
The Voluntaryist

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"If one takes care of the means, the end will take care of itself."

December, 1982

FROM POLITICS TO VOLUNTARYISM

An Interview with Dyanne Petersen

In August 1980, Dyanne Petersen, Southern Executive Director for the California Libertarian Council (the membership organization of the Libertarian Party of California), delivered her resignation speech before the State Executive Committee at the State Convention in Sacramento.

Dyanne is currently Programs Coordinator for the Center for Libertarian Studies in New York City, founder and director of the *Laissez Faire Supper Club* of Manhattan, Associate Publisher of *The Libertarian Forum*, and a supporter of The Voluntaryists. We are pleased to have her as the subject of our first interview in *The Voluntaryist*.

V: Your resignation speech caused quite a stir. I understand that several people tried to persuade you not to give the speech and just to resign quietly. What was so controversial?

DP: The speech was very critical of the direction of the Libertarian Party in general as well as critical of the 1980 campaigns. Many of the people who asked me not to give the speech were simply concerned with the timing. The campaigns were in high gear and people wanted all criticisms held until after the elections. I couldn't wait. As I said in the speech, I thought it was important for libertarians to subject their own organizations to scrutiny—to take care of their own housecleaning—before becoming the target of criticism by political enemies. Philosophy—libertarian ideals—was being sacrificed for political expediency. I used the Nock quote, "you can't be a philosopher and a politician at the same time." The campaigns of 1980 proved him correct.

V: In using the Albert Jay Nock quote, were you making a moral judgment against electoral politics?

DP: No, not at the time. I thought Nock meant it was impossible to mix politics and philosophy—not that it was morally incorrect to do so. It took further reading for me to really understand his moral opposition to electoral politics.

You see, I was one of those Libertarians who thought that the LP was merely an educational vehicle. If an LP candidate got elected, fine. But the real purpose of campaigning was to get our ideas across to the widest possible audience and influence opinion and policy. And I think this was shared by most of the Party activists in Orange County (California) in early 1978—which is where and when my Party activism began. If I had to pinpoint a time when the LP shifted gears and began to take itself seriously as a political force, it would have to be just after Clark won the 375,000 votes for governor in Calif. Vote totals and percentages became the new measure of success. The moral and ideological revolution was replaced by strategies to achieve a political one. Ballot status

became more important than education. A "mirrors game" was established.

V: What do you mean by a "mirrors game" and do you still think that the LP could be a good educational vehicle?

DP: By "mirrors game" I mean creating the illusion of a grand Party—a third Party that could really compete with the Republicrats. The LP an educational vehicle? No, I don't think so. It can provide a decent introduction, as it did for me and many others, simply by "Libertarian" visibility during campaigns. But these same campaigns can—and do—distort libertarian principles by watering them down to make them more attractive to voters. Look what happened in 1980. The campaign managers were very obviously concerned with Clark appearing Right of Reagan on economic issues, hence low-tax liberalism. "Taxation is Theft" and the reasons why it is theft were replaced with a proposed 30% tax cut. To Joe-on-the-street, Libertarians were against *excessive* taxation, not taxation itself. Just another example of Nock's statement about mixing philosophy and politics.

V: Is this what you meant in your speech about the activities of the Libertarian Party having the potential of being damaging to the libertarian movement? Can you give another example?

DP: Unfortunately, many. Clark was interviewed on television and talked about educational tax credits. He was asked the libertarian position on compulsory education and he replied that this was not part of his tax-credit program. He was asked a second time and again he refused to express libertarian principle. He obviously thought that it was too radical for the public to accept. He chose to evade the question rather than alienate voters. I'm sure my reaction to his double evasion was no different from the reaction of non-libertarians: he's just another politician. In another interview, Clark stated that he was for the decriminalization of soft drugs. This implied that he felt differently about hard drugs. Again, no statement about "no victim, no crime." The campaign was a mishmash of Left and Right. There was no evidence of consistency or principle offered by the candidate of the "Party of Pure Principle." Now the general public, confused by this wishy-washy libertarianism, has to have libertarianism redefined. I may be unfair in choosing only Clark campaign mistakes. But I think that one can see what happens when achieving political office and power is the goal. Votes become more important than ideas. But, as we know, *ideas* are the key to social change.

V: You were "converted" to the anarchist position while in the Party. Did it have anything to do with your resignation?

DP: Definitely. I became unhappy with my own inconsistencies—being an anarchist and working for an organization which was trying to achieve political power. I didn't believe any government could be benevolent or moral. Watching the LP campaigns and candidates of 1980 convinced me that they were simply the least of three

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EDITORIAL

LET MY PEOPLE GO

June, 1974 was a fateful month for political anarchists. It was during this month at the national convention that the Libertarian Party arrived at the "Dallas Accord"—an agreement to shelve the minarchist-anarchist conflict in order to facilitate cooperation within the Party. Underlying the Dallas Accord is the assumption that anarchism and minarchism derive from a common ideology, and that the debate over government is little more than an aggravating bump on a common path.

This assumption is dangerously misleading. Sound theory—or at least sound instinct—should have made this evident to political anarchists at the time. If not, the practical lessons of the past eight years have made it inescapably clear by now.

Minarchism and anarchism are not two points along the same line. They represent divergent paths which, despite frequent overlap, lead to antagonistic destinations. Their differences cannot be reduced to an abstract debate over the legitimacy of government. This debate is simply the philosophical crystallization of profound conflicts in theory, strategy, and attitude.

Is it mere coincidence that anarchists comprise the majority of Party members who support radical positions on issues *other* than government? Is it mere coincidence that advocates of disarmament, anti-militarism, cold-war revisionism, hard-core campaigns, strategic abolitionism, and so forth, usually hail from the anarchist camp? Similarly, is it mere coincidence that Party minarchists look less and less like libertarians and more and more like refugees of Reaganism? Strange indeed if these deep-seated disagreements stem from nothing more than a rather technical dispute over a philosophical principle.

As polarization within the LP worsens, as minarchists dig conservative trenches to withstand the onslaught of anarchists, it will become unmistakably clear that the antagonists embody different world views—one is tempted to say, different *cultures*. Minarchists often bring with them the cultural baggage of nationalism, militarism, strategic conservatism, and a peculiar reverence for the U.S. government. These biases have a greater impact on policy disputes than does belief in the abstract legitimacy of government. How one views government in theory is often less influential than how one views *presently existing* governments (especially one's own) in practice.

Minarchists, to employ a common metaphor, view the present U.S. government as a garden overgrown with weeds. This suggests a conservative strategy: one eliminates the weeds (repeals laws) one by one, until only flowers remain.

Anarchists, on the other hand, view the present U.S. government as a garden of weeds, period. This suggests a dif-

ferent strategy: one eliminates not only the weeds but the *soil* that permitted them to flourish. Anarchists focus not only on specific manifestations of power, but on the underlying *structure* of power itself—the State.

Minarchists will never accept the strategic vision of anarchism, for it poses as great a threat to their political convictions (their garden) as it does to more conventional defenders of government. If LP minarchists were to occupy the major positions of power in the U.S. government, they would soon regard libertarian anarchists—their supposed fellow travelers—as their greatest threat. The English Levellers learned this lesson the hard way from their alliance with Oliver Cromwell. So did the Russian anarchists who allied with the Bolsheviks. Anarchists who view the transition from a minimal government to an anarchist society as simply the last step of a long journey display a naivete that would be touching if it were not so foolhardy. They, too, are destined to learn the hard way.

As fissures deepen within the LP, internal conflicts will become more bitter and divisive. Battles will focus not on the minarchist-anarchist dispute but on particular policy stands, such as nuclear disarmament. But whatever the issue may be, there will be a majority of anarchists on one side and a majority of minarchists on the other side. In the event of a serious crisis, such as U.S. involvement in a major war, the tension will become unendurable as the minarchists bare their patriotic fangs and join in a bloody crusade against communism.

It is impossible to say what will cause the final rupture—that depends on the nature of the crisis—but the rupture *will* come. (War or a foreign policy dispute is the best bet.) Either minarchists or anarchists will flee the Party en masse. But even if this is true, why should anarchists leave the Party now to form a separate organization, as Voluntaryists urge, rather than remain in the LP to slug it out with minarchists?

The answer is simple. The anarchists cannot win. If minarchists triumph in the Party, the political anarchists lose, and their past efforts are largely wasted. If anarchists triumph in the Party, then anarchism itself loses.

Political parties (*serious* political parties, that is—ones that intend to win elections) are inherently conservative. This is chiefly because they deal with the State on the State's own terms. Political parties are essential to the legitimacy and continued functioning of the American government. Political parties may alter specific policies, or even repeal laws, but they do not—because they cannot—challenge the structure of State power itself.

Voluntaryists believe that anarchists have important contributions to make in strategy as well as in theory. We believe in the potential of nonviolent anarchist organizations to challenge State power on a level impossible for political parties. The basic theory is there, awaiting development. The strategic insights are there, awaiting implementation. Where, then, are the anarchists? Many of them, including those of the highest caliber, are stuck in a regressive and increasingly bureaucratic political party, soliciting votes like common political hacks, engaging in vendettas, and fighting delaying actions against Party conservatism which approaches with the inevitability of death.

If this were not tragic enough, Party anarchists have further crippled themselves with the Dallas Accord. After binding themselves with political ropes, they have voluntarily gagged themselves as well. Minarchists were thoroughly routed in the early debates over government, and by 1974 they were in hasty retreat. Then came the Dallas Accord, and the anarchists snatched defeat from the jaws of victory. There was to

be no official position in the LP on the legitimacy of government. The LP would remain officially neutral. Does anyone seriously believe that the public perceives the LP to be neutral on the subject of government? Unless otherwise stated (and only anarchists are there to state otherwise), the public will assume that a political party is in favor of at least some government. When there is no explicit repudiation of government by a political party the consequence is not neutrality, but the appearance of a pro-government stand.

Thus have anarchists become captives of a political party. Some of this self-imposed bondage is unintentional—the natural consequence of electoral politics. Some of it is intentional—the Dallas Accord. But regardless of the reason, the political captivity of anarchists spells disaster. Not only is their effectiveness within the Party neutralized (for every Joe Fuhrig or Less Antman there are a dozen mediocrities), but their considerable talents are diverted from the development of anarchist strategy and organization. The opportunity costs of political anarchism are incalculable.

Anarchists of the Party desert! You have nothing to lose but your chains.

G.H.S.
W.M.

THE ETHICS OF VOTING

By George H. Smith

PART TWO

III. Institutional Analysis

I have argued that institutional analysis is essential not only to the voluntaryist critique of electoral voting, but to anarchist theory generally. Anarchism combines the nonaggression principle with an institutional view of the State, resulting in the principled rejection of the State on libertarian grounds. For the concept of “anarchism” to be meaningful, the concept of the “State” must also be meaningful. Anarchism presupposes that the State can be *defined* in theory and *identified* in practice. The State must possess distinctive features which enable us to differentiate it from other kinds of human association; and there must be criteria by which we can distinguish *members* from *nonmembers* (a significant issue, as we shall see).

In addition, the anarchist rejection of the State is usually based on moral arguments. This carries institutional analysis from the *descriptive* realm to the *normative* realm, for we are now concerned with how moral evaluation applies within an institutional framework. If, as anarchists claim, the State is invasive per se and therefore inherently unjust, then what does this moral condemnation of an institution imply concerning those individuals who voluntarily become “members” of the State? Few anarchists restrict liability for the State’s criminal acts to direct aggressors only, i.e., to law enforcement personnel. Few anarchists exonerate dictators because they do not personally enforce their decrees. Indeed, anarchists often impute greatest liability to the highest levels of political decision-making (presidents, legislators, etc.), even though these levels are far removed from physical enforcement. (There were more condemnations of President Johnson

during the Vietnam War than of individual bomber pilots.) This kind of moral analysis is understandable only within an institutional framework, where individuals are assessed according to their role in sustaining and implementing State injustice, however distant they may be from actual enforcement. Individual acts, in other words, are not judged in isolation, but within a broader context. Inevitably, as I argued in Part One, this will entail some theory of vicarious liability. Anarchists must present a theory to explain how persons other than direct aggressors can be held accountable for criminal acts. We must explain, moreover, where liability ends and why.

These are not easy problems to solve, and they have been virtually ignored in libertarian literature. The result has been some rather wide gaps in anarchist theory, in which political anarchists have found it convenient to hide when under attack. When institutional analysis is used against the political anarchist, he will often object to this procedure as such (rather than to its particular application in his case) on the ground that institutional analysis, whether descriptive or normative, violates the time-honored libertarian principles of methodological individualism, value subjectivism, individual responsibility, and so forth. The political anarchist, of course, does not examine what these kamikazee arguments would do to his own profession of anarchism. He does not care to explain how, if institutional analysis is ruled out of court, it is possible even to state coherently what anarchism *is*, much less defend it. Even anarchists are afflicted with a strange blindness when they stoop to defend political power.

It is not my intention to argue for the use of institutional analysis within anarchist theory. I submit that it is *already* used extensively by political anarchists and voluntaryists alike, but that it usually lurks in the shadows, as if we are embarrassed to expose it to the light of day. It has a suspicious ancestry, this institutional analysis. It smacks of sociology, collectivism, holism, and other things generally repugnant to libertarians. Fear of contamination leads to a failure of nerve—there is, after all, the haunting possibility that anarchism itself will collapse if it rests on institutional analysis—so we go merrily about denouncing the “State” without specifying precisely which individuals constitute the State or how it is possible to pass moral judgment on an institution. (We have been somewhat fortunate that minarchist critics of anarchism have generally overlooked these vulnerable spots—but it is possible that they, too, succumb to institutional analysis.)

IV. Describing Institutions

It is important to understand that institutional analysis, as here employed, does not contradict methodological individualism. It does not deny that only individuals act or that social phenomena are reducible to individual actions. One can speak meaningfully of institutions, associations, organizations, and so forth, without implying that these social phenomena enjoy an existence apart from individuals. Methodological individualists are not required to purge their vocabulary of terms like “family,” “church,” “state,” and “corporation.”

Indeed, staunch methodological individualists have used institutional analysis extensively as an explanatory tool. This is evident among Austrian economists who, despite their commitment to methodological individualism and value subjectivism, eagerly analyze free-market institutions (such as

money) that result from human action but not from human design. "Institution," an elusive term at best, is used here in a broad sense to designate a widely recognized and stabilized method of pursuing a social activity (exchange, in the case of money). It is possible conceptually to isolate some feature of social interaction and to study it abstracted from the *particular* individuals involved. Individual actors are presupposed in this procedure, but their specific identities are *irrelevant* to the outcome. Individual actors, within institutional analysis, are anonymous. The reason for this, as F.A. Hayek has argued, is because intentional actions have unintended consequences.

"The problems which (the social sciences) try to answer arise only in so far as the conscious action of many men produce undesigned results, in so far as regularities are observed which are not the result of anybody's design. If social phenomena showed no order except in so far as they were consciously designed, there would indeed be no room for theoretical sciences of society and there would be, as is often argued, only problems of psychology. It is only in so far as some sort of order arises as a result of individual action but without being designed by any individual that a problem is raised which demands a theoretical explanation." (*The Counter-Revolution of Science*, Free Press, 1955, p. 39.)

It is possible to interpret Hayek to mean that only institutions which are themselves the product of spontaneous order are the proper subject of social theory. This would rule out *designed* institutions (often called associations), such as business organizations, fraternal clubs, and (most relevant to our purpose) modern States. But even these designed institutions exhibit many unintended consequences *internally*. An automobile factory is designed; its internal division of labor does not emerge spontaneously. The overall purpose guiding the design of an automobile factory is the efficient production of cars. But this may not be the purpose of many (or even most) factory workers. The machinist, the welder, the fitter, the warehouse foreman—these specialized roles can be filled even if the individuals concerned know or care very little about the overall product to which their labor contributes. The structure of a factory is designed, so we may speak of a factory's "purpose" (i.e., the purpose of its designers). Yet the furtherance of this purpose may, from the perspective of the individual worker, be unintended. This is why it is perfectly correct to say that an individual (the factory worker) may contribute unintentionally to an institutional end (the production of cars).

The need for specialization leads to a division of labor, and this may be *undesigned* (as in society generally) or *designed* (as in business organizations). The division of labor in designed institutions (which I shall hereafter refer to as "associations") leads to the institutionalization of labor—or "roles," to use a term common among sociologists. If a factory needs another welder, it seeks out a qualified individual to fill that role. It is possible to discuss the importance of the welder role in the overall production process without referring to any specific welder. We know, of course, that the disembodied role of welder does not actually weld anything; we always presuppose a flesh-and-blood human being who functions in that capacity. But the specific *identity* of the welder (his religion, personal characteristics, etc.) and his *personal intentions* (why he took the job) are immaterial to the successful accomplishment of the institutional end, so long as the welder satisfies the requirements of the role (i.e., "does his job"). This is what I mean when I say that the individual functioning in a role is presupposed but anonymous.

An institutional analysis of an automobile factory would examine roles within the factory, the efficient ordering of roles in relation to each other (which job should be done first? where is the best location within the plant for a particular job?), and the relation of these roles to the desired outcome

(does the addition of a tape deck as standard equipment add too much to the car's price?). We can speak meaningfully of the production *process*, the production *result*, and the contribution of roles to both process and result—even if these are unintended from the standpoint of individual workers. The welder may insist that his intention is to contribute to the building of boats—he may adamantly denounce cars as dangerous and swear his eternal hostility to them—but insofar as he fulfills the institutional role of automobile welder, we will insist that he does, *in fact*, contribute to the building of cars. This may be an *unintended* consequence of his actions, but it is a consequence nonetheless. (And we should keep in mind that "unintended" does not mean "unforeseeable.")

Thus, institutional analysis examines individual actions not in isolation, but within the broader context of institutional roles. We can give a purely physical description of the welder's actions; this is one kind of description. We can also give an institutional description of the welder's actions; this is another kind of description—one that attempts to link the isolated action to a broader chain of actions performed by others within an association.

Many common terms cannot be grasped using physical descriptions. Such terms, including many political terms, must be defined institutionally. They can be understood only by relating them to the roles and procedures of an association. "Voting" is a pertinent example. Suppose that, in preparation for election day, I construct a "voting booth" in my backyard that is physically identical (within reason) to authorized voting booths located around the city. On election day I enter my booth and pull the appropriate levers. But have I voted? Obviously not. At most I have expressed a preference in a rather bizarre fashion. Unless a voting booth is authorized by the State, whatever goes on in the booth is not described as voting. The physical similarity between my action and real voting is irrelevant. What counts is the institutional framework in which the physical activity occurs. (We shall return to this in more detail in a later installment.)

Institutional analysis also permits us to understand the *continuity* of associations. The U.S. State, since its formal inception in 1789 (ratification of the Constitution), has undergone many turnovers in personnel. Moreover, it has expanded territorially and has experienced tremendous growth in its laws, regulations, and bureaucracy. But we still refer to it as the same State, and correctly so. This is because the basic structure of the State, including its Constitution, has remained fundamentally unchanged.

Before applying institutional analysis (descriptive) to the State in more detail, let us anticipate somewhat and touch on a problem created for ethical theory by institutional analysis.

V. Division of Labor and Moral Responsibility

The division of labor within associations creates an interesting and often frustrating problem of determining responsibility. We see this in modern States which, as they expand the range and intensity of their political power, have evolved complex and highly specialized internal functions. Attributing responsibility is especially difficult in democratic States, where locating the center(s) of power keeps political "scientists" busy arguing with each other. On the one side are defenders of "elite" theories, who see political power resting in the hands of a small group, or class. This class may be defined economically (e.g., Marxists) or politically (e.g., followers of Mosca and Pareto). On the other side are democratic pluralists (e.g., Robert Dahl) who believe there are many foci of power distributed throughout a democratic

State. And there are defenders of various shades in between. (We may be thankful that few sophisticated theorists maintain any longer that political power rests in the hands of "the people.")

Ralf Dahrendorf addresses the problem of responsibility and its connection to the division of labor in *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* (Stanford, 1959, p. 297). "Like the division of labor in industrial production," Dahrendorf notes, the division of labor in political power "has led to the creation of numerous specialist positions, every one of which bears but slight traces of the process of which it is a part."

"Who produces the car in an automobile factory? The director? The fitter? The foreman? The typist? Every one of these questions has to be answered in the negative, and one might therefore be tempted to conclude that nobody produces the car at all. Yet the car is being produced, and we can certainly identify people who do not participate in its production." (Emphasis added.)

Dahrendorf applies this same reasoning to the pinpointing of responsibility in a bureaucracy:

"Nobody in particular seems to exercise 'the authority' and yet authority is exercised, and we can identify people who do not participate in its exercise. Thus the superficial impression of subordination in many minor bureaucratic roles must not deceive us. All bureaucratic roles are defined with reference to the total process of the exercise of authority to which they contribute to whatever small extent."

Dahrendorf makes a point of great significance. It may be impossible in some cases to attribute exact responsibility for the exercise of political power. But the difficulty in apportioning responsibility *within* an association (the State, in this case) does not hinder our ability to separate those who are responsible from those who are not. We can discriminate, in other words, between association *members* and *nonmembers*. We can distinguish factory workers from nonworkers.

Similarly, we can usually distinguish *members of the State* from nonmembers. The President is obviously a member of the State; the factory worker is not. Between these extremes there are shades of gray. What about the executives of a munitions firm that survives entirely from government contracts? What about a mail carrier for the United States Postal Service? Such examples could be multiplied endlessly, and they pose even more problems when we examine totalitarian governments where the private sector is virtually nonexistent (except for the black market).

I shall address some of these problems at a later time. For now we should recognize that the presence of gray does not negate the existence of black and white. To ascertain a precise cutoff point may be troublesome, but this does not mean that the extremes are any less clear. Since the dispute within libertarianism concerns the election of libertarians to significant political offices at various levels, the determination of a cutoff point is not crucial to this analysis. We must *first* decide whether anarchists can in good conscience become overt members of the State (congressmen, etc.); *then* we can attempt to clear up the fuzzy areas (working for the post office, state universities, etc.).

VI. The Modern State

"To really understand the State," wrote the anarchist Peter Kropotkin, one must "study it in its historical development" (*The State: Its Historic Role*, Haldeman-Julius, 1947, p. 7). This historical perspective teaches us that the State is a *designed* institution; it was forcibly imposed to accomplish specific objectives. By understanding these objectives, which have since become institutionalized, we are better able to understand the structure and internal functioning of States existing today. When we examine the division of labor

within a factory, it helps to know what the factory was designed to produce. Similarly, when we examine the State, it is vital to know the purpose(s) that generated this complex and massive association.

States have varied considerably in their structure and jurisdiction, but all of them fit the description by Franz Oppenheimer in *The State* (Vanguard, 1926). Oppenheimer distinguishes two basic methods of acquiring wealth: the economic means (labor and voluntary exchange) and the political means ("the unrequited appropriation of the labor of others"). This leads to a succinct description: "The state is an organization of the political means" (p. 27).

The State, for Oppenheimer, is organized theft—a method of systematic plunder. This is true but incomplete. The State is a union of thieves, but not all such unions are States. State theft is distinguished by being *legitimized*; i.e., its coercive actions are generally regarded by the subject population as morally and/or legally proper. This feature is emphasized by Max Weber in his classic discussion of the modern State:

"A ruling organization will be called 'political' insofar as its existence and order is continuously safeguarded within a given *territorial* area by the threat and application of physical force on the part of the administrative staff. A compulsory political organization with continuous operations will be called a 'state' insofar as its administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to the *monopoly* of the *legitimate* use of physical force in the enforcement of its order" (*Economy and Society*, Univ. of California Press, 1978, I, p. 54).

This harmonizes with the notion of the State employed by libertarians in the debate between minarchism and anarchism. For example, Ayn Rand—perhaps the foremost proponent of minarchism—defines "government" as "an institution that holds the exclusive power to *enforce certain rules of social conduct in a given geographical area*" (*The Virtue of Selfishness*, New American Library, p. 107).

"A given geographical area—this allusion to territorial sovereignty recurs throughout the libertarian debates on the legitimacy of government. Although this is important, it is usually overlooked that *territorial* jurisdiction is a feature not of *all* States (or governments) throughout history, but of what historians refer to as "the modern State." This does not mean that such States did not exist before the modern era: the ancient Greek city-states exercised territorial sovereignty, as did the Han Empire of China and the Roman Empire. But the modern States of Western Europe, which were to become models of State-building throughout the world (England and France were especially influential), were not extensions of the ancient world; they developed from the successful, and often brutal, centralization of power by monarchs during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. (The origin of this trend can be traced back even further—perhaps to 1100, according to Joseph Strayer, *On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State*, Princeton, 1970.)

Historians generally regard the sixteenth century as pivotal in the development of the modern State. It was during this period that monarchs began to dominate rival claimants to power (especially the nobility and church). The march to territorial sovereignty accelerated its bloody pace. "The state-makers," as Charles Tilly notes, "only imposed their wills on the populace through centuries of ruthless effort."

"The effort took many forms: creating distinct staffs dependent on the crown and loyal to it; making those staffs (armies and bureaucrats alike) reliable, effective instruments of policy; blending coercion, co-optation and legitimation as means of guaranteeing the acquiescence of different segments of the populations; acquiring sound information about the country, its people and its resources; promoting economic activities which would free or create resources for the use of the state . . . Ultimately, the people paid" (*The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, ed. Charles Tilly, Princeton, 1975, p. 24).

The American State was also designed, though under different conditions than those in Europe. As part of the British Empire, the colonies were subject to colonial administration. Under the aegis of Robert Walpole, however, the colonies enjoyed a lengthy period of "salutary neglect" wherein mercantilist regulations were loosely enforced, if at all. When this lax policy ended in 1763—owing to the crushing financial burden incurred by Britain during the Seven Years War—the English found enforcement to be extremely difficult. Lax policies, plus the difficulty of governing from thousands of miles away, had permitted the colonists to evolve their own systems of local government which hindered centralization. A system of "competing governments" arose which prevented either side from attaining complete domination.

This changed with the successful completion of the American Revolution. Revolutions, however just, have unintended consequences of considerable magnitude. Two consequences of the American Revolution are important here: first, debts incurred during the war convinced many of the need for a centralized government with taxing power; second, with the British eliminated, there was no effective brake on the formation of a national State. The major competitor had been kicked out, and the field was clear for those who desired a State, provided it was not the British State.

But a new State (especially one born in revolution against monarchy) faced the considerable problem of legitimacy. A solution was readily found in a written Constitution authorized by "the people." (We needn't examine that fraud here.) Thus came into being one of the first modern "power maps" or "manifestoes of nationalism," to use the apt phrases of Ivo Duchacek (*Power Maps: Comparative Politics of Constitutions*, American Bibliographic Center, 1973).

The national government maintained its territorial sovereignty (over a growing amount of territory) without serious internal challenge until the Civil War. Sectional conflict between the North and South had erupted long before this, of course, but the political dominance of the Democratic Party (which enjoyed support from both sides) prevented an open break. This unified support disintegrated, however, in the 1850s, largely thanks to Stephen Douglas and his support of the Kansas-Nebraska Act.

A badly divided Democratic Party lost the presidency to the Republicans in 1860; and the deep South seceded in response to the ascension of a sectional candidate to the presidency. Lincoln, an ex-Whig, was thoroughly imbued with nationalist doctrines; and this president who would not have made war to liberate slaves was nonetheless willing to wage war in order to "preserve the union." ("Secession," as Lincoln correctly said, "is the essence of anarchy.") The Fort Sumter incident provoked other southern states to join the Confederacy, and thus began the bloodiest conflict in American history. Some 600,000 people lost their lives in this titanic struggle between two States, each attempting to establish sovereignty. The most significant chapter in American State-building was written with the blood of thousands.

We see that, however modern States differ in the details of their origin, and however they differ in the extent of their power, all share a *common design*. All were explicitly intended to establish territorial sovereignty. All insist that they are the final arbiters in matters pertaining to law within a given geographical area. (The *scope* of the law varies dramatically, of course, from State to State.) All States proclaim *compulsory jurisdiction*: a person is regarded as subject to the State, with or without his consent, as long as he resides in or is passing through a certain area (land, sea, or air). This territorial sovereignty is the foundation of all other State activities.

This historical digression is an important ingredient in developing an institutional analysis of the State. The State is a designed institution, forcibly imposed. State-builders had *specific objectives in mind, foremost of which was to secure territorial sovereignty*. The internal structure of the State was dictated (and continues its evolution today) with sovereignty foremost in mind. Virtually all functions of government—a standing army, an internal police, a monopolistic judiciary, a ruthless taxing power, public schools, etc.—may be seen as supports for the monopolization of power.

After we understand the purpose for which the State was designed, we are able to undertake an institutional analysis similar to the automobile factory discussed earlier. There we discussed how the overall product (the car) may be unintended from the perspective of specialized workers. We also examined the importance of roles in the production process. It is thus possible to refer to an institutional product and process being integral to the factory's structure. The worker, in filling a role (doing his job), participates in the process and contributes to the product, quite apart from his personal intentions and goals.

Similarly, we may examine the "State-factory," the institution designed to monopolize power and thereby sustain territorial sovereignty. Sovereignty is the "product" of this association (or the most fundamental among many); a monopoly on legitimized coercion is the "process." But roles in the State apparatus, like roles in the factory, need human beings to fill them. There are increasing specialization and division of labor as the State expands its power and jurisdiction. Many of the individuals in specialized roles may have little knowledge of, or interest in, the institutionalized process and product to which their labor contributes. Their contribution, in this sense, may be unintended. (But, to repeat an earlier point, unintended does not mean *unforeseeable*.)

This is what I mean by institutional analysis. And this is what I believe to be implicit throughout much of the writing by libertarian anarchists. I have attempted to show what it *means* to say that an anarchist politician contributes to State injustice merely by filling a role (i.e., holding political office). I have attempted to show *why* the *intentions* of the politician are irrelevant to the process and product of the "State-factory" he has willingly joined. Political offices are indispensable roles in the State apparatus; and I submit that anyone who fills these roles contributes, however inadvertently, to the State process (monopoly of power) and product (sovereignty). The continuance of State power rests, not on the intentions of those who hold political offices, but on the complex *structure* of the State apparatus, each part of which contributes to the maintenance of State supremacy.

Thus the anarchist politician is like the auto worker who claims to be building a boat, and who professes surprise when a car comes out anyway against his wishes. And is he to blame? Not at all. True, he did voluntarily take on a job at an auto factory. True, he did get paid for it. True, he did show up for work and do the things that an auto worker is supposed to do. But what do such inconvenient facts count against his *desire* to build a boat?

And so our political anarchist. He gets a job with a political power factory and expects to produce freedom. He may even claim to be a clever saboteur (forgetting that authentic saboteurs never announce the fact). He goes to work, does political things (votes, etc.), receives a State salary, and even swears allegiance to the State. Because of this the voluntarist suggests that he is *in fact* contributing to State power, despite his best intentions.

(To be continued).

Continued from page 1

evils. I had to resign. Limited government libertarians—minarchists, as Sam Konkin calls them—still believe that there is a proper function for government, so they don't have a moral battle over "To Party, or not to Party." As George Smith pointed out in the first issue of *The Voluntaryist*, a minarchist must first be brought to anarchism. Then the debate over electoral politics begins.

V: Do you regret your Party activism?

DP: You are the second person to ask me that. Around the time of my resignation, Neil Schulman asked me the same question. I told him that I would never regret the time I spent in the Party and that I thought I had made some valuable contributions to our cause of liberty. He told me to write down the date. He bet me that within a year, I would change my mind. I doubt that 3 months went by before I called to tell him he had won the bet.

The ballot access drive in California in 1979 was probably the biggest waste of time, talent, energy, and money. At first, I was gung-ho about the drive. The thought of reaching tens of thousands of people with libertarianism really sounded attractive. But, as it turned out we didn't have the time to educate or convert. All we could do was go after warm bodies of voting age to fill out voter registration cards. After we got permanent ballot status, *then* we'd educate these new "Libertarians." It never happened. There were more registered Libertarians in California than ever before, but Party membership didn't increase much. We did not build cadre. Hell, most of these folks couldn't even spell Libertarian—and now they were one! The public didn't know any more about libertarianism after the drive than it did before—except that it knew we were for legalizing marijuana! The ballot drive did, however, contribute greatly to the "mirrors game" I mentioned before.

V: If you were to name the single most important influence on your thinking, who would it be?

DP: No question; Murray Rothbard. Murray's writings have incorporated and expanded upon the greats in libertarian and free-market thought. But I have to part company with him when it comes to the Party. I would be less than honest to say that I don't enjoy his pot-shots at some of the personalities in the Party. But, I feel sad at the same time. He is without a doubt the most prolific writer and most important theorist in our movement. I wish he would spend more time smashing the state—giving his excellent analysis of economic policies, insights into international affairs, and hell, who doesn't love his revisionist history? No one will know who Ed Crane and his cohorts are in a couple of years. Murray is just beating a bunch of dead horses, as far as I'm concerned. I'm convinced he'll get disgusted with the Party—soon I hope, and then we'll all see the best of Rothbard.

V: What type of libertarian activities and organizations do you see as most valuable?

DP: Well, of course, I must include the Center for Libertarian Studies—but not just because I work there. I work there because I think we are making important contributions. Educational activities—conferences, colloquia, publications, etc.—which reach the academic and intellectual community are vital to changing opinion. Supporting libertarian scholars who will influence future

generations in classrooms around the world is an enormous investment in our future for freedom. There are many other organizations actively pursuing these goals—Cato and the Institute for Humane Studies are doing outstanding work. They research, formulate, and promote ideas of liberty in many disciplines. Society for Individual Liberty, Society for Libertarian Life, Movement of the Libertarian Left, Rampart Institute—I could go on and on. There are great contributions being made in investment/financial circles as well. Doug Casey, Jerome Smith, and Jack Pugsley, for example, have sold hundreds of thousands of investment books to non-libertarians which promote Austrian economics, libertarianism, and, in varying degrees, anarchism. Libertarian supper clubs are great education vehicles. They stimulate conversation and debate between libertarians while providing comfortable social settings where libertarians can bring their business associates, relatives, and friends. Some of the table talk, I might add, is more interesting and informative than some of the presentations. There is no substitute for personal contact. I don't buy the argument that libertarianism is simply a *political* philosophy. One can live a libertarian life. Let people learn about libertarianism by example. One can put the ideas into practice and show the moral and practical superiority of our ideas.

V: You mentioned many organizations but did not include Voluntaryists. What is your impression of this new organization?

DP: How embarrassing! Just a slip. Maybe it's because it is such a new group. The potential for Voluntaryism as a movement is unlimited. I see so many libertarians who want to be active—to feel like they are part of an organization or movement—but have only had the Party to work with. Organizations like CLS simply don't have activities that can keep ex-Party activists busy on a regular basis. The Voluntaryists are providing a wonderful opportunity for anarchist libertarians to actively promote explicitly libertarian ideas. I used to joke, "Is there life after the Party?" There is. And now more than ever. There are so many hardcore libertarians who have been turned-off by the Party and electoral politics and are looking for an alternative organization where they can meet, exchange ideas, demonstrate, debate statist, organize conferences, lectures, or what have you, and feel like they are part of a movement. The Voluntaryists can fill the void in many areas. The first issue of *The Voluntaryist* was long overdue. I don't know how any anarchist still left in the Party could read George's piece on the ethics of voting and stay in the Party. There is no incentive for the Voluntaryists to sell out or compromise—but there is in the Party. Wendy wrote a wonderful piece for *Caliber*—I think I have it damned near memorized—If libertarians don't present libertarian ideas, who will? They may be rejected or accepted but they will live or die on what they *are* rather than what they *are not*. It would be tragic if the one consistent voice for freedom didn't have the courage or confidence to speak up without apology. I see the Voluntaryists as having uncompromising potential. They have nothing to lose and everything to gain—namely freedom. The Party *needs* votes, since it has chosen votes as its measure of success. Votes establish credibility for a political party with the media—not ideas.

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V: What type of activities would you like to have the Voluntaryists promote?

DP: First, theory has to be developed to convince anarcho-LPers that engaging in the electoral process is inconsistent with anarchy. That is being done in *The Voluntaryist*. Once the moral and theoretical foundation has been laid, then it will be a cinch to get recruits—building cadre is the name of the game. I'd like to see local chapters so that people can start having discussion groups. Letters to the editor on local to national issues which use "Voluntaryist." Supper clubs. Conferences. Radio debates and talk shows. So far the Voluntaryists are doing a great job in creating controversy within the Party. That's where it's got to start, simply because to accept voluntaryism, you have to follow the progression of libertarian, anarchist, voluntaryist. That's the course I followed.

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

Registration is the first step of conscription. The war shouters and their prostitute press, bent on snaring you into the army, tell you that registration has nothing to do with conscription.

They lie.

Without registration, conscription is impossible.

Conscription is the abdication of your rights as a citizen. Conscription is the cemetery where every vestige of your liberty is to be buried. Registration is its undertaker.

No man with red blood in his veins can be forced to fight against his will.

But you cannot successfully oppose conscription if you approve of, or submit to, registration.

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By registering you willfully supply the government with the information it needs to make conscription effective.

To register is to acknowledge the right of the government to conscript.

The consistent conscientious objector to human slaughter will neither register nor be conscripted.

Alexander Berkman
The Blast Vol. II, No. 5,
June 1, 1917

Information on registration resistance is available from: **National Resistance Committee, P.O. Box 42488, San Francisco, California 94142.**

Statement of Purpose

The Voluntaryists are libertarians who have organized to promote non-political strategies to achieve a free society. We reject electoral politics, in theory and in practice, as incompatible with libertarian principles. Governments must cloak their actions in an aura of moral legitimacy in order to sustain their power, and political methods invariably strengthen that legitimacy. Voluntaryists seek instead to delegitimize the State through education, and we advocate withdrawal of the co-operation and tacit consent on which State power ultimately depends.

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