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"If one takes care of the means, the end will take care of itself."

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Public Authority and the State in the Western Tradition: A Thousand Years of Growth 976-1976

By Carroll Quigley

[Editor's Note: This article consists of excerpts from the Oscar Iden Lecture series delivered at the School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, D. C., during October 1976. Carroll Quigley (1910-1977) was a professor of the history of civilizations for over 30 years and author of THE EVOLUTION OF CIVILIZATIONS (1961) and TRAGEDY AND HOPE: A HISTORY OF THE WORLD IN OUR TIME (1966).]

Lecture I: "The State of Communities — 976-1576"

For a decade after 1931, my chief intellectual concern was the growth of the European state in the Old Regime, before 1789. I dreamed that at some date in the future, perhaps 30 years in the future, I would write the definitive history of the growth of public authority and the development of the European state. But after 1941 I had to abandon the project because I was too busy with my teaching—which I enjoyed thoroughly—and no longer had access to an adequate library. Above all, I discovered that other historians were becoming so narrowly specialized, and their historical concepts so inadequate, that it was almost impossible to explain to them what had happened in the growth of the state. They lacked the conceptual paradigms, the knowledge of comparative developments, and even the understanding of their own specialties to grasp a subject as broad and of such long duration as the growth of public authority over the last thousand years. Anyone who does not understand that long term development of this subject cannot understand the more limited aspects of it in more recent periods. But modern historians are increasingly specialized in narrow ranges of chronology, geographic area, and aspects of changing events. . . .

The basic entity we must understand is the civilization as a whole. Although I tell you I'm going to talk about the last thousand years, 976-1976, Western Civilization, of which we are a part, has been around for a considerably longer time than that. We might say Western Civilization began around 550, but there was no significant structure of public authority until almost 1050, with no state at all over the preceding two centuries, 850-1050. Yet 950 is significant as the point at which our Western Civilization began the first of its three great Ages of Expansion, 970-1270. (The other two were 1440-1590 and 1770-1890). This first age of expansion applies to the core of Western Civilization, the area between the Rhine River and the Loire, the area which formed the core of the Carolingian Empire (687-887). This Empire was the earliest political structure of the new Western Civilization, one of four new civilizations which sprouted from the ruins of Classical Civilization after A.D. 500. These four were Byzantine (330-1453), Islamic (630-1922), Russian (800-?), and Western (550-?). Each of them modified the traditions it accepted from the ruins of Classical Civilization and created its own distinctive culture.

Another paradigm I want to establish is a difference between two kinds of civilizations, which means a difference between two kinds of governments in them. Asiatic civilizations, which I call Class B Civilizations, generally do not attempt to deal with individuals or with the problems of individuals; they leave interpersonal relationships to the local or kinship community. Class A Civilizations include Classical Civilization, our own Western Civilization, or the

first Chinese or Sinic Civilization, whose dates are 1800 B. C. to 400 A. D. In Class A Civilizations, although the civilization begins as an area of common culture made up of communities, there is a long term trend to destroy and break down those communities.

The way I would like to express this would be—and I used to draw it on the blackboard—by saying that all civilizations start out as aggregations of communities. Those communities are generally of two types, either local, such as parishes, neighborhoods, villages or manors; or kinship communities, families, clans and so forth. When a civilization begins with such communities, as ours did in 550, there is no state, and there are no atomized individuals. I will not go into the details of this, but in such communities, there are no written laws; all law is customary. Most controls on behavior are what I call internalized, that is, they are built into your hormones and your neurological responses. You do what is necessary to remain a member of the community, because if you are not a member of the community, you would be nothing. You would not be a man. As you may know if you have ever studied linguistics, the names which many primitives and not-so-primitive peoples have for themselves is their word for man. The communities from which Classical Civilization came were local villages and manors. Lucky civilizations, such as Chinese Civilization over the past 1500 years, generally have communities which are both kinship and local.

What happens in the course of Class A Civilization, over a thousand or more years, is that the fundamental communities are broken up and gradually disintegrate into smaller and smaller groups, and may end up simply as what we call nuclear families, a father and a mother, who eventually lose all discipline and control of their own children. The result of this process is a state which is not only sovereign but totalitarian, and it is filled with isolated individuals.

Of the four civilizations which came out of Classical Antiquity's wreckage, two, Islamic and Byzantine, clearly are Class B Civilizations, that is, they continued to work for communities. Their governments were governments of limited powers, of which the most important were raising money and recruiting soldiers. The finest example of such an Asiatic Despotism was the Mongolian Empire of Jenghiz Khan about A. D. 1250, but its origins go back to the Persian Empires of the Achaemenids and the Sassanids. Good examples of such a structure are the Chinese Civilization of 220-1949, the Byzantine Empire after 640, and the Islamic sultanates which eventually culminated in the Ottoman Empire. The efforts of the Carolingian Franks to establish a similar empire in Western Civilization collapsed and led to the Dark Age of 860-970.

These eastern political traditions might be called Providential Empire or Providential Monarchy, and they are associated with the idea of a Providential Deity. To us today, who shove religion off into a corner and insist that it must have nothing to do with politics or business or many other things, it may be hard to grasp that one of the most potent things in establishing the structure of the state in any civilization has always been man's idea of the nature of deity. . . .

Lecture II: "The State of Estates—1576-1776"

In my first lecture, I portrayed the sweep of a thousand years that we are concerned with as beginning with a period in 976 when we had no state at all. All power was private power. But we also had no individuals, that is, no isolated individuals. All we had were individuals so deeply embedded in local self-sufficient communities that the power relationships within which they functioned were in their day-to-day activities, and the controls of their behavior were almost totally internalized in their neurological and hormone systems. So they obeyed what seemed to them to be their inner compulsions while they fulfilled their functions in this interwoven

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community structure, which changed so slowly that even in the long life of 60 or 70 years—and, of course, most people in those days did not live long lives—almost no changes would be noticed by anyone in the patterns embedded inside themselves.

And at the end of the thousand year period, in the year 1976, we no longer have communities, except shattered, broken, crippled, isolated ones. Instead, we have states of monstrous power and frustrated, isolated individuals; and the state and the individuals are working together from opposite sides to destroy what we have left of communities—local, family, or whatever they might be.

Over this long period of a thousand years, the growth of the state, which is our subject, began with the appearance of a state apparatus of a very primitive kind, made up of a king and his assistants, who eventually became a monarch and a bureaucracy. Around this core, there gradually accumulated sufficient activities to make what we would regard as a public authority and, ultimately, a state. The mark of that process can be most clearly indicated, I think, by the development of what we call sovereignty. Without sovereignty, I do not think we could say that a state is much of a state, although we might call it one. There has been a great deal of talk about sovereignty in books—not very much, unfortunately, in history books—but no one has ever bothered to define it. From my study of the growth of the state, I have been able, it seems to me, to put together what sovereignty consists of, historically, in the tradition of our Western Civilization. To me, sovereignty seems to have eight functions or aspects, and I will define them for you in the approximate order in which they appeared.

All human needs require that a person live and cooperate with other people for satisfaction. None of us can satisfy any significant human needs by acting alone in a state of nature. The two fundamental needs men had from the beginning are, first, that the group within which a community is functioning and satisfying the needs of its members must be defended from outside attack. So the first aspect of sovereignty is defense. Secondly, disputes and conflicts within the group must be settled, so that insiders cooperate rather than fight with one another and open themselves to enemy attack. Thus defense against outsiders is first; settling disputes among insiders is second.

The third one is very difficult to talk about. Years ago, I gave a whole course on it: the administrative power. The French word for it—and most of my study of public authority was done in the French language and in French public law—is **la police**. It does not mean "police," it rather means "policy," and I suppose it would be necessary for the continued existence of the community. In the Middle Ages and in the Dark Age with which I began, one of the chief needs was that the food supply not be interrupted, and by the early eighteenth century, in France, if you said "**la police**," it meant control of the grain trade. However, in strict legal understanding it meant much more. For example, it meant, "What emergency measures would be taken and who would order them if a plague appeared? The dead must be buried the same day. Everyone must get a swine flu injection." And things of this kind. Notice: it's nothing you can designate. But administrative power is a most significant power, and when I taught the subject, I shocked the students by saying that in my opinion it is almost the most important of the eight aspects of sovereignty, and there is no provision for it whatever in the Constitution of the United States. . . .

The fourth is quite obvious: the taxing power, mobilizing resources for public purposes. Notice that the French government did not have the taxing power when the French Revolution began in

1789. But I'll get back to that.

The fifth is legislative power. This has always been confusing because for many centuries, and certainly in 976, there was no legislative power and yet there were laws and rules. The reason is that in a society dominated by communities, in which personal behavior is regulated largely by internalized controls, the rules are not made by an outsider. You discover the rules by observing how people act. Accordingly, in the early history of Western Civilization, the law was found and not made, and it was a very drastic innovation when we shifted from finding the law to making the law. We have not really made that transition completely in the common law countries even yet; we still say that the judges are finding the law by looking back to previous decisions.

When the royal judges first began to go around England trying cases, they never proclaimed or imposed the law; they gathered together a group of sworn local people and asked, "What do you do in a case like this?" Generally, the jury, as we call them, could give an answer based on local custom, but in some cases they would look puzzled and say, "No one here remembers such a case." Let's say it was arson or something of the kind. Then the judges would say, "In traveling around England trying cases, we have found that the most common rule is this—" and thus they established the common law. The common law in England was the law the royal judges discovered by going around and finding out what the local customary law was, and filling in the gaps with what was common to England. Thus the common law in England was a royal creation, through local custom.

In France, the law was the codification of local customs in all their diversity. I will say very little more about the legislative, but the first examples of writing down the laws were not regarded as making new rules at all: they were simply promulgations of customs. It took centuries before people realized that we did have a legislative process going on and were, in fact, making new rules. That's the fifth aspect, legislation.

The sixth aspect we might as well call the executive; the enforcement of law and judicial decisions. It is of relatively little importance in the early history of a civilization. But executive action became increasingly necessary as time went on, communities disintegrated and peoples behavior became less subject to internalized controls and more subject to external controls such as force, duress, threats, fines, restitution or other kinds of outside, external pressure. Today we think almost entirely in terms of law and order. If someone campaigns for the Presidency on a platform of Law and Order, he means that he will intensify the external controls upon behavior of which people do not approve. That is executive power.

The last two aspects of sovereignty are of tremendous importance, and they are, perhaps, the most significant today. And yet they are rarely discussed in connection with sovereignty. The seventh is money control. I pointed out last time that from the beginning, back to 500 B. C., the coinage and control of money was one of the attributes of royalty. Today, of course, it includes much more than just coinage; it means the creation and control of money and credit, and in the English-speaking world these are not a part of sovereignty. They are in private hands, even though they are the most important powers that exist in a society such as ours today.

And the last aspect of sovereignty is the incorporating power; the right to say that a group of people is a single legal entity, that is, to create corporations. This did not exist in the English-speaking world until quite recently. It was that only the **imperium**—public authority—and individuals existed. If any other legal groups existed—and by legal, I mean they had the right to own property and to sue and be sued in the courts—then they had to have some kind of a charter from the imperial power to justify this. With the fall of Rome that power of incorporation ceased entirely, and corporations of the year 970 had no charters of incorporation. There were thousands of them across Europe, many of them ecclesiastical, but other kinds as well. Because of their lack of charters, it was never quite clear, for example, whether each diocese or each parish was a corporation; generally, each monastery or convent was considered to be a corporation.

All right, those are the eight aspects of sovereignty. Once I have defined them in this way, it will be quite clear to you that when I come to the end of tonight's lecture in 1789, very few states in Europe will have all of them. Indeed, when I began the lecture

tonight in 1576, almost no states in Europe had all of them. However, if a state had six or so of them, we might say it was a sovereign state or a sovereign entity. . . .

Lecture III: "The State of Individuals—1776-1976"

This is the most difficult of the three lectures I'm giving on the history of the thousand years of the growth of public authority. What happened in the last 200 years is fairly clear to me, but it is not easy to convey it to you, even those of you who have had courses with me and are familiar with the framework of much of my thinking. One reason for this difficulty, of course, is the complexity of the subject itself, but after all, the preceding 800 years were quite as complex as the last 200 we will deal with this evening. A much more fundamental reason for the difficulty is this: The reality of the last 200 years of the history of Western Civilization, including the history of our own country, is not reflected in the general brainwashing you have received, in the political mythology you have been hearing, or in the historiography of the period as it exists today.

I will divide the period from 1776 to 1976 into two parts. The first, to about 1890, was a period of expansion of industrial society; the last 80 years, approximately, have been an age of profound crisis, not only in our own country, but in Western Civilization, which is the unit in which I carry on my thinking on the subject. In order to deal with this period, I have to go back to fundamentals, and particularly to the fundamentals of human values, and to do that, we must have paradigms.

The whole thousand years, as I explained in my first lecture, is a shift from a society made up of communities in 976, to a society today, where we have states of monstrous power and atomized individuals. . . . As I indicated in the first lecture, a state is not the same thing as a society, although the Greeks and Romans thought it was. A state is an organization of power on a territorial basis. The link between a society, whether it is made up of communities or individuals, and a state is this: Power rests on the ability to satisfy human needs. . . .

My experience and study of the destruction of civilizations and the collapse of great empires has convinced me that empires and civilizations do not collapse because of deficiencies on the military or the political levels. The Roman army never met an army that was better than it was. But the Roman army could not be sustained when all these things had collapsed and no one cared. No one wanted to serve, no one wanted to pay taxes, no one cared. . . .

Human needs are the basis of power. The state, as I said, is a power structure on a territorial basis, and the state will survive only if it has sufficient ability to satisfy enough of these needs. It is not enough for it to have organized force, and when a politician says, "Elect me President and I will establish law and order," he means organized force or organized power of other kinds. I won't analyze this level; it's too complex and we don't have time. I will simply say that the object of the political level is to legitimize power: that is, to get people, in their minds, to recognize and accept the actual power relationship in their society. . . .

In the meantime, I'm still on my introduction for this evening, and I want to discuss what happened in the last thousand years. If we go back before 976, when you had communities, the main core of people's life and experience, which controlled their behavior and determined their desires—controls and rewards, I call it—was in the religious, emotional and social levels. They had religious beliefs, they had social and emotional relationships with the people they saw every day. That was the core of their lives. The significant thing is that those controls and rewards were internalized: they were what was acquired very largely in the first four or five years of life. When a child is born, he is not a person, he is a human being. He is utterly potential. When someone becomes a personality, such as you or myself, then he has traits, which were acquired out of his potentialities as the result of experiences over numerous years.

This is why they could get along without a state in 976: all the significant controls were internalized. I took the year 976 because, although Western Civilization had come into existence about 200 years before that, it began to expand in 976. By that I mean they began to produce more goods per person per day or per year. You know what I mean by expansion if you took my freshman course: increased output per capita, increased knowledge, increased

geographic area for the civilization itself, and increased population. That began in 976, and we'll put an arrow here at the economic level to indicate it. The economic expansion was achieved chiefly by specialization and exchange: instead of each little group trying to satisfy all its own needs, groups began to concentrate and, for example, produce only wool and exchange it for other things. That process of increasing specialization and exchange, which is the basis of expansion in our civilization, I call commercialization. As long as the society is expanding, that process of commercialization will continue, as it has for a thousand years in our society, so that today everything is commercialized, politics, religion, education, ideology, belief, the armed services. Practically everything is commercialized; everything has its price.

When this expansion reaches a crisis, you get increasing politicization. I won't go into the details of this. It can be expanded in detail, as most of you, perhaps, know. Politicization means that the expansion is slowing up, and you are no longer attempting to achieve increased output per capita, or increased wealth, or increased satisfactions, or whatever is motivating you, by economic expansion, but you are going to do it by mobilizing power. We have seen this going on in our society for almost a century.

And then, as the society continues and does not reform, you get increased militarization. You can certainly see that process in Western Civilization and in the history of the United States. In the last 40 years our society has been drastically militarized. It isn't yet as militarized as other societies and other periods have been; we still have a long way to go in this direction. Our civilization has a couple of centuries to go, I would guess. Things are moving faster than they did in any civilization I ever knew before this one, but we probably will have another century or two. . . .

What happened in the last 200 years? In 1776, Western Civilization was approaching a revolutionary situation. A revolutionary situation is one in which the structure of power—real power—is not reflected in the structure of law, institutions, and conventional arrangements. Law and legal arrangements, including constitutional structures, were not legitimate in much of Western Civilization in 1776. They were not responsible because they did not reflect power. Whether it was the English Parliament, which had a legal right to rule America; or the nightmarish constitution of France, which no longer reflected the structure of power in French society in any way; or east of the Rhine, the enlightened despotisms, the laws of the polity did not reflect the power structure of Europe at all, as Napoleon very soon showed them. This, therefore, is a revolutionary situation.

Let's look a little more closely at these. . . .

In 1820, thus, the state was essentially unstable, in spite of appearances. It was not fully sovereign. For example, it did not have the control of money and credit in most places; it did not have control of corporations in most places. It was not stable because the nation is not a satisfactory community. The very idea that, because everyone who speaks French is in the same nation and, in the nineteenth century, in the same state, they must therefore be in the same community, is just not true. The nation or the state, as we now have it in terms of structure of power, cannot be a community.

Another thing which may serve to point out the instability of the power system of the state: the individual cannot be made the basic unit of society, as we have tried to do, or of the state, since the internalization of controls must be the preponderant influence in any stable society. Even in a society in which it appears that all power is in the hands of the government—Soviet Russia, let's say—at least eighty percent of all human behavior is regulated by internalized controls socialized in the people by the way they were treated from the moment they were born. As a result, they have come to accept certain things that allow the Russian state to act as if it can do anything, when it obviously can't and knows it can't. Notice the new Russian budget announced this week: as a result of our pouring our food surpluses into Russia, they are now going to increase the consumption sector of their expenditures.

Also related to the problem of internalized controls is the shift of weapons into our society. It is a profound problem. I have spent 10 years working on it throughout all of history, and I hope eventually to produce a book if I can find a publisher. There will be endless analysis of Chinese history and Byzantine history and Russian history and everything else, and the book is about nine-tenths writ-

ten, I'd say, in the last 10 years. The shift of weapons in any civilization and, above all, in our civilization, from shock weapons to missile weapons has a dominant influence on the ability to control individuals: individuals cannot be controlled by missile weapons. Notice that if you go back several hundred years to the Middle Ages, all weapons were shock, that is, you came at the enemy with a spear or a sword. Even as late as 1916, in the First World War, you came at the Germans with bayonets after a preliminary barrage with artillery. We have now shifted almost completely to missile weapons. Missile weapons are weapons that you hurl. You may shoot, you may have bombs dropped from an airplane, you may throw a hand grenade: those are missile weapons.

The essential difference between a shock weapon and a missile weapon is this: a missile weapon is either fired or it isn't fired. It cannot be half-fired. Once you let it go, it's out of your control. It is a killing weapon. But a shock weapon—a billy club or a bayonet—can be used to any degree you wish. If you say to someone, "Get up and get out of the room," and you pull out a machine gun, or you call in a B-52 bomber, or you pull the pin in a hand grenade . . . But with a bayonet, you can persuade him.

In our society, individual behavior can no longer be controlled by any system of weaponry we have. In fact, we do not have enough people, even if we equip them with shock weapons, to control the behavior of that part of the population which does not have internalized controls. One reason for that, of course, is that the twenty percent who do not have internalized controls are concentrated in certain areas. I won't go into the subject of controls. It opens up the whole field of guerrilla resistance, terrorism and everything else; these cannot be controlled by any system, or organized structure of force that exists, at least on a basis of missile weaponry. And, as I

said, it would take too many people on the basis of shock weaponry. We have now done what the Romans did when they started to commit suicide: we have shifted from an army of citizen soldiers to an army of mercenaries, and those mercenaries are being recruited in our society, as they were in Roman society, from the twenty percent of the population which does not have the internalized controls of the civilization. . . .

Now I come to my last statement. I regret ending on what is, I suppose, such a pessimistic note—I'm not personally pessimistic. The final result will be that the American people will ultimately prefer communities. They will cop out or opt out of the system. Today everything is a bureaucratic structure, and brainwashed people who are not personalities are trained to fit into this bureaucratic structure and say it is a great life—although I would assume that many on their death beds must feel otherwise. The process of copping out will take a long time, but notice: we are already copping out of military service on a wholesale basis; we are already copping out of voting on a large scale basis. I heard an estimate tonight that the President will probably be chosen by forty percent of the people eligible to vote and that the percentage of voters who were registered and didn't vote will be higher for the fourth time in 16 years. People are also copping out by refusing to pay any attention to newspapers or what's going on in the world, and by increasing emphasis on the growth of localism, what is happening in their own neighborhoods. . . .

Now I want to say good night. Do not be pessimistic. Life goes on: life is fun. And if a civilization crashes, it deserves to. When Rome fell, the Christian answer was, "Create your own communities."

Thank you, ladies and gentlemen.

Open Systems VS. Closed Systems

By Joseph Dejan

To the academic question of MORE or LESS government, we may find more useful to compare the political structure with the voluntary system.

To sustain life and maximize his well-being, organized human efforts are mandatory. Individually, man may survive, but complete independence requires all the efforts necessary just for this task. But even in a social organization, each man is capable of independent conduct, so long as he does not become a parasite on others.

Since the dawn of history, men have found only two ways of organizing human energy to reach specific goals. They can organize voluntarily, offering rewards to those who agree to cooperate, or they can organize coercively, dispensing punishment to those who refuse to join in. They also combine these two methods and establish organizations which employ simultaneously the "carrot" and the "stick."

While one cannot deny that compulsory organizations may reach the goals intended, they can only do so through the process of enslaving others; whereas, when voluntary methods are employed the basic human and moral rights of each individual are respected.

Each individual is capable of exercising his own value judgment so that he can withdraw from an organization if and when it no longer fulfills his needs or wants.

Of course, we know of two types of coercive organizations: the formal type is government (being a dictatorship or a democracy) and the informal type—any criminal gang.

Formal government can be defined as a group of men who sell retribution to the inhabitants of a limited geographic area at monopolistic prices. **Informal** government seeks to enforce their wills upon others without prior consultation.

Formal governments rely on retribution; informal governments rely on direct compulsion. But isn't it remarkable to note that the more formal they are on the outset, the more they gravitate toward informal operations where, when an informal government is organized, it's tendency is to drift toward formality!

All governments, whether formal or informal in nature contain elements moving toward ultimate control of men.

All formal governments begin with the tribal council or townhall type of democracy up to and including dictatorship which rely on

politics. Politics may be defined as the method adopted by government to obtain a monopoly. Governments are the perpetual enemies of competition and freedom. They begin by seeking a monopoly of force over the inhabitants of a given territory, they usually end when their monopolies become total. Contrary to any form of coercive organization, voluntary association maximizes human well-being. Each individual acts on the basis of his own value-judgement without imposition on others. A voluntary organization as the FREE MARKET is an open system. It has a point of input where the demands from the market are communicated to the system. It has a voluntary organized method of production. It has a point of output where there results of united efforts (goods or services) flow back into the market to satisfy the demands. But most importantly, it has a feedback loop wherein the market signals its degree of approval or disapproval to the results of the output. It issues then new input information, so that the organizational operation can be corrected, increased, diminished or suppressed in terms of market demands.

But there is another way of assuring the output of a given system: It is by suppressing the freedom of choice and by structuring the system. It is a process of corruption which in turn corrupts the environmental system. No matter what the real feedback information may be, this system continues to function in spite of its output no longer being **wanted** or **acceptable**. An environment, through political pressure, can be compelled to accept and sustain a system that is no longer wanted. If a businessman can get a law passed that will protect him from competition or can guarantee the purchase of his production, or can penalize his competitors, or can get tax-paid support of one kind or another, then this businessman can ignore the will of the market and simply act to please the political structure. The market system then becomes dysfunctional in regard to the alterations of demands. Dysfunctional attributes introduce corruption both in the basic system as well as in the overarching total system. Through artificial tampering, the dysfunctional system is sustained and will spread. It closes the system until the overarching system—being the body, the market or the entire culture—dies.

Three natural open systems exist that derive from man's nature, not requiring coercion or force. They are based on biological, economical and aesthetic necessities. They are: the family, business and voluntary associations (clubs, fraternities, etc.). Man by nature needs a mate to reproduce. The result of this system is a family relationship. Laws need not to be passed to compel people to organize business, anymore than for the creation of

families. Voluntary associations are also open systems to organize human energy based on sharing human values. They depend on voluntary choice to join and freedom to withdraw.

Although these systems are all qualified by their voluntary character, each provides for a large measure of order. Each system has its rules which must be obeyed by those joining. By adhering to these rules, order is reached. Of course, these rules are not binding on non-members. If a member refuses to obey the rules, he is asked to leave, or if the organization alters its laws, he simply withdraws. Rules are means to obtain order. They are not an end in themselves.

It is interesting to underscore that any open system is not only characterized by its voluntary nature, but by the limitation to the application of the rules. A family does not pass rules for other families in their neighborhood. One business does not seek to force another business to follow the rules established for itself. The charter and by-laws of the Science-Fiction Club are not binding on the members of the Chess Club. The rules in all open systems follow the lines of property-ownership and control.

Conversely dealing with a closed system, especially a political system, the process is precisely reversed.

First of all, open systems precede closed systems. Closed systems originate when order is already established within the three forms of open systems. Now, the rules formulated in the closed system become an end in themselves. Indeed, they become sanctified and often a matter of ritual and even obsession.

The closed system introduces compulsion and coercion. Deviations from the rules are met by police, courts, jails and, in extreme cases, by death. If a person decides to leave a closed system, he must first obtain permission, which is not always easy or possible, and if he does manage to get out of a given closed system, he will find that he has merely exchanged one set of masters for another.

Nowhere in the world can we find free territory of an open system. Furthermore, the characteristics of all closed systems are that they ignore property boundaries and all other rights, while they often were created to uphold them. Thus, with the passing of time, closed systems tend to create frustration, resentment, aggression, disorder and a breakdown leading often to war and chaos. And while it is the open systems, the free systems, that organize human energy in an orderly fashion, it is the closed systems that are credited for it. All closed systems depend on surpluses. Although any government could own and operate productive enterprises, those who govern are always members of an elite which does not engage in productive work but concentrate their baneful activities on regulating others and punishing them according to the laws they have created.

Ideally, man does not need nor should he have any government. All closed systems impair human liberty and in the long run prove destructive to human well-being. They are institutions that man has created which have proven to be inadequate, immoral and dangerous to the survival of the human race.

We all know in a general way, although few have absorbed its full significance, that science and technology have brought rapid and drastic changes in our lives, and are of such a magnitude that they are comparable to a mutation. This mutation, whether recognized or not, appreciated or not, contains undreamed of possibilities for wide betterment of man's life on earth. But if the institutions are not brought up from their barbaric era, these possibilities can be turned into an irreversible disaster. The basic psychological challenge before us is that these new conditions demand drastic changes in deeply ingrained habits of behavior and thinking patterns.

As the economist Kenneth Boulding puts it succinctly: "If the human race is to survive, it will have to change its way of thinking more in the next 25 years than it has in the last 25,000 years."

Voluntary Musings

A Column of Iconoclasm

By Charles Curley

*"Nothing can defeat an idea
—except a better one."*

— Eric Frank Russell

Protection Against Protection: As this is being written a new round of trade talks is starting in Punta del Este. This earth shattering news will immediately transfix some of the readers and cause them to glue their eyeballs to this column until they can breathe a sigh of relief upon learning that they will continue to have heavily subsidised jobs. The rest of the readers, most of them, have by now yawned and skipped on to the next article. The second set has nothing at stake. Or so they think.

Like most ideals, the idea of free trade between countries of the world is given much lip service by various governments, but not much is actually done about expanding it. Prime example: look what the supposedly pro free trade Reagan administration has done to the cocaine trade.

In fact, the talks just begun in Uruguay may well go on for a decade, as did other rounds of talks in the past. The organization under which these talks are held is the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). There are 92 member governments, and they can be expected to haggle and wheel and deal for another 10 years on this, the eighth round of GATT talks. What is at stake?

Money. Lots of it. Lobbyists for "protection" of certain industries try to sell Congress and the public on the idea that protection saves jobs. That is twaddle.

The World Bank puts the 1986 "efficiency loss" of each job saved by protectionism in the American clothing industry in 1980 at \$169,000; in the European clothing industry at \$124,700, also in 1980; and in the American steel industry in 1985 at \$71,100. Another study put the cost to British consumers of shoe industry protection at about 12 times the cost of opening up free trade. It costs about 2.35 million pounds a year to keep the shoemakers in jobs, or about 117 pounds per household.

If an American bought a Japanese car in 1984, he paid \$1300

more for it due to the "export restraints" for which Uncle Sam volunteered the Japanese. In California small trucks are about that much less than small cars. Trucks aren't included in the restraints.

If you are planning to buy a computer with 256K DRAMs in it, you might want to do so soon. Prices of the beasts have already doubled, in large part due to a market sharing "agreement" forced on the Japanese by the Americans. You need eight of them, at least, to have a 256K computer. Or buy your own from Samsung—a Korean company.

If, on the other tentacle, you wear clothes, you already are paying for protectionism. EEC consumers pay some \$1.4 billions a year in 1980; Americans \$1.5 billions, and it has surely risen. One could build a space station for less than that.

Calculate it as a surcharge on income tax, and the cost of protectionism is further put into perspective. Based on 1984 figures, the World Bank estimates that import restrictions are a 66% income tax surcharge on people earning about \$8,000 a year, or \$5,280. If you are earning \$60,000, your surcharge is 5%, \$3,000.

Now, what I want to know is, where is all this "Consumer Protection" we're supposed to be getting from the government?

Isn't Democracy Wonderful? A lot of people seem to think that democracy and free markets go together. Not necessarily. Historically, the U. S. has moved away from free markets, and toward more democratic institutions (e.g. direct election of Senators). In Britain, Parliament is slowly becoming more or less democratic, although Adam Smith might have some squawks about the British economy.

However, one of the freest economies in the world is crown colony Hong Kong. Hong Kong never held an election until 1985, and the Legislative Council is pretty much a sham for the benefit of the Red Chinese come 1996. Foreign policy, such as it is, is handled by the Foreign Office in London, and everything else is done by a Governor, appointed by London bureaucrats.

Another country which isn't very democratic in the American sense is Switzerland, where only recently were women given the vote in federal matters. Some cantons still don't allow women to vote in cantonal elections.

The federal government is small, with power residing in the cantons or communes. Really important stuff, like changes in the tax structure or bank secrecy laws are put to referendum.

Why I Detest the State

The power of the federal government is so small that very few Swiss know who the president is. They only know the finance minister, Mr. Otto Stich, because he is a Socialist, and no one else wanted the job.

The net result of all this is that the Swiss government accounts for less than 35% of GDP, miniscule compared to such neighbors as Italy or France.

How You Gonna Keep 'em Down on the Commune: An article by Czech science fiction fan Ondrej Neff in "Shards of Babel" details the state of the idiot revolution in Czechoslovakia.

"At the moment, authorities estimate that there are 250,000 video recorders in Czechoslovakia, and about five million video tapes." Only 2,500 of these were bought from State stores with Czech currency, and a few more from the official hard currency shops. The rest were imported, legally or otherwise. The first tape rental shop opened in the summer of 1985 and stocked only Soviet and Czech films. Other pipelines provide the fans with their science fiction films.

The main official organization for hobbyists is the Svazarm, which name means literally, The Union for Cooperation with the Army. The radio club has set up a video division, and this has become the core of the SF club ADA. The club owns its own VTR and has a tape library.

The tapes come in from many sources, mostly smuggling. For example, five episodes of the American television program "V" came in from different countries: Sweden, Belgium, Australia and Lebanon. The "Beruit Connection" is a chap in Lebanon with access to a movie theatre who makes copies of new releases. Thus the Czech fan saw "Star Trek III" and "Mad Max" right after their theatrical releases and well before they were available in the official stores.

Films from the Beruit Connection have Arabic subtitles on the bottom of the screen, which is reasonable. However, films from Kuwait tend to have the subtitles in the middle of the screen. Swedish and Belgian tapes have neat subtitles at the bottom.

Movies also arrive by air—telecast from West Germany. Folks in Pilsen or other western Czech areas can tape off the air. In Prague, a bit more effort is required due to the low signal strength. Out in the countryside near Prague is this spot where the signal comes in loud and clear. The places are frequented by people with hefty car batteries, inverters and roof-mounted antennae.

Dubbing is the answer to the language problem. The local idiots do simultaneous translations and record them on one track, while the original sound is retained on the other track of a stereo recorder.

Popular films among Czech science fiction fans include "Star Wars," "Escape From New York," "Alien," "Terminator," and "Bladerunner." "Dune" didn't go over too well, nor did "Gremlins" or "Ghostbusters."

"Shards of Babel" is a European science fiction fanzine. It is primarily a newsmagazine, and is available from its publishers, Roelof Goudriaan and Lynne Ann Morse, Noordwal 2, 2513 EA Den Haag, the Netherlands. Six issues will cost you \$5.00 or Fl 13, in cash please.

Charles Curley is a former gold smuggler and founder of the National Committee for Monetary Reform. Mr. Curley now writes both software and books. His interests include ancient and modern history, chess, science fiction, space industrialisation and economics.

Mr. Curley was involved in politics from the 1964 campaign of Barry Goldwater until 1972 or so, when he quit the Libertarian Party in disgust. He could say that he had quit the LP before most of its current membership had ever heard of the LP, but he won't. He has written speeches for major party Congressional candidates, and worked on local party organizations as well. He is no longer involved in politics, having better things to do, such as earning an honest living.

Mr. Curley is a native of New England, and flies the Gadsden Flag on Flag Day. An expatriate citizen of the Republic of Vermont, he now lives in the redwood mountains of Santa Cruz, California, where he expects his tomato patch to be raided by the Santa Cruz Air Force and the D.E.A. any day now.

About a year before he died, Albert Einstein wrote this warning: "The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking, and we thus drift toward unparalleled catastrophes."

In paraphrase, such a statement could describe even direr consequences:

"From tribalism to republic, man has tried every kind of *archy* conceivable, with one outcome in common: *each* has degenerated to chaos and tyranny. Man has 'changed everything *save his modes of thinking*,' and thus drifts incorrigibly into recurring disaster."

"Man acts in accordance with his deepest convictions as he perceives them," wrote my late mentor, Robert LeFevre. If that is true, our convictions are extremely important, for they guide our actions, and thus what we **believe** literally affects the **freedom of others**. I am persuaded that a conviction worth keeping is a conviction worth testing and articulating, for thereby we may construct a morally sound, consistent philosophy to live by.

A few moons ago, in the company of very intelligent people, I heard some rather astonishing convictions. The host "wound me up" by asking what I thought of the northern California "land-for-drugs" seizure. It is apparent many people favor such seizure by government, so I choose this opportunity to tell you why libertarians do not.

Most of you have read my pamphlet, and you should know it is **because** I love my country that I loathe its government, in all its forms, for a host of reasons. Now I don't just despise government because it is wasteful, arrogant and immoral. I don't hate it solely because it is coercive and legally **steals for its livelihood**. It is true that I abhor government because it cloaks its crimes with euphemisms: it **robs**, but calls it "taxation"; it **defrauds**, but calls it "social security"; it **kidnaps**, but calls it "busing"; it **enslaves**, but calls it "conscription"; and it **counterfeits**, but calls it "inflation." It does the very things **I cannot do without committing crimes**, but do you know why I **really detest** government? (I thought you would never ask.)

It is because of what government has done to my friends, and has much to do with what Karl Hess has termed "the most pernicious institution in the United States today: the public school system." Now he didn't just say that because so many high school seniors read at a fourth grade level, have difficulty filling out a job application, or trouble making simple change in the market place. He said that because **there** is where government transforms fine, young, mental timber into petrified, apologetic **tools of the state**: so that they will stand mindlessly and pledge allegiance to a piece of cloth, with 50 stars for 50 percent taxation, and **think** they are **free**; so that they will lend their lives as cannon fodder around the globe whenever *El Presidente* goes on the warpath, all in the name of "peace," you understand; so that they will **lock step** behind officials of state in a **myriad** of assaults on human liberty, and cry out with the multitude, "Crucify! Crucify!" **That's why I loathe government** because of what it has done to my friends!

Thanks to everyday, political forays of interwoven theft, the typical American on the street today wouldn't recognize a **property right** if it batted him in the face. Consequently he can't even make a **moral decision**, but looks to church and state for a determination of right or wrong. Even then he has trouble: He goes to church on Sunday morning, gives lip service to the Eighth Commandment, "Thou shall not steal" (PERIOD), and then goes to the polls on Tuesday evening, where he **abandons** his tenet, and appropriates his neighbors' capital with the stroke of a punch as though he owned it! And then he says, "I didn't take my neighbors' capital, **government** did it!" But government did it with **his authorization, his license**. Indeed the most **devastating problem** of this century is not drugs, is not terrorism, is not nuclear weapons; instead it is **utter, rampant, contemptible violation of property right**, and therein is the **root of ALL conflict**!

Libertarian actions have a common criterion: "See that one is not a thief." Ladies and gentlemen of good will, that I know you to be, if you would live in peace and harmony with others of your species, that principle is not just a convenient option; it is an absolute **obligation** on your part: See that you are not a thief, directly or in-

directly via government, in any manner, for any reason.

Is this a new concept? Certainly not. Consider two early American coins: a continental, silver dollar, minted in 1775 (that today would cost about 4,000 **declining minidollars**), and the Franklin penny, coined in 1787. Each coin was inscribed with the message: "*Mind your business.*" I submit that a healthy respect for property right is among the **oldest** of American traditions.

Now let us put this lesson to the test. I may not relish the fact that my neighbor is growing a crop of marijuana, but **I don't own his property**, and it is **his property right to grow any crop he wants**. Certainly it is **not my right to steal control of his property** to have it otherwise. By the same token, it is **not the right of a majority** of neighbors, or **government as a substitute**, to **intervene either!** We don't have to buy his drug crop. The same lesson applies to Nicaragua, Libya, Lebanon, Iran and the Union of South Africa. When you **own the property there, then and only then**, may you **morally determine** what happens there. Until that time, *please*, in order that freedom might flourish, *mind your business!*

I want to conclude with inspiration of that brilliant, nineteenth-century logician, philosopher, economist, Frederic Bastiat:

"The question of legal plunder must be settled once and for all, and there are only three ways to settle it:

1. The few plunder the many. (That's how governments get started.)
2. Everybody plunders everybody. (That's where we are today.)
3. Nobody plunders anybody. (That's the **creative** way of life.)

No legal plunder is the principle of justice, peace, order, stability, harmony and logic.

To Frederic Bastiat, *a man alone* — and to my family and friends:

*a vos sante,
"Clem Johnson"*



"I had this silly notion that since I learned it, it was mine.
So, I spent it!"

Statement of Purpose

Voluntaryists are advocates of non-political strategies to achieve a free society. We reject electoral politics, in theory and in practice, as incompatible with libertarian principles. Governments must cloak their actions in an aura of moral legitimacy in order to sustain their power, and political methods invariably strengthen that legitimacy. Voluntaryists seek instead to delegitimize the State through education, and we advocate withdrawal of the co-operation and tacit consent on which State power ultimately depends.

Ten Pillars of Economic Wisdom


1. The art of understanding economics (whole systems of human energy transfer) consists in looking not merely at the immediate, but at the longer effects of any act or policy; it consists in tracing out the consequences of that act or policy not merely for one individual or group, but for all individuals and groups.
2. Nothing in our material world can come from nowhere or go nowhere (energy can be neither created nor destroyed), nor can it be cost free. Everything in our economic life has a source, a destination, and a cost that must be paid. "There ain't no such thing as a free lunch."
3. The State is not, and can never be, a producer of goods. Goods must first be produced by people, and everything that the State gives to the people, it must first take from the people.
4. Bogus money (nothing but numbers on pieces of paper) must not be confused with real money. Real money, an honest medium of exchange, is a commodity which serves as an "energy transmission **and storage** tool."
5. The only real money that the State has to spend is that money taxed or borrowed out of the people's earnings. Inflation occurs when the State increases the supply of **bogus** money by printing more or making bookkeeping entries. When the new bogus money is spent, it reduces the purchasing power of all the previous money in existence.
6. In our modern exchange economy, all payroll and employment come from customers, and the only worthwhile job security is continuous customer patronage. Customers are the sole source of payroll. They are, therefore, the true employers.
7. Because wages are a major cost of both production and service, widespread wage increases, without corresponding increases in production, simply increase the cost of everybody's living, including the fellow who insisted upon the pay "raise."
8. **Man's Material Welfare** (well-being) depends upon changing the form, condition, and location of **Natural Resources**

through the expenditure of mental and muscular **Human Energy** aided by **Tools**. Tools are defined as all of the things used by man to improve his material welfare. Production increases only with increases in the quantity and quality of the tools, and the intelligence and diligence with which they are used. Man's Material Welfare = Natural Resources plus Human Energy multiplied by Tools. Thus, $MMW = NR + HE \times T$.

9. Tools are the only one of the three factors comprising Man's Material Welfare that man can increase. Production of new tools requires self-denial in the present in the hope of increased profits in the future. In other words, savings must first be accumulated in order to pay for invention and production of tools. Freedom to enjoy the full profits (when there are any) from such self-discipline is necessary, or people will not save, and this will eventually result in a drastic reduction in the production of tools which will inevitably result in a diminution of man's material well-being.
10. Productivity of tools, that is, the efficiency of human energy applied in connection with their use, is highest in a free market society where the law of supply and demand operates without interference. Freedom of choice (made by millions of progress-seeking individuals, rather than the decisions of a few all-powerful politicians) always proves more efficient because everybody involved in production and exchange can be held accountable for his performance and be rewarded accordingly.

[Editor's Note: The above statements of economic law were prepared by Carl Watner, Kevin Cullinane and Patricia Cullinane and are currently being used as a handout at Freedom School, Campobello, South Carolina. Some of the original ideas in *The Ten Pillars of Economic Wisdom* appeared in Fred G. Clark and Richard S. Rimanoczy, "HOW WE LIVE, New York, Van Nostrand, 1944 and 1960.]

The Wheel of Economic Progress



PROPERTY OWNERSHIP

HUB conducts the driving force which is man's economic **FREEDOM**
SPOKES give the wheel strength and are the economic **PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY**
RIM holds them together and is man's sense of **INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY**
ROAD on which the wheel must roll is man's respect for **PROPERTY OWNERSHIP**

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