The Exit Option

By Carl Watner

The ideal of an open world, one without political borders or passports, was once described by Ernest Bevin, British Foreign Secretary, in 1946: "A diplomat asked me in London one day what the aim of my foreign policy was, and I said, 'To go down to Victoria Station, get a railway ticket, and go where the hell I liked without a passport or anything else.'" Voluntaryists can certainly concur with his sentiment. The more collectivized and controlled a society is, the more political restrictions hamper freedom of movement and the right to travel. In this paper, we shall discuss the concepts of citizenship, passports and international travel as they relate to the free and the not-so-free society.

History teaches that the last resort of the individual against tyranny is the ability to escape from the tyrant. The Jews fled Egypt and the Pharaohs when things got too hot for them in Biblical days. The Separatists left Holland and England for the New World during the 17th Century. Large numbers of Jews and intellectual dissidents left Nazi Germany as they saw signs that World War II would break out. The very existence of the Berlin Wall demonstrates the threat that the communists fear from those who desire to escape.

Monetary exchange controls and restraints on the export of capital act in the same way as travel restrictions on the individual. Both the right to travel and the right to move one's money or capital around the world are forms of property rights. As Charles Fried wrote in an article on "the borders of individual freedom," "since most people do not have a unique and transportable talent, money represents the concrete expression of their effort, talent and good luck. To hold a man's money in while letting his person out seems liberal principally to the intellectual who imagines that he carries his fortune in his head. For most people, however, what they have earned is in some sense the precipitate of who they are and have been."

The "exit option," as Fried labelled it, is the last resort of those who reject collective authority. No one leaves their place of birth and home without great amounts of forethought. To leave expresses exasperation and dissatisfaction with one's community and the way it is governed. It is the next to last gesture of a free man; the last being, as Seneca noted, the exit option of suicide.

Would a stateless world exist without travel restrictions? The only voluntaryist history we have to draw upon is the experience of the American colonists and pioneers in migrating and settling this country. Until 1856, there was no federal legislation governing the granting of passports. And until World War I no passport was required for entrance into or for residence in the United States (a temporary exception was made during the Civil War whereby all Americans and foreigners had to present a passport on entering the country). Although the World War I regulations requiring passports were not in effect during the 1920s and 30s, the visa requirements of many other nations made the possession of a passport a practical necessity for American travelers. Since 1941, the federal government has required every American citizen who leaves the United States to have a valid passport (with certain exceptions as to destination). Although the World War I regulations requiring passports were not in effect during the 1920s and 30s, the visa requirements of many other nations made the possession of a passport a practical necessity for American travelers. Since 1941, the federal government has required every American citizen who leaves the United States to have a valid passport (with certain exceptions as to destination).

Until World War I, passports issued to American travelers were primarily certificates of citizenship and a guarantee that diplomatic agents abroad would extend protection to its bearer. Early passports were often issued by the Secretary of State in Washington, D.C., but also by consuls, governors of the states, other local authorities (the mayor of New Orleans issued passports as late as 1899), and even by notaries. It was not uncommon for peddlers in the larger cities in the United States to issue passports or "certificates of legitimation," that passed as passports to the unwary.

Given the experience of a nearly passport-less society for two and one half centuries (1650-1900), there seems little reason to believe there would be any legitimate market demand for routine international identification papers in a world without States. After all, even today, we don't need a passport to cross local state borders or take up residence in a new state. If the system works domestically, it could work internationally. If there were a demand for internationally recognized identification papers, private agencies or service bureaus, operating as adjuncts to insurance companies or defense services, would undoubtedly spring up to furnish them. They would probably issue certificates, something akin to the statist passport of today—a document featuring the photograph of the bearer, as well as his name and address. Such a certificate might have its authenticity guaranteed by the signature of one of the officers of the issuing agency, much as signatures are guaranteed today in commercial transactions and on contracts, by a signature guarantor at a bank.

The one thing that private passport agencies could not do would be to use their documents to restrict travel privileges, which is how nation-states have used the compulsory passport during most of the last four hundred years. Passports were instituted in France prior to the Revolution in order to control the movement of certain classes of people, like vagrants, to whom they were issued in order to enable them to return to their country of origin. They were also issued to French artisans who wished to leave the country. Those who conceivably could carry off trade secrets were denied them. In the German states, special passports were required for those citizens who were capable of military service (in order to prevent desertion and enlistment in foreign armies), for those leaving quarantine areas during epidemics, and for Jews traveling throughout the country. Soon after the Revolution in France (1792), a strict system of passport control was instituted, even though the Constitution of 1791 declared complete freedom of transit as one of the natural rights of man. The menace of political emigration, of desertion from the army, and flight abroad led the National Assembly to prohibit all persons without passports from traveling in France, and entering or departing the country. Subsequent laws of 1795 and 1795 confirmed these prohibitions and soon all the countries of Europe, with the exception of England, Sweden, and Norway, adopted the French system. It was in this manner, that the passport, which originally was a "discretionary document granted at the request of travelers in order to insure their protection, or at most, a document required only of certain classes of people, was transformed into a compulsory official paper limiting individual freedom and imposed upon all solely in the interest of the State."

Behind the idea of the passport and citizenship is the concept of allegiance. According to the State, each and every citizen has obligations: to obey the law, to pay taxes, and to serve militarily as required by law. The roots of American citizenship may be traced back to English feudal law. The ancient English tradition—"Once an Englishman, always an Englishman!"—was known as the doctrine of perpetual or indelible allegiance. As it prevailed in the 17th and early 18th centuries, this ideology was in many ways one of the most powerful and totalitarian expressions of the nation-state in the West. As far as the individual Englishmen were concerned, he was considered to owe allegiance

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Conflicts of Allegiance
By Carl Watner

THE TREE OF LIBERTY is a collection of some 400 documents from American history, inquiring into the legal, social, and psychological background of political rebellion, political crime, and their causes, suppression and punishment by the statist authorities in the area now controlled by the central government of the United States. Although there are only a few documents of major interest to voluntaryists, the extensive editorial introductions and observations accompanying the text merit attention.

The primary theme I should like to address here is the one labelled by the editors as “conflicts of allegiance.” (p. xii) They note that WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY first defined “political crime” or “political criminals” in 1979: “one involved or charged…with acts against the government or political system.” The problem with this definition, as the editors observe, is that an individual may commit acts of violence against the State or break one or more of its statutory laws “out of political motivations but be relegated to the status of common criminal by the government.” Others, while professing their loyalty to the government, may be subjected to criminal sanctions “because the government perceives his status or professed ideals as inimical to its interests.” (p. xliii)

The editors believe that the concept of politically motivated acts of criminality is a legitimate one, but they are unable to offer a clear-cut pattern to identify them. They seem to understand that allowing the government to define crimes against itself is like allowing the fox to guard the hen house. Behind their hesitation is the implicit realization that nothing would be right by political enactment, if some things were not right by nature. What is of particular interest is that the editors realize American history, since its very inception, is one unbroken record of labeling any serious challenge to governmental authority as criminal or traitorous. They write that American law over the years has responded vigorously to confusions of allegiance, from treason and sedition to the education of blacks, from the advocacy of anarchy to voting by women, from office-holding by communists to picketing and striking by workers, from interstate and international travel by dissidents and subversives and continued residence by suspect aliens and citizens. Diverse mechanisms and criminal or quasi-criminal sanctions for the control of political offenses and the punishment of political offenders likewise have been established. Federal and state laws have relied not only on penal sanctions but also on loyalty oaths, security investigations, the exclusion and expulsion of politically suspect aliens, the calling up of the military, the imposition of martial law, and the confinement of suspect populations in special camps as tools to maintain political order. (p. xii)

Although they document a number of the statutory laws and court cases dealing with these governmentally defined offenses, it would have been more interesting had they included a list of crimes committed by or on the behalf of the United States government against people living under its jurisdiction. A partial list can be constructed from the documents included in this book: (the colonial laws against individual purchase of land from the Indians, the beginnings of statutory law sanctioning black chattel slavery, the annihilation and removal of the Cherokee Indians from their tribal lands, the imposition of military government in Hawaii, and the internment of Japanese nationals during World War II). Other statist crimes, which come readily to mind, are not cataloged: the war against Mormon polygamy, the imposition of taxation, especially the federal income tax in 1913, the confiscation of gold in 1933, and all the many crimes committed under the guise of national emergencies during wartime (beginning during the Revolutionary War, and extending through the War of 1812, the Mexican War of 1848, the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, World War I, World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the “War” on Poverty, and now the “War Against Drugs”).

In defense of the editors, they did write that the United States central government has all sorts of “skeletons in its closet,” and quoted from Charles Tilly’s essay in VIOLENCE IN AMERICA, to the effect that “Western civilization and violence have always been close partners. Historically, collective violence has flowed regularly out of the central political processes of Western countries.” (p. xxxix) In another pertinent commentary, they also note that “political disorder in this country has usually been directed to modifying the use of power by government, not overthrowing it.” By confining the paradigm of debate to the notion that “it is not the government’s structure but its abusers that must be guarded against,” the government has protected itself against public dissatisfaction. We get the “evil” men out of office, but never rid ourselves of the structure itself. Thus much of the political activity in America “has taken the form of action by one group of citizens against another group rather than by citizens against the State.” (p. xiv)

Two of the three most interesting documents in this collection deal with the pacifist resistance to World War I. John Haynes Holmes was a minister of the Community Church of New York from 1907 to 1949. In 1917, the eve of World War I, and again in 1941, in the immediate aftermath of Pearl Harbor, “he reaffirmed his unwavering opposition to all wars.” “Recognizing that statements of this kind, made on the eve of War, seem to many persons to be treasonable,” Holmes insisted, nevertheless, that “the whole fabric of democracy is threatened by war, conscription, the national war fever, and the ‘orgy of bigotry, intolerance, and persecution for Americanism’ not seen since the days of the Salem witches.” In his May, 1917 “A Statement to My People on the Eve of War,” Holmes stated that

...War is in open and utter violation of Christianity. If war is right, then Christianity is wrong, false, a lie. If Christianity is right, then war is wrong, false, a lie. ...

But I must go farther—I must not speak only of war in general, but of this war in particular. Most persons are quite ready to agree, especially in these times of peace, that war is wrong. But let war a cloud no bigger than a man’s hand, appear on the horizon of the nation’s life, and they straightway begin to qualify their judgement, and if the war cloud grows until it covers all the heavens, they finally reverse it. This brings the curious situation of all war being wrong in general, and each war being right in particular. ...(p. 293)

The other text dealing with World War I is a selection from the writings of Ammon Hennacy, a socialist-anarchist (with some individualist leanings) who opposed the war “as being contrary to his socialist political beliefs. He refused to register for the draft and was imprisoned in Atlanta for speaking out in opposition [to the war].” Hennacy’s resolve was strengthened after a cell mate showed him a newspaper article in which a reporter asked his mother if she was not afraid that he might be shot as a penalty for his conscientious objection. ‘Her reply was that the only thing...
she was afraid of was that they [the authorities] might scare me to give in." [p. 294] The Henncay excerpt also includes his definition of an anarchist as "one who doesn't have to have a cop to make him behave."

The THEOLOGY OF LIBERTY also documents some of the political resistance to the United States' war in Vietnam. An article entitled "The Ultra Resistance" deals with the cases of draft record destruction and draft card burning during the 1960s. While the discussion of civil disobedience and its justification is very spotty (THEOLOGY OF LIBERTY does not include any excerpts from Thoreau's essay "On the Duty of Civil Disobedience"), one very interesting letter appears concerning the significance of the U.S. War Crimes Tribunal's decision in Nuremberg after World War II. The author, John Fried, had been special legal consultant to the American judges at Nuremberg and held a number of other highly ranked legal positions. He explained that it is "the moral choice of the individual that counts. Obedience to the higher, the world order, is more important. He should feel that, and always endeavor not to violate it." Fried elaborated by quoting from the Judgement of the TRIAL OF MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS...Nuremberg. 1945/6: "The very essence of the [Nuremberg] Charter is that individuals have international duties which transcend the national obligations of obedience imposed by the individual's state." [p. 528]

Here is one example of the serious conflicts of allegiance created by statism. The Nuremberg decision clearly recognized that there are duties owed to humanity over and above one's obligation to obey local state law. The problem is that while one is subject to the jurisdiction of one's local State, one is also subject to its sanctions. In many countries, the death penalty or years of labor service in concentration camps is meted out that political State has many different sanctions, the least of which seems sound as a nut and in which I could find no defect. Although the results have not always been as deadly or dastardly in the United States, such "political" offenders have usually been punished in this country. Nor have such offenses in America been limited to direct action against the government. Often the failure to act as directed by a positive law has constituted a crime in and of itself. Pacifists, refusers of loyalty oaths, non-tax filers have all shared the odium of being persecuted for something they did not do. The editors point out that political offenses in the United States have also been defined on the basis of "nothing more than the very act of being. Singled out on the basis of gender, color, race, ethnicity, or nationality, some populations were selected for adverse treatment—through criminal or other state sanctions—because of their perceived collective threat. Native Americans, blacks, women, and Japanese-Americans thus became political offenders by virtue of their nature rather than their deeds." [p. xli]

The political State has many different sanctions, the least of which is direct physical action involving capital or corporal punishment, restraint of liberty, fines, and confiscation. Exclusion, expulsion, exile, curfews, withholding of passports, use of injunctions and legal restraining orders, and licensing regulations are all tools of the coercive State. The State will even go so far as making seemingly innocuous activities criminal. At times during American history, the education of blacks has been prohibited, the distribution of abolitionist literature has been illegal, it has been a crime to display the "Red" flag, and against the laws to own certain forms of precious metals. The concept of political crimes (by which we generally mean acts against the political system to which one allegedly owes allegiance) can arise only in a statist context. There are a whole variety of religious, cultural, institutional, familial, and territorial loyalties which claim our allegiance, but those claims are of a voluntary nature. A person may withdraw his consent or give his consent simultaneously to two or more groups without any inherent conflict of interest. However, when a political system holds a person duty bound to obey, one is "obligated" to obey, regardless of one's other beliefs and commitments. Hence, there can arise a conflict of allegiance between one's voluntarily assumed loyalties and those imposed by the State. When the obligations of paying taxes or serving militarily conflict with one's conscience, one is honor bound to resolve the issue.

The early Stoics pointed out the voluntaryist solution to this impasse. They observed that most citizens obey the law, not necessarily because they think it is right, but rather because they think it is right to obey. The State would have us believe that without statist law, there would be no order. The Stoics saw through this myth of lawlessness. Selective disobedience to State laws does not lead to chaos and disorder. Rather the Stoics urged us to defy tyrants and consider the content of the laws: "If the government directed them to do something that their reason opposed, they were to defy the government. If it told them to do something their reason would have told them to do anyhow, they did not need a government."

But Shakespeare, perhaps, provided us with the soundest voluntaryist method of resolving all conflicts of allegiance:

"This above all—to thine own self be true.
And it must follow as the night the day,
Thou canst not be false to any man."

—Hamlet, I, iii.

Isaiah's Job

By Albert J. Nock

One evening last autumn, I sat long hours with a European acquaintance while he expounded a politico-economic doctrine which seemed sound as a nut and in which I could find no defect. At the end, he said with great earnestness: "I have a mission to the masses. I feel that I am called to get the ear of the people. I shall devote the rest of my life to spreading my doctrine far and wide among the populace. What do you think?"

An embarrassing question in any case, and doubly so under the circumstances, because my acquaintance is a very learned man, one of the three or four really first-class minds that Europe produced in his generation; and naturally I, as one of the unlearned, was inclined to regard his slightest word with reverence amounting to awe...

I referred him to the story of the prophet Isaiah. ...I shall paraphrase the story in our common speech since it has to be placed out from various sources. The prophet's career began at the end of King Uzziah's reign, say about 740 B.C. This reign was uncommonly long, almost half a century, and apparently prosperous. It was one of those prosperous reigns, however—like the reign of Marcus Aurelius at Rome, or the administration of Eubulus at Athens, or of Mr. Coolidge at Washington—where at the end the prosperity suddenly peters out and things go by the board with a resounding crash.

In the year of Uzziah's death, the Lord commissioned the prophet to go out and warn the people of the wrath to come. "Tell them what a worthless lot they are." He said. "Tell them what is wrong, and why, and what is going to happen unless they have a change of heart and straighten up. Don't mince matters. Make it clear that they are positively down to their last chance. Give it to them good and strong and keep on giving it to them. I suppose perhaps I ought to tell you," He added, "that it won't do any good. The official class and their intelligentsia will turn up their noses at you, and the masses will not even listen. They will all keep on in their own ways until they carry everything down to destruction, and you will probably be lucky if you get out with your life."

Isaiah had been very willing to take on the job—in fact, he had asked for it—but the prospect put a new face on the situation. It raised the obvious question: Why, if all that were so—if the enterprise were to be a failure from the start—was there any sense in starting it?

"Ah," the Lord said, "you do not get the point. There is a Remnant there that you know nothing about. There are obscure, unorganized, inarticulate, each one rubbing along as best he can.

"For business purposes the boundaries that separate one nation from another are no more real than the equator. ...[T]hey do not define business requirements or consumer trends."

—Robert B. Reich, THE NEXT AMERICAN FRONTIER, 1983
They need to be encouraged and braced up because when everything has gone completely to the dogs, they are ones who will come back and build up a new society. "The job of looking after the Remnant is to take care of the Remnant, so be off now and set about it."...

What do we mean by the masses, and what by the Remnant? As the word masses is commonly used, it suggests agglomerations of poor and underprivileged people, laboring people, proletarians. But it means nothing like that; it means simply the majority. The mass man is one who has neither the force of intellect to apprehend the principles issuing in what we know as the humane life, nor the force of character to adhere to those principles steadily and strictly as laws of conduct: and because such people make up the great, overwhelming majority of mankind, they are called collectively the masses. The line of differentiation between the masses and the Remnant is set invariably by quality, not by circumstance. The Remnant are those who by force of intellect are able to apprehend these principles, and by force of character are able, at least measurably, to cleave to them. The masses are those who are unable to do neither.

The picture which Isaiah presents of the Judean masses is most unfavorable. In his view, the mass man—be he high or be he lowly, rich or poor, prince or pauper—gets off very badly. He appears as not only weak-minded and weak-willed, but as by consequence knavish, arrogant, grasping, dissipated, unprincipled, unscrupulous. ...

As things now stand, Isaiah's job seems rather to go begging. Everyone with a message nowadays is, like my venerable European friend, eager to take it to the masses. His first, last, and only thought is of mass-acceptance and mass-approval. His great care is to put his doctrine in such shape as will capture the masses' attention and interest. ...

The main trouble with this (mass-man approach) is its reaction upon the mission itself. It necessitates an opportunistic sophistication of one's doctrine, which profoundly alters its character and reduces it to a mere placebo. If, say, you are a preacher, you wish to attract as large a congregation as you can, which means an appeal to the masses; and this in turn, means adapting the terms of your message to the order of intellect and character that the masses exhibit. If you are an educator, say with a college on your hands, you wish to get as many students as possible, and you whittle down your requirements accordingly. If a writer, you aim at getting many readers; if a publisher, many purchasers; if a philosopher, many disciples; if a reformer, many converts; if a musician, many auditors; and so on. But as we see on all sides, in the realization of these several desires the prophetic message is so heavily adulterated with frivolities, in every instance, that its effect on the masses is merely to harden them in their sins. Meanwhile, the Remnant, aware of this adulteration and of the desires that prompt it, turn their backs on the prophet and will have nothing to do with him or his message. Isaiah, on the other hand, worked under no such disabilities. He preached to the masses only in the sense that he preached publicly. Anyone who liked might listen; anyone who liked might pass by. He knew that the Remnant would listen. ...

The Remnant want only the best you have, whatever that may be. Give them that, and they are satisfied; you have nothing more to worry about. ...

In a sense, nevertheless, as I have said, it is not a rewarding job. ...A prophet of the Remnant will not grow purse-proud on the financial returns from his work, nor is it likely that he will get quite run out of it. Isaiah's case was exceptional to this second rule, and there are others—but not many. It may be thought, then, that while taking care of the Remnant is no doubt a good job, it is not an especially interesting job because it is as a rule so poorly paid. I have my doubts about this. There are other compensations to be got out of a job besides money and notoriety, and some of them seem substantial enough to be attractive. Many jobs which do not pay well are yet profoundly interesting, as, for instance, the job of the research student in the sciences is said to be; and the job of looking after the Remnant seems to me, as I have surveyed it for many years from my seat in the grandstand, to be as interesting as any that can be found in the world.

What chiefly makes it so, I think, is that in any given society the Remnant are always so largely an unknown quantity. You do not know, and will never know, more than two things about them. You can be sure of those—dead sure, as our phrase is—but you will never be able to make even a respectable guess at anything else. You do not know, and will never know, who the Remnant are, nor where they are, nor how many of them there are, nor what they are doing or will do. Two things you know, and no more: first, that they exist; second that they will find you. Except for these two certainties, working for the Remnant means working in impenetrable darkness; and this, I should say, is just the condition calculated most effectively to parch the interest of any prophet who is properly gifted with the imagination, insight, and intellectual curiosity necessary to a successful pursuit of his trade.

The fascination as well as the despair—of the historian, as he looks back upon Isaiah's Jewry, upon Plato's Athens, or upon Rome of the Antonines, is the hope of discovering and laying bare the "substratum of right-thinking and well-doing" which he knows must have existed somewhere in those societies because no kind of collective life can possibly go on without it. He finds tantalizing intimations of it here and there in many places, as in the Greek Anthology, in the scrapbook of Aulus Gellius, in the poems of Ausonius, and in the brief and touching tribute, Bene merenti, bestowed upon the unknown occupants of Roman tombs. But these are vague and fragmentary; and lead him nowhere in his search for some kind of measure of this substratum, but merely testify to what he already knew a priori—that the substratum did somewhere exist. Where it was, how substantial it was, what its power of self-assertion and resistance was—of all this they tell him nothing.

Similarly, when the historian of two thousand years hence, or two hundred years, looks over the available testimony to the quality of our civilization and tries to get any kind of clear, comprehensive picture concerning the substratum of right-thinking and well-doing which he knows must have been there, he will have a devil of a time finding it. When he has assembled all he can get and has made a minimum allowance for speciousness, vagueness, and confusion of motive, he will sadly acknowledge that his net result is simply nothing. A Remnant were here, building a substratum like coral insects; so much he knows, but he will find nothing to put him on the track of who and where and how many they were and what their work was like.

The historian of the present is faced with a like problem. He present is faced with a problem precisely as much and as little as the historian of the future; and that, I repeat, is what makes his job seem to me so profoundly interesting. One of the most suggestive episodes recounted in the Bible is that of a prophet's attempt—the only attempt of that kind on record. I believe—to count up the Remnant. Elijah had fled from persecution into the desert, where the Lord presently
overhauled him and asked what he was doing so far away from his job. He said that he was running away, not because he was a coward, but because all the Remnant had been killed off except himself. He had got away only by the skin of his teeth, he said, being now all the Remnant there was, if he were killed the true Faith would go flat. The Lord replied that he need not worry about that, for even without him the True Faith could probably manage to squeeze along somehow if it had to; and as for your figures on the Remnant, he said, "I don't mind telling you that there are seven thousand of them back there in Israel whom it seems you have not heard of, but you may take My word for it that there they are."

At that time, probably the population of Israel could not have run to much more than a million or so; and a Remnant of seven thousand out of a million is a highly encouraging percentage for any prophet. With seven thousand of the boys on his side, there was no great reason for Elijah to feel lonesome; and incidentally, that would be something for the modern prophet of the Remnant to think of when he has a touch of the blues. But the main point is that if Elijah the Prophet could not make a closer guess on the number of the Remnant than he made when he missed it by seven thousand, anyone else who tackled the problem would only waste his time.

The other certainty which the prophet of the Remnant may always have is that the Remnant will find him. He may rely on that with absolute assurance. They will find him without his doing anything about it; in fact, if he tries to do anything about it, he is pretty sure to put them off. He does not need to advertise for them nor resort to any schemes of publicity to get their interest. "If a writer, he need not make a point of attending any pink teas, autographing books at wholesale, nor entering into any specious freemasonry with reviewers."

All this and much more of the same order lies in the regular and necessary routine laid down for the prophet of the masses. It is, and must be, part of the great general technique of getting the mass-man's ear—or as our vigorous and excellent publicist, Mr. H. L. Mencken, puts it, the technique of bob-bumping. The prophet of the Remnant is not bound to this technique. He may be quite sure that the Remnant will make their own way to him without any adventitious aids; and not only so, but if they find him employing such aids, as I said, it is ten to one that they will smell a rat in them and will sheer off.

The certainty that the Remnant will find him, however, leaves the prophet as much in the dark as ever, as helpless as ever in the matter of putting any estimate of any kind upon the Remnant; for, as appears in the case of Elijah, he remains ignorant of who they are that have found him or where they are or how many. They do not write in and tell him about it, after the manner of those who admire the vedettes of Hollywood, nor yet do they seek him out and attach themselves to his person. They are not that kind. They take his message much as drivers take the directions on a roadside signboard—that is, with very little thought about the signboard, beyond being gratefully glad that it happened to be there, but with very serious thought about the directions.

This impersonal attitude of the Remnant wonderfully enhances the interest of the imaginative prophet’s job. Once in a while, just about often enough to keep his intellectual curiosity in good working order, he will quite accidentally come upon some distinct reflection of his own message in an unsuspected quarter. This enables him to entertain himself in his leisure moments with agreeable speculations about the course his message may have taken in reaching that particular quarter, and about what came of it after it got there. Most interesting of all those instances, if one could only run them down (but one may always speculate about them), where the recipient himself no longer knows where nor when nor from whom he got the message—or even where, as sometimes happens, he has forgotten that he got it anywhere and imagines that it is all a self-sprung idea of his own.

Such instances as these are probably not infrequent, for, without presuming to enroll ourselves among the Remnant, we can all no doubt remember having found ourselves suddenly under the influence of an idea, the source of which he cannot possibly identify. "It came to us afterward," as we say; that is, we are aware of it only after it has shot up full-grown in our minds, leaving us quite ignorant of how and when and by what agency it was planted there and left to germinate. It seems highly probable that the prophet's message often takes some such course with the Remnant.

If, for example, you are a writer or a speaker or a preacher, you put forth an idea which lodges in the Unbewusstsein of a casual member of the Remnant and sticks fast there. For some time it is inert; then it begins to fret and fester until presently it invades the man's conscious mind, and as one might say, corrupts it. Meanwhile, he has quite forgotten how he came by the idea in the first instance, and even perhaps thinks he has invented it: and in those circumstances, the most interesting thing of all is that you will never know what the pressure of the idea will make him do.


Voluntary Musings
A Column of Iconoclasms

By Charles Curley

"Nothing can defeat an idea—except a better one."
--Eric Frank Russell

"The more prohibitions there are, the poorer the people become."
"The more sharp weapons there are, the more prevailing chaos there is in the state."
"The more skills of technique, the more cunning things are produced."
"The greater the number of statutes, the greater the number of thieves and brigands."

Lao Tse (604-524 B.C.)

What If They had a War on Drugs and Nobody Came: The "War on Drugs" has had all the success of its predecessor "noble experiment", (Prohibition): zip. Its proponents are getting nervous, and desperate. In April, 1988, Mr. Ed Meese proposed a new effort: to spray vast areas of Peru with a powerful herbicide, tebuthuron, or Spike, made by the Eli Lilly company. This proposal—a Vietnam war disaster warmed over—raised the inevitable squawks from environmentalists, agricultural experts
American employees subject to brutal retribution from the government are selling under the table some products of the company on which hard work and long hours make him or her happy. Contrariwise, if you are looking for shorter hours and longer vacations and early retirement, you are in the wrong job. Perhaps you need to take up bank robbing. Or geeking in a sideshow. Or even politics."

—Robert Heinlein
To Sail Beyond the Sunset, 1987

International Trade: The Honda Motor Company, a Japanese company, is selling Honda motorcars in Japan. This is no big deal, until you realize that the cars they are selling are being made in the U.S. They have now taken to selling American made Hondas in Korea as well, to get around Korean restrictions on Japanese made cars. Where there’s a market, there’s a way.

Old Business: It is common among free marketeers to assert that the joint stock company form of economic association was invented in Holland to finance expeditions to the East Indies. The form was used in the 17th century to great effect by both Dutch and English investors. However, they weren’t the first. An earlier joint stock company Stora Kopparberg (Great Copper Mountain) in Sweden has just celebrated its 700th anniversary.

On 16 June 1288, according to a local story, a sheepskin parchment, Bishop Peter of Vaesteraas, bought back a share in a copper mine which he had sold some five years earlier. This is the first recorded mention of Stora Kopparberg, a mine in the town of Falun which later supplied copper for the roofs of the cathedrals of Europe and the bottoms of its ships.

The mine was operated as a business enterprise from its earliest recorded mention. Bishop Peter was able to buy and sell his share, so the other Swedish aristocrats could also trade their shares. In 1347, King Magnus Eriksson laid down the conditions under which the mine was to be worked in a royal charter. Master miners could hire other miners, and held shares in the mine. They could not monopolize the business (the first anti-trust law?). By 1650, there were 1,200 shares, held by 600 or 700 master miners. Also at that time there were some 100 smelting businesses in the town of Falun, all privately held.

In 1687, the mountain collapsed from all the tunneling, leaving a hole 90 meters deep. Mining continued, and today the pit is a 165-meter hole in the ground. In 1756, the mountain was mined for 200 years, and today the pit is 300 meters deep. The pit was the site this year of the town of Falun, all privately held.

The following individuals have helped assure the publication of Bob LeFevre’s biography. They deserve many thanks. The book may be ordered from The Voluntaryists for $14.95 postpaid.

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Worth Pondering: “Happiness lies in being privileged to work hard for long hours in doing whatever you think is worth doing.

One man may find happiness in supporting a wife and children. Another may find it in robbing banks. Still another may labor mightily for years in pursuing pure research with no discernable result.

“Note the individual and subjective nature of each case. No two are alike, and there is no reason to expect them to be. Each man or woman must find for him or herself that occupation in which hard work and long hours make him or her happy. Contrariwise, if you are looking for shorter hours and longer vacations and early retirement, you are in the wrong job. Perhaps you need to take up bank robbing. Or geeking in a sideshow. Or even politics.”

Lao Tse (604-524 B.C.)

When the government is lazy and dull, Its people are unspoiled;
When the government is efficient and smart, Its people are discontented.”

Lao Tse (604-524 B.C.)

Bioprivacy: Congress is now considering a law to make it illegal to sell human tissues. This will effectively make it impossible to use human tissue for biotechnology research. But the ethical question is not: who may use what for biotechnology research? Rather, the question is: who owns your body, including its components. The government can nationalize your body (if not your mind): it’s called the draft. If this nonsense passes, not only can they nationalize it when they want to, but you won’t be able to sell bits and pieces of it when you want to.

This also fits into recent efforts to ban surrogate motherhood. In addition to the issue of bioprivacy, this question also has to do with the unwillingness of some surrogates to give up the child upon birth, i.e., their refusal to deliver on their part of a contract. This proposed ban is even more insulting to women: its proponents argue, in effect, that a woman is incompetent to make and keep a contract, so, as with imbeciles and children, we won’t let them.

Don’t commit suicide: it’s illegal to destroy government property.
Gilbertian Recipe for a Politician

Take a recipe now for that clot of inanity
Known as the party political man:
From semi-humanity drain off the sanity,
Dress it in vanity, stuff it with bran:
Add a voice like a radio (nobody listening),
Gobbledygookery, dull as a ditch
(No more to the point than a bull at a christening),
Drone on — What is he, Labour or which?
The mind of a Marx (it is Groucho I'm thinking of),
Greedily for power that he longs to be stinking of,
Burning to build up an Orwell's Big Brotherland,
Yearning to sit for his portrait (not Sutherland!),
Form of a Goering — face of a sphinx —
Pond of conferring (to learn what he thinks)—
Leach from these elements all that is soluble,
Toss in a lump of the valueless voluble,
Pour off the liquid and store it in kegs,
And a party political man is the drengi

J.A. Lindon
A Choice of Comic and Curious Verse
J.M. Cohen. Ed.

"Make Haste Slowly"

You cannot make a hen hatch her eggs in less than three weeks, do what you will. ...The more haste the less speed. I have had proof of this more than once in my own experience. I once lived in a house terrible infested with rats. ...One night I heard a great splash in the water tub. That's a rat and I hastened to kill the creature at once. When the rat saw me it made an extra spring and cleared the tub. I was in such a hurry to kill it that I saved its life. When I got to it, it was drowning itself as nicely as possible, and if I had had the patience to wait it would have been dead in ten minutes. ...It may be now living and may have bred a 100 rats since then and all because I would not let it die in peace. ...There is vermin and rats everywhere, in the Church, and State. And 't is right to try and kill them off. But we had better go to work carefully. We cannot put things right instantly. And when wicked laws, or vicious principles, have received their death blow, we had better give them time to die in quiet. In no case should we resort to violence.


Exit Option

Continued from page 1

from the moment of his birth. In England, a person could not renounce his citizenship except by permission from the king in Parliament. It was the basis of all rights and duties and extended to the person in question the privilege of owning real property. Property ownership was not an inherent right as evidenced by the fact that aliens residing in England could not own land, and what land they did acquire or use was held only at the sufferance of the king.

In the United States, the development of citizenship and allegiance largely followed English law, though disputes arose as to whether British subjects could discharge their allegiance by becoming American citizens. This was one of the causes of the War of 1812. British seamen, due to the rigors of the Royal Navy, increasingly sought the protection of the American flag by taking out naturalization papers in the United States. Although Britain never claimed the right to impress native-born Americans or to search American-flagged vessels, there were numerous instances of British captains forcibly kidnapping "deserters" off American ships. From 1809 to 1811, between 750 and 1000 men each year were captured by the Royal Navy. Some of these men held dual citizenship, having been born British and then undergone U.S. naturalization. The issue was not ultimately resolved until the British Naturalization Act of 1870, by which British subjects were able to renounce their citizenship, apart from an act of Parliament.

Are voluntaryists citizens of the United States of America? What are the requirements and obligations of citizenship? The last act of an alien before acquiring United States citizenship is the recitation of the following oath:

I hereby declare on oath that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty of whom or which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen, that I will support and defend the Constitution and the laws of the U.S.A. against all enemies, foreign and domestic, that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I will bear arms in behalf of the U.S. when required by law; or that I will perform non-combatant service in the armed forces of the U.S. when required by law; or that I will perform work of national importance under civilian direction when required by the law; and that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; So help me God!

Could you, in good conscience, accept these demands?

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Propaganda, American-style

Continued from page 8

there's even a name for the erosion of belief. It's called the "Vietnam Syndrome." a grave disease in the eyes of America's elites because people understand too much.

All of this falls under Walter Lippmann's notion of "the manufacture of consent." Democracy permits the voice of the people to be heard, and it is the task of the intellectual to ensure that this voice endorses what leaders perceive to be the right course. Propaganda is to democracy what violence is to totalitarianism. The techniques have been honed to a high art in the U.S. and elsewhere, far beyond anything that Orwell dreamed of. The device of feigned dissent (as practiced by the Vietnamese "doves," who criticized the war on the grounds of effectiveness and not principle) is one of the more subtle means, though simple lying and suppressing fact and other crude techniques are also highly effective.

For those who stubbornly seek freedom around the world, there can be no more urgent task than to come to understand the mechanisms and practices of indoctrination. These are easy to perceive in the totalitarian societies, much less so in the propaganda system to which we are subjected and in which all too often we serve as willing or unwitting instruments.

[Noam Chomsky is a linguistics professor at MIT. This essay has been excerpted from an article that appeared in UTNE READER, Sept./Oct. 1988 (1624 Harmon Place, Minneapolis, Minn. 55403, $24 yearly).]

"In a State in which the government cannot control the people by force, it better control what they think."

—Noam Chomsky
Propaganda, American-style
Noam Chomsky

Pointing to the massive amounts of propaganda spewed by governments and institutions around the world, observers have called our era the age of Orwell. But the fact is that Orwell was a latecomer on the scene. As early as World War I, American historians offered themselves to President Woodrow Wilson to carry out a task they called "historical engineering," by which they meant designing the facts of history so that they would serve state policy. In this instance, the U.S. government wanted to silence opposition to the war. This represents a version of Orwell's 1984, even before Orwell was writing.

In 1921 the famous American journalist Walter Lippmann said that the art of democracy requires what he called the "manufacture of consent." This phrase is an Orwellian euphemism for thought control. The idea is that in a state such as the U.S. where the government can't control the people by force, it had better control what they think. The Soviet Union is at the opposite end of the spectrum from us in its domestic freedoms. It's essentially a country run by the bludgeon. It's very easy to determine what propaganda is in the USSR: what the state produces is propaganda.

In totalitarian societies where there's a Ministry of Truth, propaganda doesn't really try to control your thoughts. It just gives you the party line. It says, "Here's the official doctrine; don't disobey and you won't get in trouble. What you think is not of great importance to anyone. If you get out of line we'll do something to you because we have force.'

Democratic societies can't work like that, because the state is much more limited in its capacity to control behavior by force. Since the voice of the people is allowed to speak out, those in power better control what that voice says—in other words, control what people think.

One of the ways to do this is to create political debate that appears to embrace many opinions, but actually stays within very narrow margins. You have to make sure that both sides in the debate accept certain assumptions—and that those assumptions are the basis of the propaganda system. As long as everyone accepts the propaganda system, then debate is permissible.

If you pick up a book on American history and look at the Vietnam War, there is no such event as the American attack on South Vietnam. For the past 22 years, I have searched in vain for even a single reference in mainstream journalism or scholarship to an "American invasion of South Vietnam" or American "aggression" in South Vietnam. In the American doctrinal system, there is no such event. It's out of history, down Orwell's memory hole. If the U.S. were a totalitarian state, the Ministry of Truth would simply have said, "It's right for us to go into Vietnam. Don't argue with it." People would have recognized that as the propaganda system, and they would have gone on thinking whatever they wanted. They could have plainly seen that we were attacking Vietnam, just as we can see that the Soviets are attacking Afghanistan.

People are much freer in the U.S., they are allowed to express themselves. That's why it's necessary for those in power to control everyone's thought, to try to make it appear as if the only issues in matters such as U.S. intervention in Vietnam are tactical: Can we get away with it? There is no discussion of right or wrong.

During the Vietnam War, the U.S. propaganda system did its job partially but not entirely. Among educated people it worked very well. Studies show that among the more educated parts of the population, the government's propaganda about the war is now accepted unquestioningly.

One reason that propaganda often works better on the educated than on the uneducated is that educated people read more, so they receive more propaganda. Another is that they have jobs in management, media, and academia and therefore work in some capacity as agents of the propaganda system—and they believe what the system expects them to believe. By and large, they're part of the privileged elite, and share the interests and perceptions of those in power.

On the other hand, the government had problems in controlling the opinions of the general population. According to some of the latest polls, over 70 percent of Americans still thought the war was, to quote the Gallup Poll, "fundamentally wrong and immoral, not a mistake.'

Due to the widespread opposition to the Vietnam War, the propaganda system lost its grip on the beliefs of many Americans. They grew skeptical about what they were told. In this case Continued page 7