably, he does not wish to agonize over how to exempt libertarian members of the State from his supposed disdain. The political anarchist “hates” the State but seems to “love” the political offices that comprise the State. How the State is anything more than the combination of these offices acting in concert to attain institutional goals, is yet another mystery. If consistency is too much to expect of political anarchists, they might at least explain what they mean when they say that the State is invasive per se.

9. A Moral Problem

Political anarchists sometimes speculate on which governmental jobs they may consistently hold. They frequently distinguish between jobs which are necessarily invasive (tax collection, conscription) and jobs which, though financed coercively at present, would be permissible in a free society (mail delivery, school teaching). This dichotomy presumably answers the question of when libertarians may work for the State. A libertarian could work for the post office, for example, since mail delivery is not inherently invasive; but a libertarian could not work for the Internal Revenue Service. In deciding whether a libertarian could hold a political office, therefore, we should determine to which of these categories the office belongs.

I have heard this argument many times, though it has not received much attention in print. But the proposed criterion — distinguishing State offices which are invasive per se creates serious difficulties for the political anarchist.

Consider the argument that anarchists should not work for the Internal Revenue Service because tax collection is “invasive per se.” Note how this assertion immerses us in institutional analysis. For what does it mean to say that the I.R.S. is “invasive per se”? It does not mean that theft is the personal goal of every I.R.S. employee. Nor does it mean that every I.R.S. employee personally aggresses. The secretary, the file clerk, the accountant, the computer programmer — these and similar I.R.S. jobs do not require aggression or threats of aggression.

Clearly, when the political anarchist says that the I.R.S. is invasive per se, he means that the institutional purpose of the I.R.S. — the end to which lesser roles contribute — is invasive per se. So if it is impermissible for anarchists to work for the I.R.S., this is because institutional roles (jobs) in the I.R.S. contribute to its invasive purpose of theft — even though the roles themselves, considered in isolation, do not require personal aggression by all employees.

The same argument applies to employment with the Selective Service, drug enforcement agencies, and so forth. Only a minority of their employees personally aggress. Yet it is generally assumed by political anarchists that working for these invasive agencies violates libertarian principles.

This line of reasoning has devastating implications for political anarchism. An anarchist, it is said, cannot work for the I.R.S. or the Selective Service because these agencies are “invasive per se.” Yet we have seen that the essence of anarchism lies in the claim that the State itself is invasive per se. If the invasive nature of the I.R.S. precludes anarchists working for it, then why doesn’t the invasive nature of the State preclude anarchists working for it as well? If anarchists may not hire themselves out to the I.R.S. even if they avoid personal acts of aggression, then neither may they hire themselves out to the State in general — which is also invasive per se — even if they likewise avoid personal acts of aggression.

The political anarchist cannot have it both ways. He cannot invoke the “invasive per se” test with tax collection, conscription, drug enforcement, etc., and yet disregard it for the State in general. The political anarchist has two options: (1) He may deny that the State is invasive per se, thus defining himself out of anarchism; or (2) he may concede that an anarchist may properly work for an agency that is invasive per se, so long as the anarchist does not personally aggress. Neither of these options is very palatable. The first strips the political anarchist of his anarchist credentials, while the second opens a Pandora’s Box of job opportunities for anarchists. If the political anarchist seriously wishes to defend the propriety of anarchists working for the I.R.S., Selective Service, drug enforcement, the C.I.A. — the list goes on and on — then let him make his case.

The political anarchist is thus caught on the horns of a dilemma. He cannot reject the “invasive per se” criterion for the State while using it for particular agencies in the State. He cannot deny institutional objections to political office-holding, invoking the smoking revolver test instead, while advancing institutional objections against particular State agencies, thereby discarding the smoking revolver test when it suits his fancy.

Thus, either the political anarchist must become a voluntaryist, or he must introduce new (and hitherto undreamed of) employment opportunities for “anarchists.” Either he must abandon the case for political office-holding, or he must champion the legitimacy of anarchist employment in a wide variety of repulsive agencies. The latter is the only option short of capitulation.

10. Office-Holding and State Membership

The State, like all associations, has an identifiable membership. The institutionalized power of the State is a scarce resource; not everyone can benefit from its use simultaneously. The fierce competition thus generated for the control of State power necessitates membership criteria to restrict entry.

Membership criteria vary according to the form of government. An accident of birth may qualify one for membership in hereditary monarchies and aristocracies. Some forms of aristocracy encouraged the sale of political offices (“venal offices”), which then could be transferred like private property.

State membership in a democracy is theoretically bestowed by popular election, or by appointment authorized by a duly elected official.

Whatever the membership requirements, an office-holder acquires special privileges (legal rights) denied to the public at large. On the lower levels of State employment, this privilege may be nothing more than a claim on tax revenue in the form of a regular paycheck. As we ascend the hierarchy of power, however, the privileges become more extensive. Higher level office-holders enjoy considerable discretion in the exercise of power.

This power may be unlimited, as in despotism, or restricted in some fashion, as in a constitutional republic. But the privileges conferred by State offices always entail legal rights denied to nonmembers.

Political office bestows power on the occupant of that office. Bertrand de Jouvenal (The Pure Theory of Politics, Cam. bridge Univ. Press, 1963, p.118) makes this point in an interesting way:

In the museum at Corinth there are two statues, artistically worthless, which testify to the fashion under Roman rule of setting up in a place of vantage the standing figure of the governor. The sculptor has reproduced, with uninspired exactitude, every detail of the military costume borne upon occasions of state by the representative of the civitas imperans. Only the head is lacking, nor is it by accident: a hollow between the shoulders reveals grooves designed for the fitting of a removable head upon the massive body. Thus were the citizens spared the expense of putting up a new statue to honour a new governor: the old face was taken down and a new face was set in its stead. This can serve to symbolize established Authority. The statue has been set up at some previous time and lasts through many generations; but the face must be that of a living and active magistrate. The end of a life, or of a term, removes the transient head from the enduring shoulders. There is now a void to be filled, an opportunity for a new man to lift his head on to the shoulders of the statue … A complex political system comprises many statues, and the procedures for lifting heads on to them are diverse.

The legal rights of high political offices in the United States are determined primarily by the Constitution (including judicial interpretations of the Constitution). We needn’t engage in a lengthy argument to show that political privileges thus acquired run contrary to the principle of nonaggression. A reading of the Constitution alone is sufficient. Art. I, Sect. 10, for example, vests in Congress the power “To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises … To regulate commerce with foreign nations … To coin money … To establish post offices and build roads … To declare war … To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union,” and so forth. To say, as does Art. I, Sect. I, that these “powers” are “vested in” Congress means that the physical might of the State will be used to back up Congressional decisions in these areas should any citizens disobey or resist. Some members of the State, in other words, will call on other members of the State (police, military, etc.) to enforce their will.

Members of Congress have immense power; their decisions are backed by the physical coercion of the State. If my neighbor decides to rob me, it is unlikely that he can enlist the power the State to assist him. But if a Senator decides to rob me (by voting for a tax bill), the full weight of the State will fall on me should I resist.

Members of the State are thus allied in a common cause; they share an enforcement mechanism whereby their decisions will be enforced at the point of a gun. An office-holder has objective power commensurate with his legal rights. The more privileges he enjoys, the more power he wields. This power exists independently of what he decides to do with it. It exists prior to any action he may take in office, because it is inherent in the office. By the fact that an individual qualifies for an office, he acquires the legal rights of that office.

Legal rights — privileges enforced by the State — exist apart from their exercise, just as natural rights do. A man has a natural right, say, to purchase an aardvark, even though he may never actually purchase an aardvark in his life. The right exists whether he exercises it or not.

Similarly, the office-holder acquires special legal rights which exist independently of their exercise. The Senator, for example, has the legal right to pass tax laws — meaning that the State will back him up if he does so. A particular Senator (e.g., a libertarian) may never actually vote for a tax bill, but he has the legal right nonetheless. The privilege resides in the office.

A person elected to high political office allies himself with the power of leviathan. He voluntarily seeks and successfully achieves the privileges of political office which permit him to aggress against his neighbors — privileges enforced by the State.

Such a person is a dangerous threat to innocent persons everywhere. Not only has he captured a position of immense power, but he also swears an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and accepts payment (i.e., stolen money) for “services rendered.” When a person voluntarily seeks and attains invasive power, swears to enforce the rules that maintain his power, and receives a handsome salary to boot, the conclusion is inescapable: this person has become a full-fledged member of the State. He accepts its privileges, pledges his loyalty, and reaps its rewards. The protest of the libertarian office-holder — that he intends to use his power for beneficent ends — is beside the point. His actions speak louder than words. He has joined the “ruling class.”

11. The Ruling Class

In the tradition of Mosca and Pareto, libertarian anarchists embrace a theory of the ruling class based on political, rather than economic, criteria. Those who hold positions of significant political power, according to this view, are members of the “ruling class.”

Political anarchists are hard-pressed to reconcile their ruling class theory with their advocacy of political action. Political criteria for the ruling class will include libertarian politicians in their purview. The specific behavior of politicians does not determine whether they are part of the ruling elite. (A congressman does not leave the ruling class when he votes correctly and re-enter when he votes incorrectly.) Rather, those who hold significant positions of power in the State belong to the ruling class, regardless of what they do with their power. This includes libertarian office-holders.

Ruling class theory is just one of many areas where the political anarchist dodges the implications of his own theories. Sooner or later these issues must be confronted. Is the libertarian congressman objectively a member of the ruling class? If not, why not? If so, then presumably a “ruling class” is not necessarily evil or undesirable by anarchist standards. This, too, requires some explaining.

12. The Paradox of Liability

In the earlier parts of this essay I touched on an important subject without examining it in detail. Why is it, I asked, that “anarchists often impute greatest liability to the highest levels of political decision-making (presidents, legislators, etc.). even though these levels are far removed from physical enforcement”? I suggested that such judgments occur within an institutional framework, according to the role played by political offices in sustaining State power. We are now able to expand on this insight.

We are addressing what I call the “paradox of liability.” As we ascend the hierarchy of political offices we become more distant from the enforcement arms of government. But we also come closer to those persons who are, in a sense, most responsible for the State’s invasive activities. (As I pointed out in Part Two, “There were more condemnations of President Johnson during the Vietnam War than of individual bomber pilots.”)

Perhaps ascribing liability to high political offices is a mistake. Perhaps anarchists should blame only those who literally use physical violence (which would exonerate Hitler, Stalin, and others of their ilk). This approach causes more problems than it solves, however, not the least of which is the gutting of anarchist theory. It is safe to assume that most anarchists subscribe to some version of the liability paradox.

But does this paradox make sense? Should not the person who actually commits a crime be more liable than the politician who authorizes or commands it? In a sense, yes. A soldier who kills innocent civilians is guilty of murder, pure and simple. He is fully liable for his action. But the invasion of the individual soldier is relatively limited in scope. He may murder, but he does not determine the policy that authorizes murder on a vast scale. This is a privilege reserved for high political office (in most cases).

In a war crimes trial, President Johnson would not be as liable for a particular murder as the person who physically committed the act. But Johnson shares some liability for a vast number of similar acts. His degree of liability for a particular murder may be less, but his range of liability is far greater.

Consider another example: the tax agent who physically expropriates the property of a tax resister or drags him off to jail. Would congressmen who support taxes be as culpable as the tax agent who actually commits the foul deed? Probably not. They would be accomplices rather than principals. But the congressmen are accomplices to many such invasive acts — far more than can be perpetrated by a single agent. Although the degree of liability may be less for the congressmen than for the perpetrator, the scope of liability is far greater.

This is only a suggestion. A libertarian theory of liability awaits more work before any solution to the liability paradox can hope to be securely grounded. But I think my suggestion is a plausible step in the right direction. Its two components may be summarized as follows:

First, high political offices possess greater power (more privileges and wider discretion to dispense power) than enforcement personnel. Fundamental decisions are made at this level; this is where invasive policies originate.

Second, because the decisions of political office-holders are more fundamental, they are also more general in scope than the decisions of enforcement personnel. Their applicability is broader, because political decisions reverberate throughout the State and throughout the territory over which it claims sovereignty. Thus, when we say that President Johnson was “more responsible” for murders than individual bomber pilots, we mean:

(1) President Johnson, utilizing the power of his office, made fundamental decisions that set the State apparatus in motion.

(2) President Johnson was responsible, to whatever degree, for a broader range of casualties (a greater number of murders) than any individual bomber pilot.

13. Political Offices as the Manifestation of Sovereignty

The paradox of liability helps us to understand how political offices bolster State sovereignty. High offices are distinguished by their fundamentality and scope. Therefore, we may reasonably expect territorial sovereignty — the fundamental goal of the State — to be embodied in the most powerful offices. This is indeed what we find. The guardianship of State sovereignty is the most significant institutional role of high offices. They are designed to preserve and promote that sovereignty; and this purpose is served regardless of who occupies the office, so long as the occupant meets the demands of his job. (See the discussion of the auto worker in Part Two.)

E.T. Hiller, in A Study in Principles of Sociology (Harper and Row, 1947, pp.581-6), describes the relation between offices and the association they comprise:

Various functions are required to maintain an association and promote its aims. These functions, when standardized, constitute statuses which are usually referred to as offices. An office consists of the delegated administrative, executive, supervisory, and ceremonial functions belonging to an association (whether public or private, official or voluntary). It comprises prescribed, institutionalized duties and, comparable rights and privileges … The office is an expression of the special aim or aims of the association … In each type of association the authority of an office is derived from the aim to which the association is committed, the authority proceeding from the higher to the lower ranking positions … An office … is an established system of social relations which constitutes a part of the social organization. By entering [an office] the incumbent is required to play the specified part in maintaining the given social structure.

The highest legislative, executive, and judicial offices are the incarnation of sovereignty. This was obvious to the framers of the Constitution, even if it escapes many political libertarians. Assertions of sovereignty precede the enumeration of powers for each branch of government. To wit:

Art.I, Sect.I: “All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States .. .”
Art.II, Sect.I: “The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.”
Art.III, Sect.I: “The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”

Note well the wording. “All legislative powers,” “The executive power,” “The judicial power.”

An absolute monopoly of these functions is proclaimed at the outset — a monopoly enforced at the point of a gun. No competition can ever be permitted at this level. The State could abandon its monopoly on virtually every “public service” and yet remain a sovereign entity. But it cannot surrender its monopoly of political decision-making without surrendering its sovereign lifeblood.

Major political offices thus embody the basic claim of sovereignty: that members of the State have the sole legal right to rule a certain territory. If power reflects a spirit of arrogance — the impertinence that one person has the right to tell another person how to live — then political office is the body in which that spirit dwells.

Suppose a libertarian Senator votes against every piece of invasive legislation. Can he be held accountable for that legislation, if it passes despite his opposition? No. But that Senator is responsible for sustaining State power on a more fundamental, if less obvious, level. In filling his role as Senator — taking his oath of office, exercising his monopoly privilege to decide how we shall be ruled, etc. — he furthers the basic institutional goal of the State: territorial sovereignty. By accepting the framework in which the State operates, by capitulating to its conditions and demands, by voluntarily joining the “ruling class,” thereby acquiring legal privileges backed by leviathan — in a myriad of ways does the libertarian politician do all that the State requires of him.

The libertarian politician, brimming with good intentions. believes that he will use the State to further his ends. The sad truth is that the State will use the libertarian politician to further its ends.

[ Part I ] — [ Part II ] — [ Part III ]

Neither Ballots Nor Bullets


by Wendy McElroy

Number 1

 

 

The Voluntaryist seeks to reclaim the anti-political heritage of libertarianism. It seeks to reestablish the clear, clean difference between the economic and the political means of changing society. This difference was well perceived by the forerunners of contemporary libertarianism who tore the veil of legitimacy away from government to reveal a criminal institution which claimed a monopoly of force in a given area. Accordingly, early libertarians such as Benjamin Tucker maintained that one could no more attack government by electing politicians than one could prevent crime by becoming a criminal. Although he did not question the sincerity of political anarchists, he described them as enemies of liberty: “those who distrust her as a means of progress, believing in her only as an end to be obtained by first trampling upon, violating, and outraging her.” This rejection of the political process (by which I mean electoral politics) was a moral one based on the insight that no one has the right to a position of power over others and that any man who seeks such an office, however honorable his intentions, is seeking to join a criminal band.

Somewhere in the history of libertarianism, this rejection of the State has been eroded to the point that anarchists are now aspiring politicians and can hear the words “anarchist Senator” without flinching. No longer is libertarianism directed against the positions of power, against the offices through which the State is manifested; the modern message — complete with straw hats, campaign rhetoric and strategic evasion — is “elect my man to office” as if it were the man disgracing the office and not the other way around. Those who point out that no one has the right to such a position, that such power is anathema to the concept of rights itself, are dismissed as negative, reactionary or crackpot. They are subject to ad hominem attacks which divert attention from the substantive issues being raised, the issues which will be discussed in The Voluntaryist.

The Voluntaryist is unique in that it reflects both the several centuries of libertarian tradition and the current cutting edge of libertarian theory. The tradition of American libertarianism Is so inextricably linked with anarchism that, during the Nineteenth Century, Individualist-anarchism was a synonym for libertarianism. But anarchism is more than simply the non-initiation of force by which libertarianism is commonly defined. It is a view of the State as the major violator of rights, as the main enemy. Anarchism analyzes the State as an institution whose purpose is to violate rights in order to secure benefits to a privileged class. For those who believe in the propriety of a limited government it makes sense to pursue political office, but for an anarchist who views the State as a fundamentally evil institution such a pursuit flies in the face of the theory and the tradition which he claims to share. Thus, the political anarchist must explain why he aspires to an office he proclaims inherently unjust. Perhaps one reason for the erosion of anarchism within the libertarian movement is that many of the questions necessary to a libertarian institutional analysis of the State have never been seriously addressed. A goal of The Voluntaryist is to construct a cohesive theory of anti-political libertarianism, of Voluntaryism, which will investigate such issues as whether moral or legal liabilities adhere to the act of voting someone into power over another’s life. Perhaps by working out the basics of this theory the unhappy spectacle of “the anarchist as politician” can be avoided.

Another major goal is to examine non-political strategies. In constructing anti-political theory and strategy — which was assumed by early libertarians without being well defined — we will be labeled as merely counter Libertarian Party by those who innocently or with malice are unable to perceive the wider context which leads to a rejection of the political means itself. The myriad of non-political strategies available to libertarians will be dismissed or will be accepted only as useful adjuncts to electoral politics. It is ironic that a movement which uses the free market as a solution for everything from roads to national defense declares that political means, the antithesis of the free market, are necessary to achieve freedom.

As Voluntaryists we reject the Libertarian Party on the same level and for the same reason we reject any other political party. The rejection is not based on incidental evasions or corruption of principle which inevitably occur within politics. It is based on the conviction that to oppose the State one must oppose the specific instances of the State or else one’s opposition is toward a vague, floating abstraction and never has practical application. Political offices are the State. By becoming politicians libertarians legitimize and perpetuate the office. They legitimize and perpetuate the State.

If libertarianism has a future, it is as the movement which takes a principled, resounding stance against the State. Those who embrace political office hinder the efforts of Voluntaryists who are attempting to throw off this institution of force. It is common for libertarians to view anarchism and minarchism as two trains going down the same track; minarchism simply stops a little before anarchism’s destination. This is a mistaken notion. The destination of anarchism is different from and antagonistic to the destination minarchism. The theory and the emotional commitment are different. Murray Rothbard captured the emotional difference by asking his famous question in Libertarian Forum, “Do you Hate the State?” Voluntaryists respond with an immediate, heartfelt “yes”. Minarchists give reserved, qualified agreement all the while explaining the alleged distinction between a government and a state. Political anarchists are in the gray realm of agreeing heartily in words to principles which their actions contradict. It is time to have the differences between Voluntaryism and political libertarianism clearly expressed and for non-political alternatives to be pursued.

It is time for The Voluntaryist.

Ethics of Voting, Part I


 by George H. Smith

1.Introduction

A detailed libertarian critique of electoral voting is long overdue. Political libertarians (i.e., those who support the effort to elect libertarians to political office) are usually silent on the moral implications of electoral voting. When challenged, they typically dismiss moral objections out of hand, as if the voluntaryist (i.e., anti-voting) case deserved nothing more than a cursory reply.

This situation will probably change in the near future. The issues raised in voluntaryist arguments are far too important to be discarded without careful consideration, even if one ultimately rejects voluntaryist conclusions. This is especially true for those political anarchists (if I may use that curious phrase) who support the Libertarian Party. If it is at least comprehensible why minarchists (advocates of minimal government) support a political party, the spectacle of political anarchists is far more perplexing. Hence this essay (to be continued in subsequent issues of The Voluntaryist ) is directed primarily at political anarchists, though some of the material is relevant to minarchists as well.

The purpose of this essay is to explore the moral implications of libertarians (especially anarchists) holding political office, running for political office, or assisting those who do — primarily through the vote. The ethics of voting cannot be divorced from the key question of what one is voting for. And this, as I shall argue, cannot be divorced from the institutional framework in which the voting occurs.

This essay is directed to fellow libertarians who are familiar with the standard debates in contemporary libertarianism, such as that between minarchism and anarchism. I must also assume that the reader is generally familiar with the basic approach of voluntaryism. (if not, my essay Party Dialogue should be consulted, along with the other essays in “The Voluntaryist Series.”) Moreover, standard terms in the libertarian lexicon — e.g., “invasion” and “aggression” (which I use synonymously) — are not defined in this essay. Here again standard libertarian works should be consulted, such as various books and essays by Murray Rothbard. A term that may generate some confusion is “electoral voting.” This means voting for the purpose of placing someone in a political office. It does not refer to other kinds of political voting, such as voting on particular issues in a referendum. (This requires a somewhat different analysis.) Hereafter, unless otherwise noted, the simple term “voting” shall be used to mean “electoral voting.”

Since this essay is to appear in installments, I must beg reader’s pardon if some problems remain unsolved at the conclusion of each part. The theory of voting has been so neglected that it is difficult to explore its moral implications without first laying a good deal of preliminary groundwork. Some pro-voting arguments are based on different premises and actually clash with each other when employed by the same person. Other pro-voting arguments appear decisive, but they retain this appearance at the expense not only of voluntaryism, but of principles common to all libertarian theories (especially anarchism). These “kamikaze arguments” attack voluntaryism by undercutting the foundations of libertarian political analysis, thus exploding political arguments later.) For one libertarian to use a kamikaze argument against another libertarian is somewhat indelicate, to say the least.

The theory of voting should be investigated within a broad framework of political and legal theory. This plunges us into complex and troublesome areas, like principal-agent relationships, accessories before the fact, aiders and abettors of crime, and so forth. I do not presume to have solved the problems these concepts create for libertarian theory, but libertarianism undeniably depends on some notion of accountability for persons other than those directly involved in criminal (i.e., aggressive) acts.

Libertarians generally agree that the driver of a getaway car is liable for a bank robbery, even if he did not personally wield a gun or threaten force. Similarly, we hold legislators accountable for their unjust laws, political executives accountable for their unjust directives, and judges accountable for their unjust decisions. We do not exonerate these individuals just because they legitimize their actions under the “mask of law.” Yet political and bureaucratic personnel rarely participate in law enforcement; they do not strap on guns and apprehend violators. This is left to the police.

Clearly, therefore, the libertarian (anarchist) condemnation of the State as a criminal gang rests on the view that criminal liability can extend beyond the person who uses, or threatens to use, invasive force. Most of the individuals in government, though not directly involved in aggression, nevertheless “aid and abet” this process. Libertarian theory would be irreparably crippled without this presumption. If criminal accountability is restricted only to direct aggressors, then the vast majority of individuals in the State apparatus, including those at the highest levels of decision-making, must be considered nonaggressors by libertarian standards and hence totally innocent. We could not even regard Hitler or Stalin as aggressors, so long as they did not personally enforce their monstrous orders. The only condemnable persons would be in the police, military, and in other groups assigned to the enforcement of state decrees. All others would be legally innocent (though we might regard them as morally culpable).

Few libertarians are willing to accept this bizarre conclusion, but it automatically follows if we refuse to incorporate within libertarian theory some idea of “vicarious liability” defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as “indirect legal responsibility; for example, the liability of … a principal for torts and contracts of agents”).

Libertarian theorists have virtually ignored vicarious liability in three respects: first, they have rarely acknowledged it as an implicit underpinning in the libertarian (especially anarchist) analysis of the State; second, they have neglected to provide a thorough study and justification of it; third (and most relevant to this discussion), they have not examined its implications for the theory of voting.

I shall not attempt to defend a theory of vicarious liability here, despite the crucial need for such a defense. Because I am addressing fellow libertarians — most of whom accept some version of this principle — I shall accept vicarious liability as a given within libertarian theory and proceed from this foundation. Libertarian theory in general, and anarchist theory in particular, would tread perilously close to incoherence without this presumption. Given this fact, it follows that voters, in some cases at least, are deemed accountable by libertarians for the results of their votes (e.g., legislators who vote for victimless crime laws). And this liability attaches despite the fact that the voters do not directly engage in aggression or explicit threats of aggression. It is incongruous, therefore, for a political libertarian to profess bewilderment that even a prima facie case against voting may exist, on the ground that voting is obviously a nonaggressive act. If voting per se is deemed nonaggressive, if the voter is never accountable for what occurs afterwards, then this attack on vicarious liability succeeds in smashing voluntaryism at the considerable expense of rendering incoherent the libertarian analysis of the State. Thus do kamikaze arguments “succeed”.

The libertarian who seriously believes that voting is always nonaggressive — “How,” he asks, “can pulling a lever in a voting booth constitute aggression?” — is led by his own logic to conclude that voting for any candidate is permissible by libertarian standards, regardless of what the aspiring politician promises to do while in office. A candidate might promise to imprison all redheads in slave labor camps, or to order the execution of all Catholics on sight. But on a strict nonaccountability theory of voting, the voters who placed these politicians in office are in no way liable for their criminal acts. And since — as political libertarians like to remind us — libertarian theory forbids only aggressive acts, there would be nothing inconsistent in a libertarian voting for these power-seekers, because all voting, by definition, is nonaggressive.

Moreover, the successful libertarian politician would find it impossible, qua office holder, to violate libertarian principles while in office. If voting is never aggressive, then the libertarian legislator can never be aggressive (and hence unlibertarian) regardless of what he votes for. Would a libertarian legislator who voted for a draft be regarded by members of the Libertarian Party as having acted contrary to libertarian principle? Most certainly. But if libertarianism forbids aggressive acts only, and if voting can never be an aggressive act, then in no sense can the pro-draft legislator be accused of behaving in an anti-libertarian fashion.

Political libertarians who endorse a non-accountability theory of voting will have to grapple with its many paradoxes. After its implications are understood, it is unlikely to find many defenders. Some political libertarians already concede that a voter may be accountable. For example, Jeff Hummel, a prominent anarchist and supporter of the LP, maintains that “any legislator who votes for an unjust law is … in fact one of the actual aggressors!” (Free Texas, Fall, 1981). Does this argument extend a step further back? Do voters who place these politicians in power share liability for the resulting injustice? Unfortunately, this is one crucial question among many on which political libertarians remain silent.

I have argued briefly that the voluntaryist case against political voting cannot be dismissed as prima facie absurd by political libertarians. This is because political libertarians share with voluntaryists a theory of vicarious liability on which the case against voting is built. (see p. 7 of manuscript) Deny vicarious liability … and political libertarians will be hard-pressed to retrieve their own theory from the wreckage strewn about by their kamikaze attack.

Of course, to establish the prima facie possibility of the voluntaryist case does not cinch the argument. Many more arguments and principles need to be considered. But we have at least cleared a path along which the rest of this article may travel.

2. The Burden of Proof

Before proceeding to an analysis of electoral voting and the arguments pro and con, it may prove helpful to establish some procedural guidelines. Foremost in any argument is the burden of proof. Who assumes the burden of proof in a given dispute? Which side must produce the preponderance of evidence and/or arguments in order to resolve the case? Most important, if the responsible party fails to meet the burden of proof, then what is the status of the dispute?

In the voting debate, it is usually assumed that the burden of proof rests with the voluntaryist, i.e., the opponent of voting. If the voluntaryist claims that voting is inconsistent with libertarianism or anarchism, then he must substantiate his claim. He must show that electoral voting actually falls within the category of actions known as “Invasive” or “aggressive.” Failure to accomplish this acquits the political libertarian, or the political anarchist, of all charges.

This procedure seems reasonable. To condemn voting as improper is a serious charge, after all, and it appears that the voluntaryist should assume the burden of proof if he expects to be taken seriously. We see a parallel in legal theory, where a man is presumed innocent until this presumption is “defeated,” i.e., until the defendant is proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The legal presumption of innocence determines where the burden of proof rests. Failure to provide sufficient proof means that the presumption remains where it began: the defendant is innocent.

The legal analogy is accurate in one respect. It points out that the burden of proof is fixed according to the basic presumption of an argument. If, as we have seen, an accused man is presumed innocent, then the onus falls upon his accuser to defeat this presumption. A presumption functions as the starting point in a dispute.

From the legal analogy, however, it does not follow automatically that the political libertarian is analogous to the defendant, and thus it does not follow that the burden of proof lies entirely upon the voluntaryist. Indeed, in dealing with anarchism – the principled rejection of the State — I maintain that there is a presumption against political office-holding and therefore a presumption against voting for political office. Thus the political anarchist is the one who must defeat the basic presumption. When two anarchists debate the ethics of voting, it is the political anarchist who assumes the major burden of proof. It is the political anarchist who must demonstrate to the voluntaryist why voting — an overt participation in the political process — is not a violation of their common anarchist principles. Let us examine this claim in more detail.

Voluntaryists are more than libertarians; they are libertarian anarchists. They reject the institution of the state totally, and it is this element that is not contained (explicitly, at least) within libertarianism. Libertarian theory condemns invasive (rights-violating) acts and says that all human interaction should be voluntary. All libertarians, whether minarchists or anarchists, accept this. It is the defining characteristic of a libertarian.

Libertarian anarchism professes not only the nonaggression principle, but the additional view that the State is necessarily invasive and should thus stand condemned. Libertarian anarchism combines the libertarian principle of nonaggression with a particular analysis of the State — an analysis not shared by libertarian minarchists. It is the premise of nonaggression, coupled with an institutional analysis of the State, that leads to the rejection of the State by the anarchist as inconsistent with libertarian principles.

The above reference to “institutional analysis” is critical. One cannot progress from libertarianism to anarchism without an intervening argument. A principled rejection of the State does not necessarily follow from the nonaggression principle, unless one can also show that the State is necessarily aggressive. This latter point — the anarchist insight into the nature of the State — is the minor premise required to justify anarchism:

Major premise: Libertarian theory condemns all invasive acts. Minor premise: All States commit invasive acts. Conclusion: Libertarian theory condemns all States (or governments — I use the terms interchangeably).

This syllogism illustrates the difference between simple libertarianism (articulated in the major premise) and libertarian anarchism (articulated in the conclusion). The transition to anarchism is realized through the anarchist insight (articulated in the minor premise). This insight is what all libertarian anarchists share with fellow anarchists. It is also what distinguishes libertarian anarchists from their minarchist cousins.

Minarchists qualify as authentic libertarians so long as they believe it possible for their minimal State to remain nonaggressive. The minarchist, like the anarchist, accepts the nonaggression principle; but the minarchist does not accept the anarchist view of the State. This controversy over the minor premise leads to different applications of the nonaggression principle to the State. (Whether this stems from a definitional dispute or from something more substantial need not concern us here.)

The minarchist issues a challenge to all libertarian anarchists, political and voluntaryist alike: “Prove that all governments are invasive. Demonstrate that the State, by its very nature, must violate individual rights.” The anarchist responds, as indicated earlier, with an institutional analysis of the State. He avers that institutional features of the State, such as the claim of sovereign jurisdiction over a given geographical area, render the State invasive per se. This invasive trait persists regardless of who occupies positions of power in the State or what their individual purposes may be. The anarchist insight, in order words, is not arrived at inductively. The anarchist does not investigate every employee of every State, determine each individual to be an aggressor, and then generalize from the individual to the institution. On the contrary, the State is assessed first, qua institution, according to constant structural features inhering in all governments. This institutional analysis leads to the anarchist insight, after which particular individuals within the State are considered to be part of a “criminal gang” owing to their participation in the exercise of State power.

To put it another way: for anarchism, the individual does not taint the institution; rather, the institution taints the individuals who work within it. It is because the nature of the State as an institution renders it irredeemably invasive that we condemn particular offices within the State apparatus, and hence particular individuals who occupy those offices. Such individuals “aid and abet” State injustice, even though they may not personally commit aggressive acts.

It is necessary to understand that the institutional analysis sketched here is vital to all theories of anarchism, including political anarchism. This kind of institutional analysis must be valid if anarchism is to have a solid footing. It is simply impossible for anarchists to derive anarchism from the inductive method described above. It is patently impossible to examine the personal motives and goals of all individuals who comprise “the State” before we can pass judgment on the State itself. In addition, if this research were undertaken, we would find that the vast majority of State employees never intend to aggress against others, nor do they participate directly in aggressive acts. The inductive method never permits us to bridge the gap between individuals and institutions. Indeed, from a purely inductive perspective, there is no “State.” Only individuals exist and act; there are no institutions. The State, then, is a fiction, and it is nonsense to refer to the “State” as “invasive” or “aggressive.” Only individuals can invade or aggress; and although some individuals within that organization we call the “State” may personally aggress, the vast majority do not. To condemn the State per se, therefore, as the anarchist wishes to do — and by implication to condemn all individuals within the State — is flagrantly unjust. It is to besmirch the good names of innumerable State employees who never personally engage in aggression.

This methodological objection to anarchism is important, and anarchists, as I have indicated, will be unable to respond adequately unless they defend the approach I have described as institutional analysis. The coherence of anarchism as a theory hangs on this kind of analysis.

Why is this relevant to the debate over voting? Because it illustrates that the presumption, and therefore the burden of proof, varies according to whether the voluntaryist addresses a minarchist or a political anarchist. Since the minarchist need not adopt an institutional analysis, he will not view the fact that an individual is an agent of the State as even prima facie evidence of improper conduct. There is, for the minarchist, no moral “curse” on the State as such, which then filters down to individuals within the State. Working for the State, in other words, does not constitute a presumption of guilt. The individual is presumed “innocent” until proven otherwise, despite his institutional affiliations.

This is why the minarchist is a difficult convert to voluntaryism. Usually the minarchist must be brought first to anarchism, which requires that he accept an institutional analysis of the State, and only then to voluntaryism. The procedural chasm dividing voluntaryists from minarchists is so wide that this intermediate step is ordinarily required. The burden of proof falls upon the anarchist to establish the soundness of this intermediate step.

But the situation changes when the voluntaryist addresses a political anarchist. Here the anarchist insight — the recognition of the State per se as an invasive institution — is agreed upon by all parties before the argument over voting even commences. Both disputants utilized institutional analysis in order to arrive at their current positions. It is plainly inconsistent, therefore, for the political anarchist to reject voluntaryism because it employs institutional analysis. It borders on hypocrisy for the political anarchist to fall back upon the personal intentions of his favorite politicians in order to save them from the anarchist curse, when he has traveled merrily down the anarchist road without ever having regarded personal intentions as significant before this point. If an institutional analysis of the State is good enough to get us to anarchism, then it is good enough to get us to voluntaryism. Institutional analysis is not a bridge that can be conveniently burned by the political anarchist after he has used it to cross over to anarchism.

It is because of their common acceptance of the anarchist insight that the initial presumption shifts in favor of the voluntaryist. The voluntaryist and the political anarchist agree that the State is inherently aggressive. From this it follows that anyone who voluntarily joins the State — who campaigns for office, receives a salary, swears allegiance to the State, and so forth — is at least highly suspect from an anarchist point of view. There is a presumption, a prima facie case, against the political office-holder in anarchist theory (and thus against voting for a political office). The burden then falls not upon the voluntaryist to show how this office-holder participates in aggression — for both disputants already agree that the State is inherently aggressive and both accept vicarious liability — but upon the political anarchist to show how his favorite office-holder constitutes a valid exception to the general condemnation (the anarchist curse) of the State and its agents.

Anarchists agree that the State is necessarily aggressive, which is why they commonly use terms like “criminal gang” and “ruling class” to describe the State. But anarchists also realize that the State is not a disembodied entity. Institutions are not individuals; they cannot act in any fashion, much less act aggressively. Thus, if the anarchist analysis of the State is to have meaning, it must refer to individuals who work within the structure of the State apparatus. Individuals and their actions, considered within a broader institutional framework (prescribed goals, rules, and procedures), combine to form what anarchists mean by the State. Particular offices within the State, and the individuals who occupy those offices, are assessed according to their importance in directing, supporting, and furthering the institutionalized goals of State power.

It is because anarchists regard the State as inherently aggressive that there exists a presumption among anarchists that anyone who joins the State participates in this aggression. The anarchist curse — the presumption of evil — descends from the condemned institution to the individuals who are necessary to maintain the life of that institution. The institution is the skeleton, in effect, which requires the flesh and blood of real people to operate. These people are highly suspect in anarchist eyes, even if they do not personally aggress, because they are the components required to translate the institutional aggression of the State into concrete reality.

The anarchist presumption against agents of the State, like all presumptions, is defeasible. It may be that the political anarchist can argue for a valid exception to the general rule. He may be able to explain why we should regard all politicians as members of a criminal gang, except those politicians with “good” (i.e., libertarian) intentions. Personal intentions were not previously considered relevant to the anarchist analysis of the State, but the political anarchist may have uncovered new information that will convince his voluntaryist colleague. The political anarchist may thus be able to overcome the presumption, the anarchist curse, that makes his case seem initially implausible. (The idea of an “anarchist politician” does seem counter-intuitive at best.)

In our dispute between the voluntaryist and the political anarchist, therefore, the presumption is on the side of voluntaryism, and the political anarchist assumes the burden of proof. Anarchists of all persuasions have traditionally rejected electoral politics, and with good reason. This seems, after all, to be an essential part of what anarchism means. This is why I wrote in Party Dialogue (“The Voluntaryist Series,” no. 1) that “libertarianism must stand firm against all Senators, all Presidents, and so forth, because these offices and the legal power they embody are indispensable features of the State apparatus. After all, what can it possibly mean to oppose the State unless one opposes particular offices and institutions in which State power manifests itself? ”

With the preceding introduction material, we are now able to undertake a systematic analysis of voting. Some of the issues discussed thus far raise problems far too complex to be resolved without further discussion. These will be addressed in more detail in subsequent parts of this essay.

[ Part I ] — [ Part II ] — [ Part III ]

Other “How I Became a Voluntaryist” contributions


Abel, Charlie: Politics is Rotten

For me, it started in 2006 when I learned about the income tax scam. Then, in 2008, I helped with the Ron Paul presidential campaign and saw first hand all the backstabbing and what a rotten system politics really is. Then, I continued to learn by reading the voluntaryist website and listening to Marc Steven’s radio show, The No State Project. After a while, it was a natural progression to realize that a voluntary based society is the only system that is compatible with human nature, because it’s obvious that you can persuade, motivate, and give incentives to people, but you just can’t force them to do anything. The old adage, “you can lead a horse to water, but you can’t make him drink,” pretty much sums it up.


A Grateful Subscriber: My Evolution as a Voluntaryist

Dear Carl,
I really appreciate this opportunity to correspond with you! Of course you know that people with beliefs like ours are considered the Ultimate Radicals and I often experience a sense of isolation, even among friends, because the gulf between my beliefs and theirs simply cannot be bridged. Even when we discuss issues [which is often], our conversations become a game of Devil’s Advocate; no matter how sound my logic, how morally true my arguments, there seems to be a wall up in their minds that prevents them from giving any serious thought to the notion that Government by its very nature is destructive and immoral.

I found your web page; really enjoyed your article about the mails. I’ve also found segments of Lysander Spooner’s NO TREASON on the web, which are incredibly persuasive, moral and practical (The Constitution of No Authority, especially, is incredible) . Since my last letter to you I’ve read FOR A NEW LIBERTY and also DISCOVERY OF FREEDOM, by Rose Wilder Lane . I had been teetering on the edge of “anarcho-capitalism” when I wrote to you last, and Rothbard’s book, coupled with the issues of THE VOLUNTARYIST you sent, kicked me right over. The transformation has given me a surprising sense of peace, as it seems to be my natural inclination, which I’d never been able to articulate before.

A little about myself: I was raised to be a good liberal, and chanted the mantra “Regulate, Redistribute” until I was pregnant and planning a home birth. I was shocked to discover that midwives had been “taken in” at gun point, had their records seized, and been incinerated for “practicing medicine without a license.” From there I discovered vaccination legislation, homeschooling regulation, and other controls which I knew instinctively were not in the sphere of “legitimate” State interference. From there I became your standard American constitutionalist, Restore the Constitution, Restore Liberty, etc. I read voraciously, both extremist patriot literature and more scholarly studies of American History, and while I knew that a return to Constitutional principles would certainly be infinitely preferable to what we have today, to me it seemed that Constitutional limits on government were not enough. I was especially annoyed each time I heard the rallying cry “State’s Rights!”, for to my mind, the state had no more right to control an individual than the feds. But nothing I read seemed to hit the proverbial nail on the head, including mainstream Libertarian Party type literature. When I read the John Singer article in JOURNAL OF ALTERNATIVE EDUCATION, the name “Voluntaryist” struck me as something important, and the rest is history.

I still subscribe to several patriot publications, with THE NEW AMERICAN being my favorite, but I have released my fantasy of America Restored as “the answer,” which has not been very difficult. I’d always had nagging doubts about the reality of American Liberty (apart from slavery) at any point in history, as I’d read court cases and quotes from very early on which struck me as “not quite right”. I just didn’t know there was, or could be, anything MORE right. But an “anarcho-capitalist” friend put it to me quite well one night. He said something like, “If we want to avoid the Ultimate Totalitarian State, a world State, we cannot merely rethink government, we must exist without it!” And that made perfect sense to me. It seemed that just as a baby MUST grow into an adult (unless it dies), the nature of the State is always to increase its own power, until it becomes the Ultimate Authority, replacing not only all national governments, but also the Creator, the ONLY real nonpolitical authority which exists.

First published in Issue 89 of The Voluntaryist


Anonymous: What My Father Taught Me

The most basic and important lesson I learned while growing up [in my father’s store] was that you must cheat on your taxes to succeed or even survive in business, and that most everyone who could, did so. It all began when I realized we treated the front “cash” register different from the “back” cash register. After a little persistent questioning, my father said that we paid taxes on one, but not necessarily the other. He explained that if we paid taxes on every dollar of sales, we would barely break even, and that if we went out of business both we and our customers would be worse off. The meaning of this was clear to me and I understood its implications. This was not stealing. It was our money and if we gave it to the government they would just go and build more urban renewal [or spend it in ways different than those who paid it would have chosen]. Getting “let in on” the family business made my job even more enjoyable, and I would regularly divert sales to the tax-free register.

As I learned more about our operation, it seemed like everything we did violated some government rule or other, but none of the regulations – from recycling prescription bottles to the location and storage of cocaine – made sense. We never got caught and never got sued. I never heard a customer complain and we had plenty of happy long-term customers of all races and creeds.

First published in Issue 152 of The Voluntaryist


Bayer, Kris: My Sense of Justice Revised

Voluntaryism makes sense to me today because I see it as the only way to relate to others on the basis of such things as honesty, respect and mutual agreements. Voluntaryism is the only means for accomplishing peace, prosperity and freedom. I so long for these things!

When I was little, I was told how horrible I was. Free expression of my questions, my emotions, and my intuitive statements were never allowed. I learned quickly to just remain silent, but sometimes I just had to cry out, “This is not right! You do not treat people like this!” My sense of justice was developing early.

In high school I loved my government class, writing and arguing a point. In college in the 80s, I continued to follow my quest for knowledge regarding human relationships in the political, educational, and economic worlds. I involved myself in various rallies to legalize homeschooling, legalize home birthing, and stop abortion. Eight men in Nebraska were put in jail, and the authorities padlocked their church. I was at the rally. I wrote letters to my congressmen and editors of the local papers. One congressman had the nerve to write to me saying, “Because there is no law, it is illegal.” I was shocked. I cried out, “That is not right! How can they make enough laws to cover every detail in our lives?” Little did I know at the time, that was exactly what they were doing.

A seminar on God and government provided great stimulation for my inquiring mind. I thought, what does God have to do with government? This started me on a path to understand our American system and its history. I grew to respect the Founding Fathers and what I thought at the time to be our system of freedom.

The Republican Central Committee was a place for me to do something and do my part in preserving freedom, I thought. That did not happen. Soon I discovered Howard Phillips and the U.S. Taxpayers Party (which became the Constitution Party.) I became an Independent, and we worked in Nebraska to get Howard on the ballot in the 1990s. This did not happen either. However, the third party debates were fascinating to me, and I soon discovered all kinds of political ideas. The media control protecting the two party system is not right!

Homeschooling seven children took me out of the public world and into our home to study more on the American founding principles. Over the years of listening, learning and experiencing the realities of our social world, I realized that the systems that surround much of our experience treat us as children. Children grow up with parents and teachers dictating their world and experience. Once we think we become an adult and finally graduate from home and school, we end up in another system that attempts to dictate the rest of our lives with regulation, taxation, and threats of punishment if we do not comply and obey. I cry out, “This is not right either!”

My middle daughter was born in 1992; her name is Liberty. What a precious concept! America is the land of the free and the home of the brave. Right? I was discovering this is not so! I think my kids were more free than I was. They did not have birth certificates, vaccinations or social security numbers. We enjoyed our home and each other. I still have the two youngest at home teaching me more about life and social relationships.

The more I read and experience this world, the more I discover that relationships matter the most to me. My children were certainly human beings, not objects and numbers. With each child I discovered that they each are special and definitely an individual with their own purpose and destiny. It was not my job to dictate who or what they were but to enjoy the unfolding of their discovery.

I refuse to be a number and yet that is how I am treated by the system we have in place. My twelve-year-old daughter and I were having one of THOSE conversations the other day. She was angry and not willing to accept what I had to say. “Mom, you are treating me just like you complain about the government treating you. You do not like it any more than I like being treated this way,” she said. I laughed. She was not happy with me, but right on! The government is treating us like children or just plain numbers. This is not right!

Four years ago, I moved to Colorado and met a woman that introduced me to V-50. Her mom was in Andrew Galambos’ live lectures in California in the 1960s and 70s. I purchased the V-50cd set that J. Snelson prepared in which he elaborates on the original Galambos material. I listened to over 50 hours of these lectures on the science of freedom. Now I am listening to the original lectures by Galambos himself. Galambos and Snelson changed my world. I finally found what I was looking for: a peaceful, just, and humane way of solving my problems and the world’s problems. What a beautiful world that can be created with voluntary action!

I thought I was an anarchist. I loved reading The Conscience of an Anarchist by Gary Chartier. What a compelling argument. I agree it is time to leave the State and build a free society! However, anarchy has such a negative connotation I think we need a new word. I like voluntaryism. It sounds better. So I am a voluntaryist, if I have to have a label. Generally I do not fit too neatly in any box so I hesitate labeling myself. I just think that how we treat one another and engage in exchange with others must be voluntary if we want peace, prosperity and freedom. I so long for these things!


Buhl, Andrew: How I Became a Voluntaryist

Many years ago I worked with a fellow who said he was a ‘libertarian’. He never explained what it was, other than the fact that libertarians were ok with him smoking marijuana. I wrote it off as something akin to the marijuana party. But a seed of a different kind had been planted. Fast forward to the last year or so when I started to realize that my involvement in the structured system that most people accept as normal wasn’t working for me, but actually against me and almost every one else, the seed started to germinate.

I had been talking to a friend in NYC about libertarianism and liked what I was hearing. I was struggling with some of the social network issues (I am Canadian) such as socialized medicine and social assistance for the disabled and unemployed. He agreed that the Canadian model worked better than the big medicine/ big pharma model from the USA. Then I started to think. I don’t use a regular doctor, I go to a doctor of Traditional Chinese Medicine, that isn’t covered under our provincial health plan. I came to realize i was paying through the provincial health plan for EVERYONE ELSE’S health care and then paying cash for my families on top of it. The snowball was rolling down hill and picking up mass and speed.

Then another friend from Manitoba posted something about voluntaryism on Facebook. Wow. It blew my mind. It was every thing I knew in my heart to be right. Living you life the way you want and allowing others to be free. Such a simple concept but it was like the red pill in the matrix. It radically changed my life outlook. I read more and realized that government is self perpetuating, that there is no such thing as just a little government, that it will always regrow. It made voluntaryism the only conceivable alternative.

I had been politically active in the past and now realize that no participation is the only reasoned response in light of the facts I had been presented with. I realized that heath care, unemployment insurance, welfare were all more expensive though the system as there are always attendant administrative cost that are part of normal operations.

Now I am a outspoken and unapologetic voluntaryist. Something I don’t see changing anytime soon.


Duncan, Don: My Political and Economic Re-Education

This is a subject I have thought about since 12 and studied online at mises.org. among other sites. I went to the library at 13 and checked out “The Communist Manifesto” because my father and grandfather were communists. I was given books by Marx and Engles my father had hidden. He was afraid to admit his political beliefs for a long time. We met a 74 year old socialist economist who ran his garden supply & nursery when I was 16. Every Sunday, if it was raining, we would discuss politics and economics for hours instead of working in the garden or yard. Harvey (the socialist) told me to investigate the Federal Reserve Act. He claimed it was the worst piece of legislation ever passed. I have read many books on it. He was correct. My political and economic re-education was by independent reading, not in the public system. I remember being sent to the principle’s office at Whitney Ave. School for asking questions of my teacher, Jack Smith, could not answer. Why? Because my questions pointed out his contradictions. (He claimed the U.S. was Capitalist but could not explain import taxes to protect American businesses at the expense of American consumers.) At La Sierra I constantly argued with Mr. Frizzi when he criticized Capitalism. His slanders were unsubstantiated and I kept pointing that out. At 16 I had become a Capitalist despite my upbringing. I do not believe this country has been Capitalist for 100 years. It was never completely Capitalist. It has always had a mixed economy, part Capitalist and part Socialist. There is no third system and the mixture is unstable and becomes Socialist because Capitalism has not been understood, even by Capitalist businessmen. Ayn Rand wrote a book to explain why Capitalism is the only system that works: “Capitalism, the Unknown Ideal”. If this were taught in school we would not have the current mess, here and worldwide. But a public school would not allow such a book. Government and Socialism support each other. They are both founded on the idea that the individual must be sacrificed to the “general welfare”. In this system we are asked to accept injustice on a personal scale for a “greater good”. No property rights can exist under this system even though the proponents claim the reverse. No right to life exists also. This system had been tried for thousands of years in hundreds of cultures. The most remarkable resent example is the USSR. After 74 years of untold suffering and denial of reality, they finally admitted it was not working. Socialists here are NOT deterred. The same can be said around the world. The problem is they have no idea how freedom works, even though they use the word. Why should they? Schooling is by government which always indoctrinates in one way: authoritarianism. Public schools teach us to be a good citizen, i.e., follow the law, i.e., do what we are told, even if it makes no sense or if it seems irrational or self destructive. This is pure superstition. It is the most dangerous, anti-life superstition ever proposed. It must be questioned. It must be exposed and rejected.

We see this superstition go unquestioned in the article about Wal-Mart you sent. It proposed we let Wal-Mart run the country. What does it mean to “run the country”? It means to rule. I don’t want to be ruled or be ruler. I want to self govern. I want to protect myself because no one has ever come up with a system that will protect me from a group of monopoly protectors. Private protection agencies may be flawed but they can be fired and must guard their reputation. Government has no such restraint. As all the world’s experiments with government have shown; all governments grow into monsters.

We don’t need a violent revolution. All we need to do is: stop supporting our destroyers.

I shop at Wal-Mart a lot. They are a good example of a more or less free market. I really love Trader Joe’s and Whole Foods Market. These 3 get 95% of my business. I would use the farmer’s market if it was closer.


Fox, Garrett:Voluntarily Coming From Truth and Change

About 10 years ago I was told that it’d be in my best interest to open a bank account to have somewhere to store the money that I was earning. Seemed reasonably at the time. That’s what you’re supposed to do right?

So I open the account and was told I could open a checking/debit account for easier transactions. I said “Ok cool, sign me up”. I even got a card with my picture on it. This was really exciting for me at the time. I was growing up and taking control of my life.

Little did I know that a year later I was going to get the first in my face dose of “things are not what they seem”. I was tight on cash but was confident that I had enough money [in my year old account] to put some gas in my car. Paid at the pump, gassed up and headed home. The next day I get an email that my account had been over drafted. They had charged me $5 for dropping below the $25 minimum balance requirement.

So I’m getting charged for not have enough funds? How is that right? Then, because of that initial $5 fee my account over drafted from the gas I purchased and I was charged another fee. This one was $30! Now my account balance was actually a negative number. I owed my bank money because I wasn’t thinking about all the fine print from a year ago.

This all started a chain reaction of money issues for me which I was eventually able to work out. But, I’ve never trusted a bank since.

Not too much longer after getting my first taste of being legally robbed, a major national incident happened. I was sitting in my 11th grade US History class [of all the classes i could have been in] when one of the other teachers came frantically into our class with a TV. A couple of planes had just plowed into the twin towers. Just watching the videos of the towers falling, I could tell something wasn’t right. It just felt like I was being lied to. Why would these buildings just fall straight down like that? I kept asking myself. Not to mention my school mates where running around excited about how we where getting out early that day. The whole world had changed, almost like a movie.

For the next 7 years I just floated through life. Knowing that things weren’t alright. We’re in all of these wars, gas prices are exploding and we’re in this “Greatest Depression”. I felt trapped. Well then I’m just going to party and work on my career, I decided. So somehow (it’s a long story) I ended up in Las Vegas. Living with a couple gnarly roommates, this is where I really started pulling my head out of the sand.

My roommate walks up to me and starts saying something about this new agenda to combine Canada, the US and Mexico. There was even this supposed new currency called the Amero. How the hell is this possible and I’ve never heard a thing about it? So my rommate shows me this crazy movie [you might have heard of it] called Zeitgeist. “Ladies and gentlemen, please fasten your seatbelts it’s going to be a crazy ride”. This opened the floodgates. I wanted to know MORE.

I had all of these questions now. From “how does nobody know this” to “You mean I don’t have to pay taxes”? Every question I had that got answered, just led me to more questions. Now I had a mission, a goal, something to live for. Expose the truth. Through further research I stumbled upon a little group by the name of We Are Change based out of New York City. Then I started a Meetup for our chapter in Maryland. It’s an awesome thing when you’re searching the internet about a particular topic and you come across a website that you can join and share ideas with other like-minded individuals. It all has to start somewhere.

After a couple years of street actions, protests and hours of conversation with people who just didn’t want to hear any of it, I got frustrated. I get it, so how come my friends and family are so content with ignoring the things I’m trying to show them. All of this anger and frustration led up to one question in my mind, “How can I live free, right now”? It was this question that led me to New Hampshire’s Free State Project.

There are people already joining together to live in liberty oriented communities up in New Hampshire? They’re living their lives to the fullest and not asking for permission?! This is where I stumbled upon the website for the 2010 Porcupine Freedom Festival. Before I could even finish the event description, I was forwarding the link to all of my friends and making preparations to take off of work so I could go see what this festival was all about. This was, by far, the best thing I have ever done for myself.

I came in there as a constitutionalist who was getting ready to run for my district’s Republican Central committee. I didn’t want to be a registered republican but I needed to do something more constructive than just my local activism. And boy did PorcFest change that! Who knew a bunch of Anarchists with guns could be so intelligent?

Through many conversations and after watching a ton of great speakers and debates, I was starting to realize something. Freedom doesn’t come from the top down. It comes from within. I realized that I didn’t have to wait for the system to collapse, or for everybody to wake up. I could start living more free everyday.

Leave it to an event like PorcFest to turn a “Truther” into an individualist-anarchist-voluntaryist or whatever you want to label it today. I have had a blast so far, learning ways to avoid all these governmental constraints. And just doing things everyday without anyones permission, as long as it doesn’t conflict with the Non-Agression Principle. I’ve never had such good relationships with friends and such a joy for life since I became a Voluntaryist


Geddes, Raymond:My Story

What follows is a brief history of a conversion to libertarianism.

I was born in 1924-6years after the mess that was WW1 and started in the 1st grade in 1930. My family REALLY knew what the depression was. There was very little money. My father was a Roosevelt supporter Democrat. I remember him [a one-horse businessman] arguing with his boyhood friend who was a bureaucrat and was anti-Roosevelt and on the other side.

As the war clouds gathered, we were very patriotic and I joined the Army in 1942. My first claim to fame is that at 0125 on D-Day I jumped into Normandy with the 501st Parachute infantry ,101st A/B Division and of course like many others was wounded later on in that operation. I was not yet 20 at the time but I will say that I grew up in the Army. My second claim to fame is that when I became 21 I cast my first vote– For Roosevelt…

As an aside, those of us who were in the service got rid of Hitler, Mussolini and Tojo– the external threats to the USA and freedom. You today have a far more difficult job getting rid of the internal threat– the rot that exists in Washington D.C. I fear for the future of freedom.

Anyway, I was discharged in 1946 and went through the University of Maryland graduating in 1951-10 years after high school. I had long realized something was wrong but did not know what. Then, in 1979 my son gave me Robert Ringer’s “Restoring the American Dream”. If ever a book changed my thinking it was that book. It really opened my eyes. Later on, attending the Free University courses at Johns Hopkins given by Carl completed my conversion to libertarianism and I have been one ever since.

As Carl once said, “libertarianism or voluntaryism does not have all of the answers but it is sure better than what we have now”.


McIntyre, Terry: How I Became a Voluntaryist

In my teens, when I came across the Henry Thoreau quote about “that government is best which governs not at all”, it made perfect sense to me. When I later fathered two children, the most natural thing in the world was to teach them myself – not that I know everything, but it was obvious to me that many teachers at government-regulated schools knew far less.

Today, my daughter teaches her five children. The eldest just completed “third grade” (he is nine years old) , took a standardized Woodcock Johnson test, and achieved “18th grade equivalent” on all math sections; the rest of his skills aren’t too shabby, either. His siblings are far ahead of the norms in many categories. The same is widely true of home-schooled children; they average about 35 percentile points higher than their peers.

I spent years trying to work with minarchists, viewing them as sort of “fellow travelers” – we were going in the same direction, and would discuss the final destination when we got closer, in theory. However, over the years, I’ve seen many minarchists become warhawks; they view “defense” as one of the “proper” roles of government, and forget that all the libertarian criticisms of socialism – the public choice argument that special interests will capture the bulk of benefits, and the inability of socialist “markets” to calculate what is worth doing, or how to do it efficiently – apply just as much to the military as to any other socialist institution.

Nowadays, I avoid politics and stick to the basics: helping and encouraging people to teach their own, to defend their own, and to provide for the well-being of their own, through voluntary cooperation. When enough of us get used to doing these things for ourselves, the State will be seen as obviously superfluous and counterproductive.


Mower, Brodie: My Voluntaryist Story

About eight years ago, I purchased a Nissan 350z. I then joined my350z.com. They had a politics section. I decided to go there. I posted a thread stating I thought that there needed to be more regulations to keep businesses in check. At the time I would probably have considered myself a conservative Democrat. To my surprise, the posters on the forum posted a resounding no to my question. I then had a long conversation with them (I later found out they were libertarians) after which I had to conclude that they were right and that regulations were bad for businesses to thrive and unnecessary as well for product safety. Over the next couple of years I had more conversations with them. I then started looking for more content and ran across cato.com and fee.org. I read them for a while and then came across mises.org and freetalklive.com. By this time I had become a minarchist. After having quite a bit of discussion on mises.org and listening to freetalklive, I finally gave up the whole idea of needing government. The whole process took about six years. Later I discovered Marc Stevens website and bought his book Adventures in Legal Land. This solidified my understanding of justice and how exactly government courts are not just.

What Voluntaryism Means to Me


By Carl Watner
(June, 2014)

 

I don’t have any special qualifications to define ‘voluntaryism,’ except that I have been publishing THE VOLUNTARYIST newsletter since its inception in 1982, and am a long-time student of the concept. Both in historical tradition and in contemporary usage, voluntaryism coincides with my personal philosophy of non-violence and non-participation in politics. With special thanks to all the voluntaryists of the past who have contributed to this tradition, I offer the following personal statement of belief:

1. I condemn all invasive acts and reject the initiation of violence. This is what many today call ‘libertarianism.’

2. I assert that the State acts aggressively when it engages in taxation and coercively monopolizes the provision of public services. Many disagree with this assertion, but those who agree with it would generally label themselves ‘anarchists.’

3. This anarchist insight into the nature of the State – that the State is, inherently and necessarily, an invasive institution – serves to distinguish the anarchist from the libertarian, for my purposes here. In other words, not all libertarians are anarchists, since some libertarians view limited taxation and limited government as non-invasive and legitimate.

4. I hold the doctrine, which is common among anarchists, that all the affairs of people should be conducted on a voluntary basis. I do not argue for the specific form that voluntary arrangements will take; only that coercion be abandoned so that individuals in society may flourish.

5. The burden of proof is on those who attempt to justify the State (in whatever form) since they are trying to prevent people from peacefully using their own property in accord with their own desires.

6. Although it is not incumbent upon them to do so, some anarchists try to present their vision of a future stateless society. Based on these ‘visions,‘ we find many different types of anarchists. Two chief issues which have divided anarchists historically and theoretically are the questions of 1) how property will be owned in a stateless society; and 2) what means will be used to remove the State from our lives.

7. I am an individualist-anarchist because I recognize the validity of the self-ownership and homesteading axioms. The individualists advocate private ownership – both in property for personal consumption, as well as in the means of production. Collectivist-, communist-, and syndicalist- anarchists, on the other hand, support some sort of communal/community ownership of the means of production.

8. Like all voluntaryists, past and present, I commit myself to shunning participation in the electoral system, and also reject violent means of fighting or sabotaging the State. Violence is no substitute for convincing argument. People must come to the conclusion that the State is not a necessary social institution. Rejection of the political means and violence is premised on the voluntaryist insight that governments depend on the cooperation of those they rule. Etienne de a Boetie, a mid-16th Century Frenchman, was probably the first to call attention to this observation: If enough people withdraw their consent, the State will fall of its own accord. The Voluntaryist Statement of Purpose explains it thusly:
Voluntaryists are advocates of non-political, non-violent strategies to achieve a free society. We reject electoral politics, in theory and in practice, as incompatible with libertarian principles. Governments must cloak their actions in an aura of moral legitimacy in order to sustain their power, and political methods invariably strengthen that legitimacy. Voluntaryists seek instead to delegitimize the State through education, and we advocate withdrawal of the cooperation and tacit consent on which State power ultimately depends.

9. Thus, graphically displayed, there would be a large circle labeled “libertarians.” Then there would be a smaller circle within the libertarian circle, which would be labeled “anarchists,” and within the anarchist circle would be yet a smaller circle labeled “voluntaryists,” for those anarchists who reject electoral politics and embrace peaceful change.

10. I think that H. L. Mencken pretty well summarized my sentiments, when he wrote in THE FORUM of September 1930:

“I believe that all government is evil in that all government must make war upon liberty and that the democratic form is at least as bad as any of the other forms. But the whole thing may after all be put very simply:

I believe it is better to tell the truth than lie;

I believe it is better to be a free man than a slave; and

I believe it is better to know than to be ignorant.”

On the History of the Word “Voluntaryism”


by Carl Watner

 

 

[This article first appeared in Whole No. 130 of THE VOLUNTARYIST. It appears here in a slightly altered version.]

There is no way to know what voluntaryism might accomplish today or tomorrow, but on moral, historical, and even practical grounds, we have every reason to think that our experiences would parallel that of Beecher’s which are mentioned in the final paragraph of this article. Voluntaryism has a rich past and hopefully an even brighter future.

Voluntaryism has a long historical tradition in the English-speaking world. Our first cite of modern usage is from WIKIPEDIA, THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA, found on the worldwide web:
voluntaryism – “in politics and economics … the idea that human relations should be based on voluntary cooperation …, to the exclusion of political compulsion….. A journal is published based on this idea: The Voluntaryist … (http//:www.voluntaryist.com)”.”
The NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY offers the following definitions, citing usage that dates back to the 1830s:
voluntar[y]ism – “The principle that the Church or schools should be independent of the State and supported by voluntary contributions.”
voluntar[y]ist – “An advocate or adherent of voluntarism or voluntaryism.”

However, voluntaryism has roots deeper than the early 19th Century. The purpose of this article is to show the connections between 21st Century voluntaryism and its intellectual heritage, which can be traced at least as far back as the Leveller movement of mid-17th Century England. The Levellers can be best identified by their spokesmen John Lilburne (?1614-1657) and Richard Overton (?1600-?1660s) who “clashed with the Presbyterian puritans, who wanted to preserve a state-church with coercive powers and to deny liberty of worship to the puritan sects.” All the Leveller thinkers were nonconformist religious types who agitated for the separation of church and state.

During the late 16th and 17th Centuries, the church covenant was a common means of organizing the radical religious sects. This was sometimes an explicit congregational agreement by which those enrolling in a particular church pledged themselves to the faith. The church to their way of thinking was a voluntary association of equals. To both the Levellers and later thinkers this furnished a powerful theoretical and practical model for the civil state. If it was proper for their church congregations to be based on consent, then it was proper to apply the same principle of consent to its secular counterpart. For example, the Leveller ‘large’ Petition of 1647 contained a proposal “that tythes and all other inforced maintenances, may be for ever abolished, and nothing in place thereof imposed, but that all Ministers may be payd only by those who voluntarily choose them, and contract with them for their labours.” One only need substitute “taxes” for “tythes” and “government officials” for “Ministers” to see how close the Levellers were to the idea of a voluntary state. The Levellers also held tenaciously to the idea of self-proprietorship. As Richard Overton wrote: “No man hath power over my rights and liberties, and I over no mans [sic].” They realized that it was impossible to assert one’s private right of judgment in religious matters (what we would call today, liberty of conscience) without upholding the same right for everyone else, even the unregenerate.

These ideas were embraced in Scotland by John Glas, a Dundee minister who challenged the establishment church of the Covenanters. Glas taught that there was no Scriptural warrant for a state church, that the civil magistrate should have no authority in religious matters, and that the imposition of a creed against unbelievers was not a Christian thing. What appropriately became known as the Secession Church began when Glas and three other ministers left the Scottish state church, and formed the first Associate Presbytery in 1733, near Kinross. As W. B. Selbie wrote, “It [the Secession Church] was a Voluntary Church dependent on the free will offerings of the people, and independent of any State control.”

In an extensive discussion of “Voluntaryism” published in Chambers’s ENCYCLOPAEDIA reference is made to the “Voluntary Controversy which sprung up in the second decade of th[e 19th] Century between churchmen and dissenters in Scotland.” There the voluntaryists held “that all true worship … must be the free expression of individual minds. … [T]herefore, religion ought to be left by civil society to mould itself spontaneously according to its own” spiritual nature and institutions. This should be done “without violence to individual freedom from any interposition of secular authority or compulsory influence.” These religious voluntaryists held that the “only weapons of the Church are moral and spiritual. The weapon of the State is force.” They believed that the “Church was never so vital, so convincing, so fruitful as in the first three centuries before her alliance with the State.”

Back in England, from about the mid-1840s to the mid-1860s, voluntaryism became a force to be reckoned with in another sphere. In 1843, Parliament considered legislation which would require part-time compulsory attendance at school of those children working in factories. The effective control over these schools was to be placed in the hands of the Anglican church, the established Church of England, and the schools were to be supported largely from funds raised out of local taxation. Nonconformists, mostly Baptists and Congregationalists, were alarmed by the Factories Education Bill of 1843. They had been under the ban of the law for more than a century. At one time or another they could not be married in their own churches, were compelled to pay church rates against their will, and had to teach their children underground for fear of arrest. They became known as voluntaryists because they consistently rejected all state aid and interference in education, just as they rejected the state in the religious sphere of their lives. Three of the most notable voluntaryists included the young Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), who was to publish his first series of articles “The Proper Sphere of Government,” beginning in 1842; Edward Baines, Jr., (1800-1890) editor and proprietor of the LEEDS MERCURY; and Edward Miall (1809-1881), Congregationalist minister, and founder-editor of THE NONCONFORMIST (1841), who wrote VIEWS OF THE VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLE in 1845.

The educational voluntaryists wanted free trade in education, just as they supported free trade in corn or cotton. Their concern “for liberty can scarcely be exaggerated.” They believed that “government would employ education for its own ends,” (teaching habits of obedience and indoctrination) and that government-controlled schools would ultimately teach children to rely on the state for all things. Baines, for example, noted that “[w]e cannot violate the principles of liberty in regard to education without furnishing at once a precedent and inducement to violate them in regard to other matters.” Baines conceded that the then current system of education (both private and charitable) had deficiencies, but he argued that freedom should not be abridged on that account. Should freedom of the press be compromised because we have bad newspapers? “I maintain that Liberty is the chief cause of excellence; but it would cease to be Liberty if you proscribed everything inferior.” Baines embraced what he called the Voluntary system which included

all that is not Government or compulsory, – all that men do for themselves, their neighbours, or their posterity, of their own free will. It comprehends the efforts of parents, on behalf of the education of their children, – of the private schoolmaster and tutor, for their individual interest, – of religious bodies, benevolent societies, wealthy benefactors, and cooperative associations, in the support of schools, – and of those numerous auxiliaries to education, the authors and editors of educational works, lecturers, artists, and whoever devotes his talents in any way to promote the instruction of the young, without the compulsion of law or the support of the public purse. …

[I]ts very essence is liberty. It offends no man’s conscience, exacts from no man’s purse, favors no sect or party, neither enforces nor forbids religion in the schools, is open to all improvement, denies to no person the right of teaching, and gives to none the slightest ground for complaint. It is as just and impartial as it is free. In all these important respects it differs from systems which require the support of law and taxation.

Although educational voluntaryism failed to stop the movement for compulsory schools in England, voluntaryism as a political creed was revived during the 1880s by another Englishman, Auberon Herbert (1838-1906). Herbert served a two year term in the House of Commons, but after meeting Herbert Spencer in 1874, decided not to run for re-election. He wrote “State Education: A Help or Hindrance?” in 1880, and began publishing his journal, THE FREE LIFE (Organ of Voluntary Taxation and the Voluntary State) in 1890. Herbert advocated a single monopolistic state for every given geographic territory, but held that it was possible for state revenues to be generated by offering competitive services on the free market. Some of his essays are titled “The Principles of Voluntaryism and Free Life” (1897), and “A Plea for Voluntaryism,” (posthumously, 1908).

Although the label “voluntaryist” practically died out after the death of Auberon Herbert, its use was renewed in late 1982, when George Smith, Wendy McElroy, and Carl Watner began editing THE VOLUNTARYIST. George Smith, after publishing his article “Nineteenth-Century Opponents of State Education,” suggested use of the term to identify those libertarians who believed that political action and political parties were antithetical to their ideas. In NEITHER BULLETS NOR BALLOTS: Essays on Voluntaryism, Watner, Smith, and McElroy explained that voluntaryists were advocates of non-political strategies to achieve a free society. They rejected electoral politics “in theory and practice as incompatible with libertarian goals,” and explained that political methods invariably strengthen the legitimacy of coercive governments. In concluding their “Statement of Purpose” they wrote: “Voluntaryists seek instead to delegitimize the State through education, and we advocate the withdrawal of the cooperation and tacit consent on which state power ultimately depends.”

Although there was never a “voluntaryist” movement in America till the late 20th Century, earlier Americans did agitate for the disestablishment of government-supported churches in several of the original thirteen States. Such people believed that the individual was no longer automatically to become a member of the church simply by reason of being born in a given state. Their objection to taxation in support of the church was two-fold: taxation not only gave the state some right of control over the church; it also represented a way of coercing the non-member or the unbeliever into supporting the church financially. In New England, where both Massachusetts and Connecticut started out with state churches, many people believed that they needed to pay a tax for the general support of religion – for the same reasons they paid taxes to maintain the roads or the courts. It was simply inconceivable to many of them that society could long exist without state support of religion. Practically no one comprehended the idea that although governmentally-supplied goods and services might be essential to human welfare, it was not necessary that they be provided by the government.

In Connecticut, the well-known Congregational minister, Lyman Beecher, opposed disestablishment of the State church, which was finally brought about in 1818. In his autobiography, Beecher admits that this was a time of great depression and suffering for him. Beecher expected the worst from disestablishment: the floodgates of anarchy would be loosened in Connecticut. “The injury done to the cause of Christ, as we then supposed, was irreparable.” This supposition was soon challenged by a new revolutionary idea, that true religion might stand on its own without support from the state. “Our people thought that they should be destroyed” if the law no longer supported the churches. “But the effect, when it did come, was just the reverse of the expectation. We were thrown on God and ourselves,” and this made the church stronger. “Before we had been standing on what our Fathers had done, but now we were obliged to develop all our energy.” Beecher also noted with elation the new alignment of religious forces which was the result of disestablishment. By repealing the law that compelled everyone to pay for the support of some church, “the occasion of animosity between us and the minor sects was removed, and the infidels could no more make capital with them against us.” On the contrary, “they began themselves to feel the dangers from infidelity, and to react against it, and this laid the basis of co-operation and union of spirit.” Beecher’s final conclusion was “that the tax law had for more than twenty years really worked to weaken us” and strengthen our opponents.

The Voluntaryist Spirit


 by Carl Watner

 

 

[Author’s Introduction of February 2004: This hitherto unpublished essay was first written in June 1983, and then revised in August of that same year. It sat for two decades (receiving only limited private circulation) until it was read by Peter Ragnar of Avalon Mint and Roaring Lion Press. At Peter’s request it was re-edited with a view to posting on the world wide web. The author wishes to thank Alan Koontz (editing of 1983) and Julie Watner (editing of 2004) for their timely assistance in commenting on this essay.]

Voluntaryism is a dual doctrine, having both a positive and a negative side. As a brand of anarchism it is the doctrine that all coercive government (what most people would refer to as “the State”) should be voluntarily abandoned; that all invasions of individual self-ownership rights should cease. This is its negative side. Its positive side is that all the affairs of people should be conducted on a voluntary basis. It does not argue for the specific form that voluntary arrangements will take; only that the sovereignty of the individual must remain intact, except where the individual coerced has already aggressed upon the sovereignty of another non-aggressive individual.

To voluntaryists, this dual doctrine represents a means, an end, and an insight. The end, predicated upon a theory of self-ownership and just property titles, is a peaceful anarchy, an all voluntary society. All the affairs of people, both public and private, should be carried out by individuals or their voluntary associations. The means to reach such an end-state must be consistent with the goal sought. As shall be demonstrated, it is in fact the means that determine the end. So only voluntary methods of persuasion, education, and nonviolent resistance to State criminality may be used to bring about voluntaryist goals. People cannot be coerced into freedom. Finally, voluntaryism is a realization about the nature of political society, viz., that all States are grounded upon general popular acceptance and require the cooperation of their victims.

These three aspects of voluntaryism mutually reinforce each other. The very goal of an all-voluntary society suggests its own means. The attempt to use governmental or political processes to reform or abolish the evils of coercion is not a voluntaryist means because it rests on coercion. The distinguishing marks of voluntaryism — that it is at once both nonviolent and non-electoral in its efforts to convince people to voluntarily abandon the State — set it apart from all other methods of social change. The voluntaryist insight into the nature of political power does not permit people to violently overthrow their government or even use the electoral process to change it, but rather points out that if they shall withdraw their cooperation from the system, it will no longer be able to function or enforce its will.

The voluntaryist spirit is thus an attitude of mind or a sense of life, if you will, which animates those engaged in the struggle for the recognition of self-ownership rights and the demise of the State. It is the passionate disinterested love of justice for its own sake, regardless of the consequences which the struggle brings to one personally. It is a knowledge that if one takes care of the means that the end will take care of itself. It is an understanding that the morality and principles of voluntary interaction with other self-owners is the only practical manner of living life upon this earth. It is an epistemological rejection of violence, a knowledge that coercion can never rationally convince. Come what will, wherever the chips may fall, voluntaryism seeks the perfect way but it differs from other philosophies of life in seeking it with utter disinterestedness. Right means are an end in themselves, their own reward.

There is a great deal of affinity between what has been called “the aristocratic spirit” and the voluntaryist spirit. Writing in the March 1920 issue of The North American Review, Hanford Henderson defined the former “as the love of excellence for its own sake, or even more simply as the disinterested passionate love of excellence. The aristocrat, to deserve the name, must love excellence everywhere and in everything.” Continuing on, Henderson wrote:

He must love it in himself, in his own beautiful body, in his own alert mind, in his own illuminated spirit and he must love it in others; must love it in all human relations and occupations and activities, in all things in earth or sea or sky. And this love must be so passionate that he strives in all things to attain excellence, and so tireless that in the end he arrives. But not even the hope of Heaven may lure him. He must love and work disinterestedly, without the least thought of reward, enamored only of the transcendent beauty of excellence, and quite unregardful of himself.

Both the aristocratic spirit and the voluntaryist spirit demand the highest effort of the individual. It is a contradiction to say that aristocracy or voluntaryism asks for privilege, which can only be upheld by violence. Coercive grants of power are contrary both to the doctrine of perfection and voluntary means. What the aristocrat and the voluntaryist want is that people come to share their attitudes toward life. Neither “may accept nothing which others may not have upon precisely the same terms, and the terms are unremitting, passionate effort. … It is not a matter of birth, or occupation, or education. It is an attitude of mind carried into daily action. …”

Terence MacSwiney, an early 20th Century Hibernian patriot, referred to the voluntaryist spirit as “a moral force”, “that great virtue of mind and heart that keeps a man unconquerable above every power of brute strength.” “A man of moral force is he who, seeing a thing to be right and essential and claiming his allegiance, stands for it as for the truth, unheeding of any consequence. It is not that he is a wild person, utterly reckless of all mad possibilities . . . and indifferent to any havoc that may ensue. No, but it is a first principle of his, that a true thing is a good thing, and from a good thing rightly pursued can follow no bad consequence. And he faces every possible development with conscience at rest — it may be with trepidation for his own courage in some great ordeal, but for the nobility of the cause and the beauty of the result that must ensue, always with serene faith.”

Although neither Henderson nor MacSwiney would have considered themselves anarchists, they did realize that this mind cast made for a laissez-faire attitude, particularly in such fields of endeavor as education and industry. The aristocratic spirit seeks excellence in variety and resists the tendencies towards enforced uniformity in all areas of life. It looks for a multiform and varied excellence. “The aristocratic world is not one of dead levels, but a world of varied interests and constant promise and unfaltering progress. It is, in a word, the world of evolution.” In fact, it is only in a voluntaryist setting that the aristocratic spirit can truly operate. The attempt to coerce must inevitably vitiate such a spirit. For as Henderson concludes, the teaching that the end justifies the means is not at all in harmony with the aristocratic spirit. “The whole event must be excellent, the means as well as the end. … It is only in the disinterested quest of excellence that anything notable can be accomplished. … Disinterestedness is the essential condition of success.”

MacSwiney, too, understood the importance of means and ends in the Irish struggle against England. “A fight that is not clean-handed will make victory more disgraceful than any defeat.” He maintained that Ireland could not win her independence by “base methods” and that no physical victory could compensate for a spiritual defeat. He also noted that every sphere of a man’s life is interconnected with the rest. Therefore he claimed that the secret of strength was the development of individual character in every activity of life. In an interesting comment on means and ends, he noted that “the middle of the day has a natural connection with the beginning of the day and the end of the day, and in whatever sphere a man finds himself, his acts must be in relation to and consistent with every other sphere. … One cannot be an honest man in one sphere and a rascal in another. … Everything that crosses a man’s path in his day’s round of little or great moment requires of him an attitude towards it, and the conscious or unconscious shaping of his attitude is determining how he will proceed in other spheres not in view.”

Voluntaryism relies heavily on the means-end insight to justify its own position. Indeed, without any formal guidelines as to the shape that an all-voluntary society will take, voluntaryism necessarily concentrates exclusively on the means. Voluntaryism is means-oriented, not goal-oriented because all it objects to is the initiation of coercion against the non-invasive person. So long as the means are peaceful, respectful of self-ownership and property titles, the ends cannot be criticized from the voluntaryist perspective. This is not to imply that the only standard of judging human behavior is whether or not it is voluntary. Certainly some behavior may be irrational, vicious, immoral, religious, irreligious, (etc., etc.) but the first question the voluntaryist asks is: “Is it truly voluntary?” The voluntaryist spirit attacks the State on precisely this basis: although certain government goods or services may be essential, it is not essential that they be provided by government. Whether we object to what governments do (i. e., the provision of whatever product or public service, whether it be public schools, the post office, etc.) is beside the point. Voluntaryists oppose the State because it relies on force for its very existence. We oppose the State because of its means, regardless of its ends.

The means orientation of voluntaryism is not unlike the concept of disinterested attachment associated with the aristocratic spirit. Similarly, it relates to the Hindu doctrine of nonattached action which relies on the paradox “that one cannot travel on the path unless one has become the path itself.” Indeed, although one must have an ultimate goal and destination in life, one’s attachment to it eventually becomes irrelevant and disappears. One’s concern must be with the next step rather than the summit. Only in such a fashion can the exhilaration of the climb become an end in itself rendering unimportant the attainment of the peak. That is why the means to the goal become more important than the goal itself and why the means then become the test of progress. “To travel on the proper path” is more important than arriving at one’s destination. Thus full effort becomes the measure of victory rather than the attainment of one’s goal. The effort is within our power and control; the end is not.

The means-end insight encompasses many important points, the least of which is the commonplace observation that the means one uses must be consistent with the goal one seeks. It is impossible in the nature of things to wage a war for peace or to fight politics by becoming political. Gandhi, who might be considered one of the true aristocrats of all times, understood that “there is a great mystery concealed in the fact that the means are more important than the ends.” As he wrote:

They say means are after all means. I would say means are after all everything. As the means, so the end. There is no wall of separation between means and ends. We have limited control over means and some over the ends. Realization of the goal is always in exact proportion to that of the means. … Our progress towards the goal is always in exact proportion to the purity of the means. This method may appear to be long, perhaps too long, but I am convinced, it is the shortest.

Since the means are the only things we have to work with, they are at least as important as the actual ends we seek. Means to be means must be within our reach. As John Dewey explained it, “the end is merely a series of events viewed at a remote stage and a means is merely the series viewed at an earlier one.” Means must be viewed as intermediate steps but because of this the one closest to us must be considered the most important. The most important means is the next one, the next step in the series of intermediate actions we take to finally arrive at our destination. If we take a false route, even though we know where we wish to go, we will never get there. To finish our journey we must not only begin it but we must begin it in the proper direction and this means attention to the means. “To reach an end we must take our minds off from it, and attend to the act which is next to be performed.”

The idea that the ends can justify the means actually has the process in reverse order. Since the ends pre-exist in the means (like begets like, we shall reap as we have sowed), no end can ever justify a means. What actually happens is that the means not only justify what they accomplish, but they guarantee it. “What today is, makes tomorrow what it shall be.” As Gandhi and many others have said: “take care of the means you employ and the end will take care of itself.” The Rom (the gypsies) have a saying that “the road leading to a goal does not separate you from the destination; it is essentially apart of it” and this readily explains why impure means must result in an impure end.

Different means must inevitably bring about different ends for the simple reason that they lead one down different paths. For the voluntaryist concern with an all-voluntary society this necessitates both eschewing the electoral process as well as revolutionary violence. Neither of these routes can even approximate voluntaryist goals because they depart from the voluntaryist spirit. The existence of a voluntaryist society depends on a change in attitude, an improvement in the moral tone of the people who comprise it. Therefore our means must be voluntary, for moral ends can only be attained by moral means. Our means must be as pure as our ends.

Emma Goldman, in her analysis of the Russian Revolution, written in the early 1920’s, realized that “today is the parent of tomorrow.” The means used to prepare for the future becomes its cornerstone and therefore she held that the means used to bring about social change must always harmonize with its purpose:

There is no greater fallacy that the belief that aims and purposes are one thing, while methods and tactics are another. This conception is a potent menace to social regeneration. All human experience teaches that methods and means cannot be separated from the ultimate aim. The means employed become, through individual habit, and social practice, part and parcel of the final purpose; they influence it, modify it, and presently the aims and means become identical. . . . The whole history of man is continuous proof of the maxim that to divest one’s methods of ethical concepts means to sink into the depths of utter demoralization.

The voluntaryist holds that “the only way to freedom is ‘by’ freedom.” This path does not dictate what specific form the economic system of voluntaryism will take. Its only guidelines are that the resultant system be voluntary, which already implies a respect for self-ownership and just property titles. A regime of proprietary justice allows all economic systems to compete on a voluntary basis and there is no reason why voluntary cooperatives could not exist side by side with voluntary communes or voluntary capitalist companies. How people choose to conduct their voluntary affairs in the absence of the State is up to them.

In advocating an all voluntary society, voluntaryists place the burden of proof on those who wish to justify any form of the coercive State. The advocate of any form of invasive coercion — ­State or non-State — is in a logically precarious position. Coercion does not convince, nor is it any kind of argument at all. In fact, the initiation of invasive force is a confession of the failure of the invader’s persuasive powers. As William Godwin said, “if he who employs coercion against me could mould me to his purposes by argument, no doubt he would. He pretends to punish me because his argument is strong, but he really punishes me because he is weak.”

The epistemological bias against violence is an essential part of the voluntaryist spirit. Those in the position of initiating violence are in a morally and logically indefensible position. As Godwin added, “Force is an expedient, the use of which is much to be deplored. It is contrary to the nature of the intellect, which cannot but be improved by conviction and persuasion. It corrupts the man that employs it, and the man upon whom it is employed.” The burden of proof rests on the advocates of violence (or the State) because “liberty, or the absence of coercion, or the leaving of people to think, speak, and act as they please, is in itself a good thing. It is the object of a favorable presumption. The burden of proving it inexpedient always lies and wholly lies on those who wish to abridge it by coercion.”

Voluntaryist arguments proceed against State coercion by criticizing the means, regardless of the ends. Health care or vaccination may be important, but if they are to be achieved by force (the means) they “ipso facto” become tainted. If those who advocate compulsory vaccination or State health care must rely on force to accomplish their goals, then there is something drastically wrong with their ends. Vaccination or health care is either good or bad. Its goodness removes the need for compulsion and its badness destroys the right to coerce those who oppose it. Coercion never convinces, never brings about a change of mind.

Similar arguments may be applied against the State itself. Either it is good or bad. Its goodness should avoid the need to apply invasive force (for it should be possible to persuade people of its goodness) and its badness already speaks for itself. If a government cannot rely wholly on voluntary support, then it deserves not to exist. Statists, in their anxiety to coerce others, already demonstrate their own lack of faith in the prescription they suggest.

On the other hand, the voluntaryist spirit is permeated with peaceful, nonviolent means. Voluntaryism is certainly not the cure all or end all of social evils, but to the extent that people can be persuaded to embrace the voluntary principle, it offers the best of all possible worlds. Voluntaryism is not to be compared with the model of perfection, it is only offered as the most satisfactory among competing theories.

Voluntaryists do not operate on the principle that everyone necessarily knows his or her own best interest, but only that everyone should have the right to pursue his or her interests as they deem best. “What is being asserted is the right to act with one’s own person and property and not the necessary wisdom of such action.” So long as you “do your own thing” with your “own” person and property you in no way violate the spirit of voluntaryism.

The claim that governments have a monopoly on knowledge is implicit in the arguments of statists. However, given the fact that every individual person is a unique human being, it is highly unlikely that any monopolistic government could engineer or plan a society better than the outcome of the workings of the voluntary principle. Governments have no exclusive monopoly on knowledge or any exclusive monopoly of the knowledge of facts which would enable them to run an economy. In fact, they would have no need to resort to the use of force if their services were voluntarily desired. The very fact they must initiate force to sustain themselves proves they are unwanted and undesired by at least some of the people within their purview.

The fact that the State coercively monopolizes the administration of justice (courts, police, and law code in a given geographic area) makes the State, and its employees, automatically suspect. If there are certain natural laws of justice, then there is no reason for government to become a coercive monopolist. Because the principles of justice are grounded in objective, natural laws, they fall within the province of human knowledge by all who choose to study them and reason them out. Just as we do not require a government to dictate what is right or wrong in steel-making, so we do not require a government to dictate standards and procedures in the realm of justice. If it is possible to verify objectively that one legal procedure is valid, and another not, then it does not matter who employs the procedure in question. We should look to reason and fact; not to government. On the opposing hand, if there is no such thing as natural law and natural justice, then government could certainly not claim to administer a thing which did not exist. In such case there would be no need for government.

Austrian economics, bolstered by the arguments developed by Ludwig von Mises, has long argued that economic calculation under central government planning is impossible. Since profit and loss serve as the central guide for directing the flow of resources, the government of a centrally planned economy has no rational way of calculating because it has sabotaged or destroyed the market pricing system. This inability to make rational economic decisions saps the vitality of any economic system and is inherent in all forms of government intervention. Despite their seeming ability to “direct” and “fine-tune” the economy, government employees and politicians have no special means of obtaining knowledge, any different from those of others. No one has a monopoly of knowledge and no single group or person has a monopoly on the truth, honesty, or fair play. As we have seen of government itself, the very fact that a centrally planned economy needs to initiate force to sustain itself indicates that it is not the most efficient method of social and economic organization. As Murray Rothbard has asked, “if central planning is more efficient, why has it never voluntarily come about through the creation of one big firm?”

Voluntaryists, seeing all forms of government as invasive ‘per se’, nonetheless realize that the State is just one form of coercive monopoly which sustains itself by the use of force, albeit legitimized in the eyes of many. An examination of how to attack coercive monopoly on the market should shed light on how to undermine State power. After all, the problem with government is exactly the same problem as with any other coercive monopoly. The voluntaryist insight points out that all businesses depend on the cooperation, support, and patronage of their customers. The ultimate weapon of both consumers and producers on the market is the option of expressing their indignation by not purchasing from or selling to, boycotting, ostracizing, and non-cooperating with the would-be or actual monopolist. In fact, all market activity on the free market can be interpreted as a variety of nonviolent resistance against those whom one does not wish to deal with. An understanding of monopoly theory applies not only to private monopolies but to any situation where one group has acquired control over the means of production over a large area.

The voluntaryist spirit attacks government and coercive monopolies where it hurts them the most: it destroys whatever legitimacy they lay claim to and urges the withdrawal of the consent and cooperation on which all organizations depend. The “popular health movement” of the 1830’s and 1840’s in the United States illustrates this attitude at work in two distinct ways. First, it shows what incredible diversity can come about when a government does not attempt to monopolize knowledge and coerce people into accepting its authority. Second, it demonstrates the integral nature of freedom. As one medical historian has explained: “A people accustomed to govern themselves . . . want no protection but freedom of inquiry and freedom of action. It was the spirit of the times to throw all fields of business and professional endeavors open to unrestricted competition — why not medicine among the rest? … Hence medicine, with all other human activities, must take its chances in the grand competitive scramble characteristic of the age.” If Americans were entitled to religious freedom, why not medical freedom as well?

“The freedom to discover truth” is what competition is all about. It is only through voluntary exchanges that the truth of the market place can be discovered. “The subjectivity of human wants implies that only individuals participating in an exchange can be the legitimate judge of their own interests. Competition is a learning process” where self-ownership and property rights “provide an incentive to make individuals responsible for their mistakes and give them an incentive to learn.” It is only under voluntaryism that this learning process and self-responsibility are able to exist.

The voluntary principle insures that while we may have the possibility of choosing the worst, we also have the right to choose the best. “By attempting to compel virtue, we eliminate its possibility.” Thus we can see that “freedom is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the achievement of virtue.” Certainly the price of moral freedom is the responsibility of acting at one’s own peril and this always includes the possibility of failure. The voluntaryist spirit, however, asserts that the real victory goes not to those who win the battle but rather to those that fought the best. As David Norton, the author of Personal Destinies, has explained, “moral nobility is earned by the efforts of the individual. It comes about in no other way, it is available to all persons, and it is not a matter of birth but of individual effort.” He reminds us, “that if there is a chance for a good life, the risk of a bad one must also be accepted.”

The voluntaryist spirit, as we have seen, comprises several diverse areas of libertarian thought. It expresses the epistemological bias against violence by arguing that rational persuasion is the only means of judging success. In a very real sense, there are only two relations possible among men — that of logic and war. The person who does not accept physical might as the expression of truth, who rejects the doctrine that might makes right, demands logic instead of force. The person who always demands proof and who never assumes anything on faith alone therefore always remains implicitly a voluntaryist. Such a person refuses to acknowledge the legitimacy of government because it “wields the most violence,” or because “no human society has ever existed without it,” or because “there would be chaos without government-provision of law and order.”

The resort to violence, in place of argument, is an implicit confession that one’s argument is weak and unconvincing. This explains why freedom is better than compulsion. To paraphrase the argument of a 19th Century English bishop, who preferred to see Englishmen free (and possibly drunk) rather than compulsorily sober, we say: With freedom, in the end we might attain our highest desires, but on the other hand, compulsion assures us that we would lose both freedom and our most highly cherished ends. A poor freedom is always better than a rich slavery.

Voluntaryism also emphasizes the importance of self-ownership and just property titles, which form the underlying basis for the very definition of voluntary relationships with others. In fact, we can have no concept of what it is to violate the rights of others, nor can we even make the distinction between invasive and non-invasive force without having an implicit concept of justice, or a code of principles, which defines what a man is due. In short, the very distinction between voluntaryism and coercion depends upon and presupposes a theory of justice in property titles and people. “The principle of self-ownership means we must treat all others with absolute respect for their self-ownership. You literally have no claim on the lives of others, nor they on you. You can only relate to them when, where, and how they want you to; otherwise you must let them be. You must treat them with respect for their self-ownership rights or not at all.”

Voluntaryists have a clear understanding of the nature of power (what they call “the voluntaryist insight”) — that all governments and human institutions depend on the consent and cooperation of its victims. A person who harbors the voluntaryist spirit understands that he or she cannot be compelled to do anything against his or her will. Such a person may suffer the consequences of holding to his or her belief, but as Corbett Bishop, a World War II conscientious objector who fasted for over 400 days in government prisons and hospitals, pointed out: Governments know that they can terrorize individuals into submitting to tyranny by grabbing the body as hostage and thus hoping to destroy the spirit (of conscience and resistance within the individual). But if one repudiates the body and will have nothing to do with it, the spirit remains free. This is the essence of total non-cooperation with one’s oppressors. The voluntaryist spirit also reminds us of the stoics “who were different from others” in refusing to allow pain to disturb the equanimity of their minds and the exercise of their reason.

There is the story of a Stoic who was captured and told to renounce his beliefs. He refused and was tortured. Still unable to make him recant, his captors told him he would be put to death. He answered they could do whatever they wanted with his body but whatever they did could not injure his philosophy. That was in his mind and their authority, in its physical and moral aspect, did not extend [that far].

As the relator of this story continues, “Stoicism was unique in that its martyrs did not go to death believing their ideas would change the world.” They went to death because their integrity was worth more to them than their existence. For life, if the courage to die be lacking, is slavery. The man who is afraid to die cannot possibly live up to his vision of the truth because he fears for both his person and property. Thus the only favorable course to those who uphold voluntaryism is “to remain loyal to one’s own integrity. For man, as a moral agent, has an obligation to value truth for its own sake, not for any supposed benefits it might bring as a by-product.”

The emphasis on the means-end insight in voluntaryism explains why voluntaryists deem it necessary to take action to achieve their goals. They know they cannot run away from weakness, that sometimes they must resist and disobey or else lose their own self-respect. The voluntaryist spirit is a passionate, disinterested quest for justice and truth. Since all times are proper for pursuing what is right, they realize that there is no time like the present; that the first chance is always the best. They are not bound by difficulties, but by justice. They must do what they think right and let the consequences take care of themselves. The love of truth is infectious. One’s ideals and ideas must be professed everywhere; there is no escaping it and no middle way. If voluntaryism is worth anything, it is worth the effort to try to work towards it. The truth is something to be done, not just something to be believed. The true secret of freedom is the courage to resist. “No one ever remains free who acquiesces in what they know to be wrong.” In the context of the voluntaryist critique of the State, disobedience to invasive laws is the greatest virtue.

It is said that a journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step, and the voluntaryist realizes that only by beginning the long-term efforts to deligitimize the State can any progress be made toward his or her goal. As futile as a single step may seem, it is only by taking that very first step that the journey towards voluntaryism can be started. Those who are moved by the voluntaryist spirit realize that they must do everything humanly possible to move towards their goal. People may not feel they have done everything they can do until they have tried to do it.

It was Ludwig von Mises in his Notes and Recollections who argued that it is a matter of temperament how we shape our lives in the knowledge of inescapable catastrophe. In high school he had chosen a verse by Virgil as his motto: “Tu ne cede malis sed contra audientur ito.” (Do not yield to the bad, but always oppose it with courage.) In the darkest hours of World War I he recalled this dictum:

Again and again I faced situations from which rational deliberations could find no escape. But then something unexpected occurred that brought deliverance. I would not lose courage even now. I would do everything (I) could do. I would not tire in professing what I knew to be right . . . I regret only my willingness to compromise, not my intransigence.


Short Bibliography – The Voluntaryist Spirit

  • John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, New York: Carlton House, 1922, see pp. 34-37 and 230-233.
  • Ronald Duncan, Selected Writings of Mahatma Gandhi, Boston: Beacon Press, 1951
  • Emma Goldman, My Further Disillusionment in Russia, Garden City, Doubleday, Page & Co., 1924, see Chapter XII, “Afterword”.
  • William Grampp, Economic Liberalism, (Vol. 1: “The Beginnings”), New York: Random House, 1965, pp. 11 and 26.
  • Hanford Henderson, “The Aristocratic Spirit”, The North American Review, Vol. 211, March 1920, pp. 387-401.
  • Arthur Wollaston Hutton, “The Moral Argument against Compulsory Vaccination”, The Humanitarian, Vol. 7, No. 3, September 1895, pp. 177-185.
  • Raghavan N. Iyer, The Moral and Political Thought of Mahatma Gandhi, New York: Oxford University Press, 1973, esp. see Chapter 13, “Means and Ends in Politics”.
  • Terence MacSwiney, Principles of Freedom, Dublin: The Talbot Press. 1921.
  • Ludwig von Mises, Notes and Recollections, South Holland: Libertarian Press, 1978.
  • David Norton, Personal Destinies, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974, see. p. 320.
  • Murray Rothbard, “Myth and Truth About Libertarianism”, Modern Age, Vol. 24, Winter 1988, pp. 9-15.
  • Richard Harrison Shryock, “Public Relations of the Medical Profession in Great Britain and the United States: 1600-1870,” Annals of Medical History (n.s.), VII, 1930, pp. 308-39, esp. see pp. 319-23.
  • Carl Watner, Towards a Theory of Proprietary Justice, Baltimore: by the author, 1976.
  • Carl Watner (editor), I Must Speak Out: The Best of The Voluntaryist 1982-1999, San Francisco: Fox & Wilkes, 1999.

Voluntaryism - The Voluntaryist Spirit

Why I Write And Publish The Voluntaryist


by Carl Watner
Number 93 – Aug 1998

 

 

As I compose this article, I have only a few more issues of The Voluntaryist to write and publish before I reach No. 100. Once completed, that effort will have spanned nearly seventeen years of my life. During that time I have been imprisoned for forty days on a federal civil contempt charge (1982); married Julie (1986); witnessed the homebirths of our four children; operated two businesses here in South Carolina (one of them a feed mill, I have been running since my marriage; the other, a retail tire store and service center I took over in early 1997); have been responsible for the building of our family’s house; and participate in the homeschooling of all our children. Although The Voluntaryist has been an important and constant part of my life all this time, the first article that I wrote and published preceded The Voluntaryist by nearly a decade. It was “Lysander Spooner: Libertarian Pioneer” and appeared in Reason Magazine in March 1973.

As I reflect upon my writing career. I recall one of my very first self-published monographs – Towards A Theory of Proprietary Justice. In it there was a piece titled “Let It Not Be Said That I Did Not Speak Out!”. There is obviously something in my mental-spiritual-physical constitution that needs a publishing outlet. It is important to me to set forth my ideas, especially when they are so very different from the vast majority of people that I associate with most of the time. If everyone seems to be heading toward a precipice, they need to be warned. If I am pushed and shoved along with them, even if I am powerless to stop the crowd, it is important to me and my integrity that some record be left of my resistance and of my recognition that we are headed toward danger. “Let It Not Be Said That I Did Not Speak Out!” was published in 1976, and appears now in the pages of The Voluntaryist for the first time:

When the individuals living under the jurisdiction of the United States Government awake to political reality, they are going to find themselves living in government bondage. Every act of government brings us closer to this reality. The only logical future is to expect life in a socialized state. Henceforth, to be a citizen will mean to be a slave.

To speak the truth without fear is the only resistance I am bound to display. To disseminate without reserve all the principles with which I am acquainted and to do so on every occasion with the most persevering constancy, so that my acquiescence to injustice will not be assumed, is my self-assumed obligation.

The honest among us realize that the resort to coercion is a tacit confession of imbecility. If he who employs force against me could mold me to his purposes by argument, no doubt he would.

The alternative is then simply living by the libertarian principle that no person or group of people is entitled to resort to violence or its threat in order to achieve their ends. This means that everyone, regardless of their position in the world, who is desirous of implementing their ideas must rely solely on voluntary persuasion and not on force or its threat.

Individuals make the world go round; individuals and only individuals exist. No man has any duty towards his fellow men except to refrain from the initiation of violence. Nothing is due a man in strict justice but what is his own. To live honestly is to hurt no one and to give to every one his due.

. . . Justice will not come to reign unless those who care for its coming are prepared to insist upon its value and have the courage to speak out against what they know to be wrong.

Let it not be said that I did not speak out against tyranny!

As much as any other piece I have ever written, it probably best explains why I have devoted so much time to The Voluntaryist over the years. There is an episode in Ayn Rand’s Anthem in which the protagonist, Equality 7-2521, discovers a room full of books, someone’s personal library, that had escaped the book-burning that undoubtedly had accompanied the creation of the collectivist holocaust in which he lived. It was among these books that he rediscovered the word “I” which had disappeared from the current lexicon. My hope is that The Voluntaryist message – that a non-violent and stateless society is both moral and practical – will survive, just like the books that Equality found. Hopefully, if someone in the future finds copies of The Voluntaryist newsletter or the anthology that I am proposing to publish (see accompanying article) they will help to re-kindle, re-discover, or elaborate the ideal of a totally free market society. One doesn’t need to be a pessimist to see that those ideas might one day disappear. Even in our own time, only a small part of the population enbraces libertarian ideas; and only a small number of libertarians would consider themselves voluntaryists – people who reject voting and the legitimacy of the State. Even the individualism of several centuries of American history is in danger of being obliterated by State propaganda. With luck, The Voluntaryist will play some small part in preserving a record of those times in history when men were free to act without State interference, and were self-confident enough to know that the State possesses no magical powers.

May knowledge and wisdom come to those who read The Voluntaryist. Long live voluntaryist ideas.

Cultivate Your Own Garden: No Truck with Politics


by Carl Watner
From Number 40 – October 1989

 

 

Little has appeared in these pages of late concerning the Libertarian Party because I believe it is more important to focus on the positive side of voluntaryism than to critique methodologies which differ from our own philosophy. I believe that we need to put our time, intelligence, and energy into that which we wish to nurture. Criticism directed toward an erroneous view not only sometimes helps entrench the opposition, but lessens the focus on the efforts to make voluntaryism grow. However, remarks by Karl Hess in the pages of Libertarian Party News (March/April 1989) deserve some comment. In an editorial titled, “Our Goal Is Still Liberty,” Hess writes:

Ever since joining the Libertarian Party, years after declaring myself a small “l” libertarian, I have been concerned by the tendency of some in the party to insist that the party is, in fact, the movement. I have been equally concerned by the tendency of some outside of the party to insist that the party itself is a betrayal of the movement.

My own conviction is that neither case is valid.

The reasons for that have been stated many times in these editorial viewpoints. Rather than restate them, I want to move past them to what I hope is a practical suggestion to help us keep our eyes on the goal – liberty – rather than become fixated on one or another of the widely divergent ways of getting there.

Might we not, as individuals, make some concession to at least the possibility of cooperating toward that main goal even through we may disagree about a number of things along the way [?]

I offer a statement that would at least say we were friends: “Sharing a belief that free markets and voluntary social arrangements can be the basis of a peaceful and prosperous world, we members of various liberty-seeking organizations agree, as individuals, to cooperate, share information, and, as appropriate and practical, mutually support, or at least not impede, our varied and often sharply different efforts to increase individual freedom.”

Without for a moment suppressing our arguments, we might at least agree that we are headed in roughly the same direction and probably have less to fear from one another than from the great apparatus of state power that surrounds us.

The assumption that we might agree “that we are headed in roughly the same direction” is one with which I must take issue. This is an attitude that was shared by many debaters of limited-government and no-government during the early days of the L.P. According to this view, all libertarians are passengers on the same train. The only difference between the advocates of limited-government, no-government, and the voluntaryists is that some get off sooner than others; but all are headed toward the same destination: liberty. However much this image might explain the difference between limited-government and no-government libertarians, it does not do justice to the voluntaryist view. At most, the image that I would suggest is that libertarians (of whatever stripe) and voluntaryists are at a common point of departure (we all face the present statist world). But the two groups board different trains, according to the methodology of social change that they choose to use. Since they are using the political means, the train of the political libertarians is travelling on the rails of statism, even if it seems to start off in the same direction as the other train. It will not long run parallel to the train boarded by the voluntaryists. The voluntaryists have no way of knowing where their journey will take them, and they are certain it has no end. The proper direction of their train can be only judged by the means used to propel it forward. There is no final “stop” or point of arrival since freedom and liberty are an on-going process. For the voluntaryists, the “final” form is in the means, not the ends.

While I do not wish to berate Hess’s emphasis on toleration and co-operation among liberty-seeking individuals, one might also take issue with his reference to “liberty-seeking organizations” since most structures to achieve a public mission usually end up devoting more time to the structure than the mission. That theme was developed in the October 1988 Voluntaryist article, “Does Freedom Need to Be Organized?” so there is no reason to belabor it here.

In addition, it is not a certain fact that voluntaryists would have less to fear from the political libertarians than from the current statists, were the former to gain power. If the “law” is to be respected and enforced and not disobeyed (an attitude which political libertarians must necessarily cultivate), then it is quite likely libertarians will use that power not only to support themselves but to crack down on the opposition. George Smith argued this point persuasively In The New Libertarian Weekly (October 31, 1976) in his satirical essay, “Victory Speech of the Libertarian Party President-Elect, 1984.” Also the entire history of the European anarchist movement (especially the brutal suppression of the Russian anarchist movement by the Bolsheviks, and the treatment of the anarchists during the Spanish Civil War) lends weight to this argument (see Voluntaryism in the European Anarchist Tradition in Neither Bullets Nor Ballots). As Errico Malatesta, the Italian anarchist, wrote in 1932:

The primary concern of every government is to ensure its continuance in power, irrespective of the men who form it. If they are bad, they want to remain in power in order to enrich themselves and to satisfy their lust for authority; and if they are honest and sincere they believe it is their duty to remain in power for the people. …The anarchists… could never, even if they were strong enough, form a government without contradicting themselves and repudiating their entire doctrine; and, should they do so, it would be no different from any other government; perhaps it would even be worse.

Informed common sense says that “political gains without philosophical understanding are potentially short-lived.” This may be better understood if we realize that we should focus on the question: “How do we prevent another State from taking the place of the one we already have?” rather than concentrating on the short-term problem (which most libertarians address) of “How do we get rid of the current State?” How can people be weaned from the State by the use of electoral politics? If the political method is proper to remove the State, as those active in the L.P. believe, then would it not be proper to re-introduce a new State, if the majority of voters were to desire it? The point is that there must be a sufficient respect and understanding for freedom and liberty in a given social community before those ideals can be realized, and if that respect and understanding already exist (or are brought into existence) – there is no reason to capture the seats of political power in order to disband the State. You attack evil at its roots by not supporting it. Just as voluntaryism occurs naturally if no one does anything to stop it, so will the State gradually disappear when those who oppose it stop supporting it. (This is not to overlook the fact that a certain “critical mass” of numbers must be reached before this can happen.)

The only thing that the individual can do “is to present society with ‘one improved unit’.” As Albert Jay Nock put it,

“Ages of experience testify that the only way society can be improved is by the individualist method … ; that is, the method of each ‘one’ doing his very best to improve ‘one’.”

This is the “quiet” or “patient” way of changing society because it concentrates upon bettering the character of men and women as individuals. As the individual units change, the improvement of society will take care of itself. In other words, “If one takes care of the means, the end will take care of itself.”

There is no question that this method is extremely difficult, since most of us realize what force of intellect and force of character are required just to improve ourselves. “it is easy to prescribe improvement of others; it is easy to organize something, to institutionalize this-or-that, to pass laws, multiply bureaucratic agencies, form pressure-groups, start revolutions, change forms of government, tinker at political theory. The fact that these expedients have been tried unsuccessfully in every conceivable combination for six thousand years has not noticeably impaired a credulous intelligent willingness to keep on trying them again and again.” There is no guarantee that the voluntaryist method will be successful – but because each individual concentrates on himself and not others, it is worth-while, profitable, and self-satisfying even if it does not come to fruition in the short-run or during one’s lifetime. The time spent on building a better, stronger you, on developing your vocational and avocational skills, your family, and your marriage makes you a better person regardless of outside circumstances. In short, time spent cultivating your own garden is always profitable and moral. Trying to cultivate another’s garden is trespass, (unless you are first invited to enter) and of necessity lessens the amount of time you can spend on your own self-improvement.

Libertarians engaged in electoral politics are saying (though they might not admit it) that the ends justifies the means. This has always been a common excuse for electoral activity and for supporting the existing political system. Emma Goldman laid this error to rest when she wrote:

There is no greater fallacy than the belief that aims and purposes are one thing, while methods and tactics are another. This conception is a potent menace to social regeneration. All human experience teaches that means cannot be separated from the ultimate aims. The means employed become, through individual habit and social practice, part and parcel of the final purpose; they modify it, and presently the aims and means become identical. … The whole history of man is continuous proof of the maxim that to divest one’s methods of ethical concepts is to sink into the depths of utter demoralization.

This is why I believe that political methods are inherently self-defeating and inconsistent with voluntaryism. Such methodologies carry the seeds of their own destruction. Though Karl Hess and other supporters of the Libertarian Party may claim to support liberty, I honestly believe they are mistaken. Their tickets may say “Destination-liberty,” but I sincerely doubt that their train is headed in that direction.

Fundamentals of Voluntaryism


Fundamentals of Voluntaryism – Introduction

 

 

Voluntaryism is the doctrine that relations among people should be by mutual consent, or not at all. It represents a means, an end, and an insight. Voluntaryism does not argue for the specific form that voluntary arrangements will take; only that force be abandoned so that individuals in society may flourish. As it is the means which determine the end, the goal of an all voluntary society must be sought voluntarily.

People cannot be coerced into freedom. Hence, the use of the free market, education, persuasion, and non-violent resistance as the primary ways to change people’s ideas about the State. The voluntaryist insight, that all tyranny and government are grounded upon popular acceptance, explains why voluntary means are sufficient to attain that end.


The Epistemological Argument

Violence is never a means to knowledge. As Isabel Paterson, explained in her book, The God of the Machine, “No edict of law can impart to an individual a faculty denied him by nature. A government order cannot mend a broken leg, but it can command the mutilation of a sound body. It cannot bestow intelligence, but it can forbid the use of intelligence.” Or, as Baldy Harper used to put it, “You cannot shoot a truth!” The advocate of any form of invasive violence is in a logically precarious situation. Coercion does not convince, nor is it any kind of argument. William Godwin pointed out that force “is contrary to the nature of the intellect, which cannot but be improved by conviction and persuasion,” and “if he who employs coercion against me could mold me to his purposes by argument, no doubt, he would.. He pretends to punish me because his argument is strong; but he really punishes me because he is weak.” Violence contains none of the energies that enhance a civilized human society. At best, it is only capable of expanding the material existence of a few individuals, while narrowing the opportunities of most others.


The Economic Argument

People engage in voluntary exchanges because they anticipate improving their lot; the only individuals capable of judging the merits of an exchange are the parties to it. Voluntaryism follows naturally if no one does anything to stop it. The interplay of natural property and exchanges results in a free market price system, which conveys the necessary information needed to make intelligent economic decisions. Interventionism and collectivism make economic calculation impossible because they disrupt the free market price system. Even the smallest government intervention leads to problems which justify the call for more and more intervention. Also, “controlled” economies leave no room for new inventions, new ways of doing things, or for the “unforeseeable and unpredictable.” Free market competition is a learning process which brings about results which no one can know in advance. There is no way to tell how much harm has been done and will continue to be done by political restrictions.


The Moral Argument

The voluntary principle assures us that while we may have the possibility of choosing the worst, we also have the possibility of choosing the best. It provides us the opportunity to make things better, though it doesn’t guarantee results. While it dictates that we do not force our idea of “better” on someone else, it protects us from having someone else’s idea of “better” imposed on us by force. The use of coercion to compel virtue eliminates its possibility, for to be moral, an act must be uncoerced. If a person is compelled to act in a certain way (or threatened with government sanctions), there is nothing virtuous about his or her behavior. Freedom of choice is a necessary ingredient for the achievement of virtue. Whenever there is a chance for the good life, the risk of a bad one must also be accepted.


The Natural Law Argument – Fundamentals of Voluntaryism

Common sense and reason tell us that nothing can be right by legislative enactment if it is not already right by nature. Epictetus, the Stoic, urged men to defy tyrants in such a way as to cast doubt on the necessity of government itself. “If the government directed them to do something that their reason opposed, they were to defy the government. If it told them to do what their reason would have told them to do anyway, they did not need a government.” Just as we do not require a State to dictate what is right or wrong in growing food, manufacturing textiles, or in steel-making, we do not need a government to dictate standards and procedures in any field of endeavor. “In spite of the legislature, the snow will fall when the sun is in Capricorn, and the flowers will bloom when it is in Cancer.”


The Means-End Argument – Fundamentals of Voluntaryism

Although certain services and goods are necessary to our survival, it is not essential that they be provided by the government. Voluntaryists oppose the State because it uses coercive means. The means are the seeds which bud into flower and come into fruition. It is impossible to plant the seed of coercion and then reap the flower of voluntaryism. The coercionist always proposes to compel people to do some-thing, usually by passing laws or electing politicians to office. These laws and officials depend upon physical violence to enforce their wills. Voluntary means, such as non-violent resistance, for example, violate no one’s rights. They only serve to nullify laws and politicians by ignoring them. Voluntaryism does not require of people that they violently overthrow their government, or use the electoral process to change it; merely that they shall cease to support their government, whereupon it will fall of its own dead weight. If one takes care of the means, the end will take care of itself.


The Consistency Argument – Fundamentals of Voluntaryism

It is a commonplace observation that the means one uses must be consistent with the goal one seeks. It is impossible to “wage a war for peace” or “fight politics by becoming political.” Freedom and private property are total, indivisible concepts that are compromised wherever and whenever the State exists. Since all things are related to one another in our complicated social world, if one man’s freedom or private property may be violated (regardless of the justification), then every man’s freedom and property are insecure. The superior man can only be sure of his freedom if the inferior man is secure in his rights. We often forget that we can secure our liberty only by preserving it for the most despicable and obnoxious among us, lest we set precedents that can reach us.


The Integrity, Self-Control, and Corruption Argument

It is a fact of human nature that the only person who can think with your brain is you. Neither can a person be compelled to do anything against his or her will, for each person is ultimately responsible for his or her own actions. Governments try to terrorize individuals into submitting to tyranny by grabbing their bodies as hostages and trying to destroy their spirits. This strategy is not successful against the person who harbors the Stoic attitude toward life, and who refuses to allow pain to disturb the equanimity of his or her mind, and the exercise of reason. A government might destroy one’s body or property, but it cannot injure one’s philosophy of life. – Furthermore, the voluntaryist rejects the use of political power because it can only be exercised by implicitly endorsing or using violence to accomplish one’s ends. The power to do good to others is also the power to do them harm. Power to compel people, to control other people’s lives, is what political power is all about. It violates all the basic principles of voluntaryism: might does not make right; the end never justifies the means; nor may one person coercively interfere in the life of another. Even the smallest amount of political power is dangerous. First, it reduces the capacity of at least some people to lead their own lives in their own way. Second, and more important from the voluntaryist point of view, is what it does to the person wielding the power: it corrupts that person’s character.

 

Fundamentals of Voluntaryism

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